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The
Downfall of Napóleon

His Escape from Elba
The Battle of Waterloo, Captivity in
St. Helena, and Death

From
SIR WALTER SCOTT'S
Life of Napoleon Buonaparte

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INTRODUCTION.

From Sir Walter Scott's *Life of Napoleon* we have extracted, with some slight curtailment, the episode of those famous "Hundred Days" in which the Emperor made his final struggle for power. The Battle of Waterloo, which forms the main incident, has been the theme of much paper warfare. Our great story-teller was sure to make the most of the patriotic and picturesque features; he had the advantage of visiting the field, and of conversing with officers engaged in the battle; and his spirited narrative may be accepted as essentially accurate.

The main story is here introduced by the chapter dealing with Napoleon's life on Elba, and concludes with the account of his last days on St. Helena—the whole completing one of the most romantic and resounding episodes in modern history, which is here prefaced by a brief summary of the previous events in the life of this extraordinary man.

Napoleon Buonaparte was born in 1769 at Ajaccio, the capital of Corsica, which had not long before become a French possession. Educated at the military school of Brienne, he entered the artillery, and first distinguished

himself at the siege of Toulon, occupied by the English. He had witnessed, rather critically than enthusiastically, the early excesses of the Revolution; then in 1795 he was the first officer to succeed by force of arms in repressing the turbulent Parisian mob. This exploit having brought him into notice, he was appointed to command the army of Italy. The hot patriotism of French soldiers had put a fresh spirit into warfare, which, directed by the young general's genius, carried all before it. The Austrians were driven out of Italy by a series of brilliant victories enough to turn the head of their young conqueror. The imagination which made part of his nature led him now to conceive dreams of Eastern adventure; and he next invaded Egypt, as a step towards attacking British India. After a campaign full of dramatic incident, that led to little solid advantage, he suddenly abandoned his army, on hearing that the field of ambition at home was open to a daring adventurer. Reaching Paris, he put down the unpopular Directory by military force, and became henceforth, under one title and another, the virtual ruler of France. Another glorious campaign against Austria confirmed his authority: from First Consul he was made Consul for life; then, in 1804, had himself crowned Emperor by the Pope.

An interval of peace with Great Britain and the other Powers now gave him the opportunity of consolidating his government and establishing French society on a new basis of law and order. But his restless ambition soon

drove him into war again. He collected a great flotilla for the invasion of England, which, however, proved impracticable; so he once more turned his armies against the Continent. Austria, Prussia, and Russia were successively humbled by the famous battles of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. Italy, Holland, Poland, Sweden, and the Rhine Provinces more or less willingly accepted sovereign rulers from his hand. He was not so fortunate in an attempt to subdue Spain and Portugal, where a British army held out against his lieutenants, finally to drive them back across the Pyrenees. But while Wellington remained a sore thorn in his side here, and while Britannia ruled the waves, Napoleon could look on himself as master of the greater part of Europe. The seal seemed to be set on his triumphs when, having divorced his first wife, Josephine Beauharnais, as childless, he married Maria Louisa of Austria, a princess of the proudest of royal houses.

But, at the zenith of his power, he was tempted to strain it too far. Russia proving not subservient enough to carry out his system of closing the Continent to English commerce, in 1812 he declared war against that country, which he invaded with an army half a million strong. It is well known how in the flames of Moscow he met a fatal check, and how, of that vast host, scarcely a twentieth part came back, and that in wretched plight. Germany rose behind them, and next year Napoleon had to face a formidable coalition formed by his late vassals.

Even against such odds he made a brave fight, but in the great "Battle of Nations", at Leipsic, was completely defeated. France, in turn, found herself invaded on the north by the allied forces, on the south by Wellington.

Napoleon still struggled desperately with such raw levies as he could force into service, till Paris fell, when, finding himself at the mercy of his enemies, he abdicated the crown at Fontainebleau. As honourable banishment, the allies bestowed upon him the petty sovereignty of Elba, from which, next year, he escaped to make one final effort to regain the sovereignty of France and Europe, as related in Sir Walter Scott's narrative.



THE FALL OF NAPOLEON.

I.

ELBA.

ELBA, to the limits of which the mighty empire of Napoleon was now contracted, is an island opposite to the coast of Tuscany, about sixty miles in circumference. The air is healthy, excepting in the neighbourhood of the salt-marshes. The country is mountainous, and, having all the florid vegetation of Italy, is, in general, of a romantic character. It produces little grain, but exports a considerable quantity of wines; and its iron ore has been famous since the days of Virgil, who describes Elba as,

"Insula inexhaustis chalybum generosa metallis".

There are also other mineral productions. The island boasts two good harbours, and is liberally productive of vines, olives, fruits, and maize. Perhaps, if an empire could be supposed to exist within such a brief space, Elba possesses as much both of beauty and variety as might constitute the scene of a summer night's dream of sovereignty. Buonaparte seemed to lend himself to the illusion, as, accompanied by Sir Niel Campbell, he rode in his usual exploring mood around the shores of his little state. He did not fail to visit the iron mines, and being informed the annual produce was 500,000 francs, "These then," he said, "are mine." But being reminded that he

had conferred that revenue on the Legion of Honour, he exclaimed, "Where was my head when I gave such a grant! But I have made many foolish decrees of that sort."

One or two of the poorer class of inhabitants knelt, and even prostrated themselves, when they met him. He seemed disgusted, and imputed this humiliating degree of abasement to the wretchedness of their education, under the auspices of the monks. On these excursions he showed the same apprehension of assassination which had marked his journey to Frejus. Two couriers well armed rode before him, and examined every suspicious spot. But as he climbed a mountain above Ferrajo, and saw the ocean approach its feet in almost every direction, the expression broke from him, accompanied with a good-humoured smile, "It must be confessed my isle is very little!"

He professed, however, to be perfectly resigned to his fate; often spoke of himself as a man politically dead, and claimed credit for what he said upon public affairs, as having no remaining interest in them. He professed his intentions were to devote himself exclusively to science and literature. At other times he said he would live in his little island like a justice of peace in a country town in England.

The character of Napoleon, however, was little known to himself, if he seriously thought that his restless and powerful mind could be satisfied with the investigation of abstract truths, or amused by the leisure of literary research. He compared his abdication to that of Charles V., forgetting that the Austrian Emperor's retreat was voluntary, that he had a turn towards mechanical pursuits, and that, even with these means of solace, Charles became discontented with his retirement. The character of Buonaparte was, on the contrary, singularly opposed to a state of seclusion. His propensities continued to be exactly of the same description at Elba, which had so long terrified and disquieted Europe. To change the external face of what was around him; to imagine extensive alterations, without accurately considering the

means by which they were to be accomplished; to work within his petty province such alterations as its limits permitted; to resume, in short, upon a small scale, those changes which he had attempted upon that which was most magnificent; to apply to Elba the system of policy which he had exercised so long in Europe, was the only mode in which he seems to have found amusement and exercise for the impatient energies of a temper accustomed from his early youth to work upon others, but apt to become lethargic, sullen, and discontented when it was compelled, for want of other exercise, to recoil upon itself.

During the first two or three weeks of his residence in the island of Elba, Napoleon had already planned improvements, or alterations and innovations at least, which, had they been to be carried into execution with the means which he possessed, would have perhaps taken his lifetime to execute. It was no wonder, indeed, accustomed as he had been to speak the word, and to be obeyed, and to consider the improvements which he meditated as those which became the head of a great empire, that he should not have been able to recollect that his present operations respected a petty islet, where magnificence was to be limited, not only by utility, but by the want of funds.

In the course of two or three days' travelling, with the same rapidity which characterized his movements in his frequent progresses through France, and showing the same impatience of rest or delay, Napoleon had visited every spot in his little island, mines, woods, salt-marshes, harbours, fortifications, and whatever was worthy of an instant's consideration, and had meditated improvements and innovations respecting every one of them. Till he had done this he was impatient of rest, and having done so, he lacked occupation.

One of his first, and perhaps most characteristic proposals, was to aggrandize and extend his Lilliputian dominions by occupation of an uninhabited island, called Rianosa, which had been left desolate on account of the frequent descents of the corsairs. He sent thirty of his

guards, with ten of the independent company belonging to the island, upon this expedition (what a contrast to those which he had formerly directed!), sketched out a plan of fortifications, and remarked, with complacency, "Europe will say that I have already made a conquest".

In an incredibly short time Napoleon had also planned several roads, had contrived means to convey water from the mountains to Porto Ferrajo, designed two palaces, one for the country, the other in the city, a separate mansion for his sister Pauline, stables for one hundred and fifty horses, a lazaretto, buildings for accommodation of the tunny fishery, and salt-works on a new construction, at Porto Longone. The Emperor of Elba proposed, also, purchasing various domains, and had the price estimated; for the inclination of the proprietor was not reckoned essential to the transaction. He ended by establishing four places of residence in the different quarters of the island; and his amusement consisted in constant change and alteration. He travelled from one to another with the restlessness of a bird in a cage, which springs from perch to perch, since it is prevented from winging the air, its natural element. It seemed as if the magnitude of the object was not so much the subject of his consideration, providing it afforded immediate scope for employing his constant and stimulated desire of activity. He was like the thorough-bred gamester, who, deprived of the means of depositing large stakes, will rather play at small game than leave the table.

Napoleon placed his court also upon an ambitious scale, having more reference to what he had so long been than to what he actually now had been reduced to, while, at the same time, the furniture and internal accommodations of the imperial palace were meaner by far than those of an English gentleman of ordinary rank. The proclamation of the French governor, on resigning his authority to Napoleon, was well and becomingly expressed; but the spiritual mandate of the Vicar-general Arrighi, a relation of Buonaparte's, which was designed to congratulate the people of Elba on becoming the subjects of the Great Napoleon, was extremely ludicrous.

"Elevated to the sublime honour of receiving the anointed of the Lord", he described the exhaustless wealth which was to flow in upon the people from the strangers who came to look upon the hero. The exhortation sounded as if the isle had become the residence of some non-descript animal, which was to be shown for money. —

The interior of Napoleon's household, though reduced to thirty-five persons, still held the titles, and affected the rank, proper to an imperial court, of which it will be presently seen the petty sovereign made a political use. He displayed a national flag, having a red bend dexter in a white field, the bend bearing three bees. To dignify his capital, having discovered that the ancient name of Porto Ferrajo, was Comopoli (*i.e.* the city of Como), he commanded it to be called Cosmopoli, or the city of all nations.

His body-guard, of about 700 infantry and 80 cavalry, seemed to occupy as much of Napoleon's attention as the grand army did formerly. They were constantly exercised, especially in throwing shot and shells; and, in a short time, he was observed to be anxious about obtaining recruits for them. This was no difficult matter, where all the world had so lately been in arms, and engaged in a profession which many, doubtless, for whom a peaceful life had few charms, laid aside with regret, and longed to resume.

As early as the month of July, 1814, there was a considerable degree of fermentation in Italy, to which the neighbourhood of Elba, the residence of several members of the Buonaparte family, and the sovereignty of Murat, occasioned a general resort of Buonaparte's friends and admirers. Every day this agitation increased, and various arts were resorted to for disseminating a prospect of Napoleon's future return to power. Sundry parties of recruits came over to Elba from Italy to enlist in his guards, and two persons employed in this service were arrested at Leghorn, in whose possession were found written lists, containing the names of several hundred persons willing to serve Napoleon.

About the middle of summer, Napoleon was visited by

his mother, and his sister the Princess Pauline. At this time, too, he seems to have expected to be rejoined by his wife, Maria Louisa, who, it was said, was coming to take possession of her Italian dominions. Their separation, with the incidents which happened before Paris, was the only subject on which he appeared to lose temper. Upon these topics he used strong and violent language. He said, that interdicting him intercourse with his wife and son excited universal reprobation at Vienna—that no such instance of inhumanity and injustice could be pointed out in modern times—that the Empress was detained a prisoner, an orderly officer constantly attending upon her—finally, that she had been given to understand before she left Orleans that she was to obtain permission to join him at the island of Elba, though it was now denied her. It was possible, he proceeded, to see a shade of policy, though none whatever of justice, in this separation. Austria had meant to unite the child of her sovereign with the Emperor of France, but was desirous of breaking off the connection with the Emperor of Elba, as it might be apprehended that the respect due to the daughter of the House of Hapsburg would, had she resided with her husband, have reflected too much lustre on the abdicated sovereign.

The Austrian commissioner, General Kohler, on the other hand, insisted that the separation took place by the Empress Maria Louisa's consent, and even at her request; and hinted that Napoleon's desire to have her society was dictated by other feelings than those of domestic affection. But allowing that Napoleon's views in so earnestly desiring the company of his wife might be political, we can see neither justice nor reason in refusing a request, which would have been granted to a felon condemned to transportation.

About the middle of May, Baron Kohler took farewell of Napoleon, to return to Vienna. He was an Austrian general of rank and reputation; a particular friend and old schoolfellow of Prince Schwartzemberg. The scene of Napoleon's parting with this gentleman was quite pathetic on the emperor's side. He wept as he embraced

General Kohler, and entreated him to procure, if possible, his reunion with his wife and child—calling him the preserver of his life—regretted his poverty, which prevented his bestowing on him some valuable token of remembrance—finally, folding the Austrian general in his arms, he held him there for some time, repeating expressions of the warmest attachment. This sensibility existed all upon one side; for an English gentleman who witnessed the scene, having asked Kohler afterwards what he was thinking of while locked in the emperor's embraces—"Of Judas Iscariot", answered the Austrian.

After the departure of Baron Kohler, Colonel Sir Niel Campbell was the only one of the four commissioners who continued to remain at Elba by orders of the British Cabinet. It was difficult to say what his office really was, or what were his instructions. He had neither power, title, nor means to interfere with Napoleon's motions. The emperor had been recognized by a treaty—wise or foolish, it was too late to ask—as an independent sovereign. It was, therefore, only as an envoy that Sir Niel Campbell could be permitted to reside at his court; and as an envoy also, not of the usual character, for settling affairs concerning the court from which he was despatched, but in a capacity not generally avowed—the office, namely, of observing the conduct of that at which he was sent to reside. In fact, Sir Niel Campbell had no direct or ostensible situation whatever, and of this the French minister of Elba soon took advantage. Drouet, the governor of Porto Ferrajo, made such particular inquiries into the character assumed by the British envoy, and the length of his stay, as obliged the latter to say that his orders were to remain in Elba till the breaking up of the congress, which was now settling the affairs of Europe; but if his orders should direct him to continue there after that period, he would apply to have his situation placed on some recognized public footing, which he did not doubt would be respectable.

Napoleon did not oppose or murmur at the continued, though equivocal residence of Sir Niel Campbell at Elba; he affected, on the contrary, to be pleased with it. For a

considerable time, he even seemed to seek the society of the British envoy, held frequent intercourse with him, and conversed with apparent confidence upon public affairs. The notes of such conversations are now before us; and though it is, on the one hand, evident that Napoleon's expressions were arranged, generally speaking, on a premeditated plan, yet, on the other, it is equally certain, that his ardent temperament, when once engaged in discourse, led him to discover more of his own private thoughts than he would, on cool reflection, have suffered to escape him.

On the 16th September, 1814, for example, Sir Niel Campbell had an audience of three hours, during which Napoleon, with his habitual impatience of a sedentary posture, walked from one end of the room to the other, and talked incessantly. He was happy, he said, that Sir Niel remained in Elba, *pour rompre la chimère* (to destroy, namely, the idea, that he, Buonaparte, had further intention of disturbing the peace of Europe). "I think," he continued, "of nothing beyond the verge of my little isles. I could have supported the war for twenty years, if I had chosen. I am now a deceased person, occupied with nothing but my family, my retreat, my house, my cows, and my poultry." He then spoke in the highest terms of the English character, protesting it had always had his sincere admiration, notwithstanding the abuse directed against it in his name. He requested the British envoy to lose no time in procuring him an English grammar.

In the rest of the conversation the Elbese Emperor was probably more serious. He inquired with eagerness after the real state of France. Sir Niel Campbell informed him, that all the information he had been able to collect ascribed great wisdom and moderation to the sovereign and government; but allowed that those who had lost good appointments, the prisoners of war who had returned from abroad, and great part of the army who remained embodied, were still attached to Napoleon. In answer, Buonaparte seemed to admit the stability of the throne, supported as it was by the *maréchaux* and

great officers; but he derided the idea of affording France the benefit of a free constitution. He said, the attempt to imitate that of Great Britain was a farce, a caricature. It was impossible, he observed, to imitate the two Houses of Parliament, for that respectable families, like those composing the aristocracy of England, did not now exist in France. He talked with bitterness of the cession of Belgium, and of France being deprived of Antwerp. He himself spoke, he observed, as a spectator, without hopes or interest, for he had none; but thus to have mortified the French, showed an ignorance of the national character. Their chief feeling was for pride and glory, and the allies need not look forward to a state of satisfaction and tranquillity under such circumstances as France was now placed in. "The French," he said, "were conquered only by a great superiority of number, therefore were not humiliated; and the population had not suffered to the extent alleged, for he had always spared their lives, and exposed those of Italians, Germans, and other foreigners." He remarked that the gratitude of Louis XVIII. to Great Britain was offensive to France, and that he was called in derision the King of England's Viceroy.

In the latter months of 1814, Sir Niel Campbell began to become sensible that Napoleon desired to exclude him from his presence as much as he possibly could, without positive rudeness. He rather suddenly intrenched himself within all the forms of an imperial court; and without affording the British envoy any absolute cause of complaint, or even any title to require explanation, he contrived, in a great measure, to debar him from opportunities of conversation. His only opportunity of obtaining access to Napoleon was on his return from short absences to Leghorn and Florence, when his attendance on the levee was matter of etiquette.

On such occasions, the tenor of Napoleon's prophecies was minatory of the peace of Europe. He spoke perpetually of the humiliation inflicted upon France, by taking from her Belgium and his favourite object—Antwerp. On the 30th of October, while enlarging on these topics, he described the irritable feelings of the nation, saying,

every man in France considered the Rhine to be their natural boundary, and nothing could alter this opinion. There was no want, he said, of a population in France, martial beyond any other nation by natural disposition, by the consequences of the Revolution, and by the idea of glory. Louis XIV., according to his account, notwithstanding all the misfortunes he had brought upon the nation, was still beloved on account of the éclat of his victories, and the magnificence of his court. The battle of Rosbach had brought about the Revolution. Louis XVIII. totally mistook the character of the French in supposing that either by argument or by reasoning, or indulging them with a free constitution, he could induce them to sink into a state of peaceful industry. He insisted that the Duke of Wellington's presence at Paris was an insult on the French nation; that very strong discord prevailed in the country, and that the king had but few friends, either in the army or among the people. Perhaps the king might try to get rid of a part of the army by sending them to St. Domingo, but that, he observed, would be soon seen through; he himself had made a melancholy trial, with the loss of 30,000 men, which had proved the inutility of such expeditions.

He then checked himself, and endeavoured to show that he had no personal feeling or expectation from the revolutions he foretold. "I am a deceased man," he said; "I was born a soldier; I have mounted a throne; I have descended from it; I am prepared for any fate. They may transport me to a distant shore, or they may put me to death here; I will spread my bosom open to the poniard. When merely General Buonaparte I had property of my own acquiring—I am now deprived of all."

On another occasion he described the ferment in France, which he said he had learned from the correspondence of his guards with their native country, and so far forgot the character of a defunct person as to say plainly that the present disaffection would break out with all the fury of the former revolution, and require his own resurrection. "For *then*," he added, "the sove-

reigns of Europe will soon find it necessary, for their own repose, to call on ME to tranquillize matters."

This species of conversation was perhaps the best which could have been adopted, to conceal his secret purpose from the British commissioner. Sir Nial Campbell, though not without entertaining suspicions, judged it upon the whole unlikely that he meditated anything eccentric, unless a tempting opening should present itself on the part of France or Italy.

Napoleon held the same species of language to others as well as the British resident. He was affable, and even cordial (in appearance), to the numerous strangers whom curiosity led to visit him; spoke of his retirement as Dioclesian might have done in the gardens of Salonica; seemed to consider his political career as ended, and to be now chiefly anxious to explain such passages of his life as met the harsh construction of the world. In giving free and easy answers to those who conversed with him, and especially to Englishmen of rank, Buonaparte found a ready means of communicating to the public such explanations concerning his past life as were best calculated to serve his wishes. In these he palliated, instead of denying, the scheme of poisoning his prisoners in Syria, the massacre at Jaffa, the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, and other enormities. An emperor, a conqueror, retired from war, and sequestered from power, must be favourably listened to by those who have the romantic pleasure of hearing him plead his own cause. Milder editions of his measures began to be circulated in Europe, and, in the curiosity to see and admire the captive sovereign, men forgot the ravages which he had committed while at liberty.

As the winter approached a change was discernible in Napoleon's manners and habits. The alterations which he had planned in the island no longer gave him the same interest. He renounced, from time to time, the severe exercise in which he had indulged, used a carriage rather than his horse, and sunk occasionally into fits of deep contemplation, mingled with gloomy anxiety.

He became also subjected to uneasiness to which he had

hitherto been a stranger, being that arising from pecuniary inconveniences. He had plunged into expenses with imprudent eagerness, and without weighing the amount of his resources against the cost of the proposed alterations. The ready money which he brought from France seems to have been soon exhausted, and to raise supplies, he commanded the inhabitants of his island to pay up, in the month of June, the contributions of the last year. This produced petitions, personal solicitations, and discontent. It was represented to him that so poor were the inhabitants of the island, in consequence of want of sale for their wine for months past, that they would be driven to the most extreme straits if the requisition should be persisted in. In some of the villages the tax-gatherers of the Emperor were resisted and insulted. Napoleon, on his side, sent part of his troops to quarter upon the insurgent peasantry, and to be supported by them at free cost, till the contributions should be paid up.

Thus, we recognize, in the government of this miniature state, the same wisdom, and the same errors, by which Buonaparte won and lost the empire of the world. The plans of improvements and internal ameliorations which he formed were probably very good in themselves, but he proceeded to the execution of that which he had resolved with too much and too reckless precipitation; too much of a determination to work his own pleasure, and too little concern for the feelings of others.

The compositions proving a weak resource, as they were scarce to be extracted from the miserable islanders, Napoleon had recourse to others, which must have been peculiarly galling to a man of his haughty spirit. But as his revenue, so far as tangible, did not exceed 300,000 francs, and his expenditure amounted to at least a million, he was compelled to lower the allowances of most of his retinue; to reduce the wages of the miners to one-fourth; to raise money by the sale of the provisions laid up for the garrisons; nay, even by selling a train of brass artillery to the Duke of Tuscany. He disposed also of some property—a large house which had been used as a bar-

rack, and he went the length of meditating the sale of the Town-house at Porto Ferrajo.

We have said that Napoleon's impatience to execute whatever plans occurred to his fertile imagination was the original cause of these pecuniary distresses. But they are not less to be imputed to the unfair and unworthy conduct of the French ministry. The French administration were, of all others, most intimately bound in conscience, honour, and policy, to see the treaty of Fontainebleau, as forming the footstool by which Louis XVIII. mounted his restored throne, distinctly observed towards Napoleon. The sixth article of that treaty provides an annuity, or revenue, of two millions five hundred thousand francs, to be registered on the Great Book of France, and paid without abatement or deduction to Napoleon Buonaparte. This annual provision was stipulated by the *maréchals*, Macdonald and Ney, as the price of Napoleon's resignation, and the French ministers could not refuse a declaration of payment without gross injustice to Buonaparte, and at the same time a severe insult to the allied powers. Nevertheless, so far from this pension being paid with regularity, we have seen no evidence that Napoleon ever received a single remittance to account of it. The British resident, observing how much the ex-Emperor was harassed by pecuniary straits, gave it, not once but repeatedly, as his opinion, "that if these difficulties pressed upon him much longer, so as to prevent him from continuing the external show of a court, he was perfectly capable of crossing over to Piombino with his troops, or committing any other extravagance". This was Sir Niel Campbell's opinion on 31st October, 1814, and Lord Castlereagh made strong remonstrances on the subject, although Great Britain was the only power among the allies, who, being no principal party to the treaty of Fontainebleau, might safely have left it to those states who were. The French were not ashamed to defend their conduct on the technical objection that the pension was not due until the year was elapsed; a defence which we must consider as evasive, since such a pension is of an alimentary nature, the termly payments of which ought

to be made in advance. The subject was mentioned again and again by Sir Niel Campbell, but it does not appear that the French administration desisted from a course, which, whether arising from a spirit of mean revenge, or from avarice, or from being themselves embarrassed, was at once dishonourable and impolitic.

Other apprehensions agitated Buonaparte's mind. He feared the Algerine pirates, and requested the interference of England in his behalf. He believed, or affected to believe, that Brulart, the governor of Corsica, who had been a captain of Chouans, the friend of Georges, Pichegru, &c., was sent thither by Louis XVIII's administration for the purpose of having him assassinated, and that fitting agents were despatched from Corsica to Elba for that purpose. Above all, he pretended to be informed of a design to dispense with the treaty of Fontainebleau, and to remove him from his place of refuge, to be imprisoned at St. Helena or St. Lucie. It is not impossible that these fears were not altogether feigned; for though there is not an iota of evidence tending to show that there was reason for believing the allies entertained such an unworthy thought, yet the report was spread very generally through France, Italy, and the Mediterranean, and was encouraged, doubtless, by those who desired once more to place Buonaparte in action. He certainly expressed great anxiety on the subject, sometimes declaring he would defend his batteries to the last, sometimes affecting to believe that he was to be sent to reside in England, a prospect which he pretended not to dislike personally, while he held out sufficient reasons to prevent the course from being adopted. "He concluded", he said, "he should have personal liberty, and the means of removing prejudices entertained against his character, which had not yet been fully cleared up"; but ended with the insinuation that by residing in England he would have easier communication with France, where there were four of his party to every single Bourbonist. And when he had exhausted these topics, he returned to the complaints of the hardship and cruelty of depriving him of the society of his wife and child.

While Buonaparte, chafed by poverty, and these other subjects of complaint, tormented, too, by the restlessness of a mind impatient of restraint, gave vent to expressions which excited suspicion, and ought to have recommended precaution, his court began to assume a very singular appearance, quite the opposite of that usually exhibited in the courts of petty sovereigns upon the Continent. In the latter there is an air of antiquated gravity, which pervades the whole establishment, and endeavours to supply the want of splendour, and of real power. The heavy apparatus designed for the government of an independent state, is applied to the management of a fortune not equal to that of many private gentlemen; the whole course of business goes slowly and cumbrously on, and so that appearances are maintained in the old style of formal grandeur, the sovereign and his counsellors dream neither of expeditions, conquest, nor any other political object.

The court of Porto Ferrajo was the reverse of all this. Indeed, the whole place was, in one sense, deserving of the name of Cosmopoli, which Napoleon wished to impose on it. It was like the court of a great barrack, filled with military, gendarmes, police officers of all sorts, refugees of every nation, expectants and dependants upon the court, domestics and adventurers, all connected with Buonaparte, and holding or expecting some benefit at his hand. Rumours of every kind were buzzed about through this miscellaneous crowd as thick as motes in the sunshine. Suspicious characters appeared and disappeared again, without affording any trace of their journey or object. The port was filled with ships from all parts of Italy. This, indeed, was necessary to supply the island with provisions, when crowded with such an unusual degree of population; and, besides, vessels of all nations visited Porto Ferrajo, from the various motives of curiosity or speculation, or being compelled by contrary winds. The four armed vessels of Napoleon, and seventeen belonging to the service of the miners, were constantly engaged in voyages to every part of Italy, and brought over or returned to the Continent Italians, Sicilians, Frenchmen, and Greeks, who seemed all active, yet gave

no reason for their coming or departure. Dominico Ettori, a monk who had escaped from his convent, and one Theologos, a Greek, were considered as agents of some consequence among this group.

The situation of Sir Niel Campbell was now very embarrassing. Napoleon, affecting to be more tenacious than ever of his dignity, not only excluded the British envoy from his own presence, but even threw obstacles in the way of his visiting his mother and sister. It was, therefore, only from interviews with Napoleon himself that he could hope to get any information, and to obtain these Sir Neil was, as already noticed, obliged to absent himself from the island of Elba occasionally, which gave him an opportunity of desiring an audience, as he went away and returned. At such times as he remained on the island he was discountenanced, and all attention withdrawn from him; but in a way so artful as to render it impossible for him to make a formal complaint, especially as he had no avowed official character, and was something in the situation of a guest, whose uninvited intrusion has placed him at his landlord's mercy.

Symptoms of some approaching catastrophe could not, however, be concealed from the British resident. Napoleon had interviews with his mother, after which she appeared deeply distressed. She was heard also to talk of three deputations which he had received from France. It was besides accounted a circumstance of strong suspicion that discharges and furloughs were granted to two or three hundred of Napoleon's Old Guard, by the medium of whom, as was too late discovered, the allegiance of the military in France was corrupted and seduced, and their minds prepared for what was to ensue. We cannot suppose that such a number of persons were positively intrusted with the secret; but every one of them was prepared to sound forth the praises of the Emperor in his exile, and all entertained and disseminated the persuasion, that he would soon appear to reclaim his rights.

At length Mariotti, the French consul at Leghorn, and Spannoki, the Tuscan governor of that town, informed Sir Niel Campbell that it was certainly determined at

Elba, that Buonaparte, with his guards, should embark for the Continent. Sir Neil was at Leghorn when he received this intelligence, and had left the *Partridge* sloop of war to cruise round Elba. It was naturally concluded that Italy was the object of Napoleon, to join with his brother-in-law Murat, who was at that time, fatally for himself, raising his banner.

On the 25th of February [1815], the *Partridge* having come to Leghorn and fetched off Sir Niel Campbell, the appearance, as the vessel approached Porto Ferrajo on her return, of the national guard on the batteries, instead of the crested grenadiers of the Imperial guard, at once apprised the British resident of what had happened. When he landed, he found the mother and sister of Buonaparte in a well-assumed agony of anxiety about the fate of their Emperor, of whom they affected to know nothing, except that he had steered towards the coast of Barbary. They appeared extremely desirous to detain Sir Niel Campbell on shore. Resisting their entreaties, and repelling the more pressing arguments of the governor, who seemed somewhat disposed to use force to prevent him from re-embarking, the British envoy regained his vessel, and set sail in pursuit of the adventurer. But it was too late; the *Partridge* only obtained a distant sight of the flotilla, after Buonaparte and his forces had landed.

II.

THE HUNDRED DAYS.

The Congress of representatives of the principal states of Europe had met at Vienna, in order to arrange the confused and complicated interests which had arisen out of so prolonged a period of war and alteration. The lapse of twenty-five years of constant war and general change had made so total an alteration, not merely in the social relations and relative powers of the states of Europe, but in the habits, sentiments, and principles of the inhabitants, that it appeared altogether impossible to restore the original system as it existed before 1792. The Continent resembled the wrecks of the city of London after the great conflagration in 1666, when the boundaries of individual property were so completely obliterated and confounded that the king found himself obliged, by the urgency of the occasion, to make new, and in some degree arbitrary, distributions of the ground, in order to rebuild the streets upon a plan more regular, and better fitted to the improved condition of the age. That which proved ultimately an advantage to London may perhaps produce similar good consequences to the civilized world, and a better and more permanent order of things may be expected to arise out of that which has been destroyed. In that case, the next generation may reap the advantages of the storms with which their fathers had to contend.

Amid the labours of the Congress, their attention was turned on the condition of the kingdom of Naples; and it was urged by Talleyrand, in particular, that allowing the existence of the sovereignty of Murat in that beautiful kingdom was preserving, at the risk of future danger to Europe, an empire founded on Napoleon's principles, and governed by his brother-in-law. It was answered truly, that it was too late to challenge the foundation of Murat's right of sovereignty, after having gladly accepted

and availed themselves of his assistance, in the war against Buonaparte. Talleyrand, by exhibiting to the Duke of Wellington a train of correspondence between Buonaparte, his sister Caroline, and Murat, endeavoured to show that the latter was insincere, when seeming to act in concert with the allies. The Duke was of opinion, that the letters did not prove treachery, though they indicated what was to be expected, that Murat took part against his brother-in-law and benefactor with considerable reluctance. The matter was now in agitation before the Congress; and Murat, conceiving his power in danger, seems to have adopted the rash expedient of changing sides once more, and again to have renewed his intercourse with Napoleon. The contiguity of Elba to Naples rendered this a matter of little difficulty; and they had, besides, the active assistance of Pauline, who went and came between Italy and her brother's little court. Napoleon, however, at all times resolutely denied that he had any precise share or knowledge of the enterprise which Murat meditated.

The King of France, in the meanwhile, recalled by proclamation all Frenchmen who were in the Neapolitan service, and directed the title of King Joachim to be omitted in the royal almanac.

Murat, alarmed at this indication of hostile intentions, carried on a secret correspondence with France, in the course of which a letter was intercepted, directed to the King of Naples, from General Excelsman, professing, in his own name and that of others, devoted attachment, and assuring him that thousands of officers, formed in his school and under his eye, would have been ready at his call, had not matters taken a satisfactory turn. In consequence of this letter, Excelsman was in the first place put on half-pay and sent from Paris, which order he refused to obey. Next he was tried before a court-martial, and triumphantly acquitted. He was admitted to kiss the King's hand, and swear to him fidelity *à toutes épreuves*. How he kept his word will presently appear. In the meantime the King had need of faithful adherents, for the nets of conspiracy were closing fast around him.

The plot formed against Louis XVIII. comprehended two enterprises. The first was to be achieved by the landing of Napoleon from Elba, when the universal good-will of the soldiers, the awe inspired by his name and character, and the suspicions and insinuations spread widely against the Bourbons, together with the hope of recovering what the nation considered as the lost glory of France, were certain to ensure him a general good reception. A second, or subordinate branch of the conspiracy, concerned the insurrection of a body of troops under General L'Allemand, who were quartered in the north-east of France, and to whom was committed the charge of intercepting the retreat of the King and royal family from Paris, and seizing them, to detain them as hostages at the restored Emperor's pleasure.

It is impossible to know at what particular period of his residence in Elba Napoleon gave an express consent to what was proposed, and disposed himself to assume the part destined for him in the extraordinary drama. We should suppose, however, his resolution was adopted about that time when his manner changed completely towards the British envoy residing at his little court, and when he assumed the airs of inaccessible and imperial state, to keep at a distance, as an inconvenient observer, Sir Niel Campbell, to whom he had before seemed rather partial. His motions after that time have been described, so far as we have access to know them. It was on Sunday, 26th February, that Napoleon embarked with his guards on board the flotilla, consisting of the *Inconstant* brig, and six other small vessels, upon one of the most extraordinary and adventurous expeditions that was ever attempted. The force with which he was once more to change the fortunes of France amounted but to about a thousand men. To keep the undertaking secret, his sister Pauline gave a ball on the night of his departure, and the officers were unexpectedly summoned, after leaving the entertainment, to go on board the little squadron.

In his passage Napoleon encountered two great risks. The first was from meeting a royal French frigate, who

hailed the *Inconstant*. The guards were ordered to put off their caps, and go down below, or lie upon the deck, while the captain of the *Inconstant* exchanged some civilities with the commander of the frigate, with whom he chanced to be acquainted; and being well known in these seas, was permitted to pass on without farther inquiry. The second danger was caused by the pursuit of Sir Niel Campbell, in the *Partridge* sloop of war, who, following from Elba, where he had learned Napoleon's escape, with the determination to capture or sink the flotilla, could but obtain a distant view of the vessels as they landed their passengers.

This was on the first of March, when Napoleon, causing his followers once more to assume the three-coloured cockade, disembarked at Cannes, a small seaport in the gulf of Saint Juan, not far from Frejus, which had seen him land, a single individual, returned from Egypt, to conquer a mighty empire; had beheld him set sail, a terrified exile, to occupy the place of his banishment; and now again witnessed his return, a daring adventurer, to throw the dice once more for a throne or a grave. A small party of his guard presented themselves before Antibes, but were made prisoners by General Corsin, the governor of the place.

Undismayed by a circumstance so unfavourable, Napoleon instantly began his march at the head of scarce a thousand men, towards the centre of a kingdom from which he had been expelled with execrations, and where his rival now occupied in peace an hereditary throne. For some time the inhabitants gazed on them with doubtful and astonished eyes, as if uncertain whether to assist them as friends, or to oppose them as invaders. A few peasants cried *Vive l'Empereur!* but the adventurers received neither countenance nor opposition from those of the higher ranks. On the evening of 2nd March, a day and a half after landing, the little band of invaders reached Ceremin, having left behind them their small train of artillery, in order to enable them to make forced marches. As Napoleon approached Dauphiné, called the cradle of the Revolution, the peasants greeted him with

more general welcome, but still no proprietors appeared, no clergy, no public functionaries. But they were now near to those by whom the success or ruin of the expedition must be decided.

Soult, the minister at war, had ordered some large bodies of troops to be moved into the country betwixt Lyons and Chamberri, to support, as he afterwards alleged, the high language which Talleyrand had been of late holding at the Congress, by showing that France was in readiness for war. If the *maréchal* acted with good faith in this measure, he was at least most unfortunate; for, as he himself admits, even in his attempt at exculpation, the troops were so placed as if they had been purposely thrown in Buonaparte's way, and proved unhappily to consist of corps peculiarly devoted to the ex-Emperor's person. On the 7th of March, the seventh regiment of the line, commanded by Colonel Labédoyère, arrived at Grenoble. He was young, nobly born, handsome, and distinguished as a military man. His marriage having connected him with the noble and loyal family of Damas, he procured preferment and active employment from Louis XVIII. through their interest, and they were induced even to pledge themselves for his fidelity. Yet Labédoyère had been engaged by Cambonne deep in the conspiracy of Elba, and used the command thus obtained for the destruction of the monarch by whom he was trusted.

As Napoleon approached Grenoble, he came into contact with the outposts of the garrison, who drew out, but seemed irresolute. Buonaparte halted his own little party, and advanced almost alone, exposing his breast, as he exclaimed, "He who will kill his Emperor, let him now work his pleasure!" The appeal was irresistible—the soldiers threw down their arms, crowded round the general who had so often led them to victory, and shouted "*Vive l'Empereur!*" In the meanwhile, Labédoyère, at the head of two battalions, was sallying from the gates of Grenoble. As they advanced he displayed an eagle, which, like that of Marius, worshipped by the Roman conspirator, had been carefully preserved to be

the type of civil war; at the same time he distributed among the soldiers the three-coloured cockades, which he had concealed in the hollow of a drum. They were received with enthusiasm. It was in this moment that *Maréchal de Camp Des Villiers*, the superior officer of *Labédoyère*, arrived on the spot, alarmed at what was taking place, and expostulated with the young military fanatic and the soldiers. He was compelled to retire. General *Marchand*, the loyal commandant of *Grenoble*, had as little influence on the troops remaining in the place: they made him prisoner, and delivered up the city to *Buonaparte*. Napoleon was thus at the head of nearly three thousand soldiers, with a suitable train of artillery, and a corresponding quantity of ammunition. He acted with a moderation which his success could well afford, and dismissed General *Marchand* uninjured.

When the first news of Napoleon's arrival reached *Paris*, it excited surprise rather than alarm; but when he was found to traverse the country without opposition, some strange and combined treason began to be generally apprehended. That the Bourbons might not be wanting to their own cause, *Monsieur*, with the Duke of *Orleans*, set out for *Lyons*, and the Duke of *Angoulême* repaired to *Nismes*. The Legislative Bodies, and most of the better classes, declared for the royal cause. The residents of the various powers hastened to assure *Louis* of the support of their sovereigns. Corps of volunteers were raised both among the Royalists and the Constitutional or moderate party. The most animating proclamations called the people to arms. An address by the celebrated *Benjamin Constant*, one of the most distinguished of the moderate party, was remarkable for its eloquence. It placed in the most striking light the contrast between the lawful government of a constitutional monarch, and the usurpation of an *Attila*, or *Genghis*, who governed only by the sword of his *Mamelukes*. It reminded France of the general detestation with which *Buonaparte* had been expelled from the kingdom, and proclaimed Frenchmen to be the scorn of Europe, should they again stretch their hands voluntarily to the shackles

which they had burst and hurled from them. All were summoned to arms, more especially those to whom liberty was dear; for in the triumph of Buonaparte it must find its grave for ever.—“With Louis,” said the address, “was peace and happiness; with Buonaparte, war, misery, and desolation.” Even a more animating appeal to popular feeling was made by a female on the staircase of the Tuileries, who exclaimed, “If Louis has not men enough to fight for him, let him call on the widows and childless mothers who have been rendered such by Napoleon!”

Notwithstanding all these demonstrations of zeal, the public mind had been much influenced by the causes of discontent which had been so artfully enlarged upon for many months past. The decided Royalists were few, the Constitutionals lukewarm. It became every moment more likely that not the voice of the people, but the sword of the army, must determine the controversy. Soult, whose conduct had given much cause for suspicion, which was augmented by his proposal to call out the officers who since the restoration had been placed on half-pay, resigned his office and was succeeded by Clarke, Duke of Feltre, less renowned as a soldier, but more trustworthy as a subject. A camp was established at Melun—troops were assembled there—and as much care as possible was used in selecting the troops to whom the royal cause was to be intrusted.

In the meantime, Fortune had not entirely abandoned the Bourbons. That part of the Buonapartist conspiracy which was to have been executed in the north was discovered and disconcerted. Lefebvre Desnouettes, discreditably known in England by his breach of parole, with the two Generals L’Allemand, were the agents in this plot. On the 10th March, Lefebvre marched forward his regiment to join Buonaparte; but the officers having discovered his purpose, he was obliged to make his escape from the arrest with which he was threatened. The two L’Allemands put the garrison of Lisle, to the number of 6000 men, in motion, by means of forged orders, declaring there was an insurrection in Paris. But Maréchal Mortier, meeting the troops on the march, detected and

defeated the conspiracy, by which, had it taken effect, the King and royal family must have been made prisoners. The L'Allemands were taken, and to have executed them on the spot as traitors, might have struck a wholesome terror into such officers as still hesitated; but the ministers of the King did not possess energy enough for such a crisis.

The progress of Buonaparte, in the meantime, was interrupted. It was in vain that, at Lyons, Monsieur and the Duke of Orleans, with the assistance of the advice and influence of Maréchal Macdonald, endeavoured to retain the troops in their duty, and the inhabitants in their allegiance to the King. The latter, chiefly manufacturers, afraid of being undersold by those of England in their own market, shouted openly, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" The troops of the line remained silent and gloomy. "How will your soldiers behave?" said Monsieur to the colonel of the 13th Dragoons. The colonel referred him to the men themselves. They answered candidly, that they would fight for Napoleon alone. Monsieur dismounted, and addressed the soldiers individually. To one veteran, covered with scars, and decorated with medals, the prince said, "A brave soldier like you, at least, will cry, '*Vive le Roi!*'"—"You deceive yourself," answered the soldier. "No one here will fight against his father—I will cry, '*Vive Napoleon!*'" The efforts of Macdonald were equally vain: He endeavoured to move two battalions to oppose the entry of Buonaparte's advanced guard. So soon as the troops came in presence of each other, they broke their ranks, and mingled together in the general cry of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Macdonald would have been made prisoner, but the forces whom he had just commanded would not permit this consummation of revolt. Monsieur was obliged to escape from Lyons, almost alone. The guard of honour formed by the citizens, to attend the person of the second of the Bourbon family, offered their services to Napoleon; but he refused them with contempt, while he sent a cross of honour to a single dragoon, who had the loyalty and devotion to attend Monsieur in his retreat.

Buonaparte, now master of the ancient capital of the Gauls, and at the head of 7000 men, was acknowledged by Maçon, Chalons, Dijon, and almost all Burgundy. Marseilles, on the contrary, and all Provence, declared against the invader, and the former city set a price upon his head.

Napoleon found it necessary to halt at Lyons for the refreshment of his forces; and, being joined by some of the civilians of his party, he needed time also to organize his government and administration. Hitherto, the addresses which he had published had been of a military character, abounding with the Oriental imagery which Buonaparte regarded as essential to eloquence, promising that victory should move at the charging step, and that the eagle should fly with the national colours from steeple to steeple, till she perched on the towers of Notre Dame. The present decrees were of a different character, and related to the internal arrangement of his projected administration.

Cambacérès was named his minister of justice; Fouché, that of police (a boon to the revolutionists); Davoust was made minister of war. Decrees upon decrees issued forth, with a rapidity which showed how Buonaparte had employed those studious hours at Elba, which he was supposed to have dedicated to the composition of his Memoirs. They ran in the name of Napoleon, by the grace of God, Emperor of the French, and were dated on the 13th of March, although not promulgated until the 21st of that month. The first of these decrees abrogated all changes in the courts of justice and tribunals which had taken place during the absence of Napoleon. The second displaced all officers belonging to the class of emigrants, and introduced into the army by the King. The third suppressed the order of St. Louis, the white flag and cockade, and other royal emblems, and restored the three-coloured banner and the imperial symbols of Buonaparte's authority. The same decree abolished the Swiss Guard, and the household troops of the King. The fourth sequestered the effects of the Bourbons. A similar ordinance sequestered the restored property of emigrant families,

and was so artfully worded as to represent great changes of property having taken place in this manner. The fifth decree of Lyons suppressed the ancient nobility and feudal titles, and formally confirmed proprietors of national domains in their possessions. The sixth declared sentence of banishment against all emigrants not erased from the list previous to the accession of the Bourbons, to which was added confiscation of their property. The seventh restored the Legion of Honour, in every respect as it had existed under the Emperor, uniting to its funds the confiscated revenues of the order of St. Louis. The eighth and last decree was the most important of all. Under pretence that emigrants who had borne arms against France, had been introduced into the body of the Peers, and that the Chamber of Deputies had already sat for the legal time, it dissolved both Chambers, and convoked the Electoral Colleges of the empire, in order that they might hold, in the ensuing month of May, an extraordinary assembly of the *Champ-de-Mai*. This convocation, for which the inventor found a name in the history of the ancient Franks, was to have two objects: *First*, to make such alterations and reformations in the constitution of the empire as circumstances should render advisable; *secondly*, to assist at the coronation of the Empress and of the King of Rome.

We cannot pause to criticise these various enactments. In general, however, it may be remarked, that they were admirably calculated to serve Napoleon's cause. They flattered the army, and at the same time heated their resentment against the emigrants, by insinuating that they had been sacrificed by Louis to the interest of these his followers. They held out to the Republicans a speedy prospect of confiscations, proscriptions, and revolutions of government; while the Imperialists were gratified with a view of ample funds for pensions, offices, and honorary decorations. To the proprietors of national domains was promised security; to the Parisians, the spectacle of the *Champ-de-Mai*; and to all France, peace and tranquillity, since the arrival of the Empress and her son, so confidently asserted to be at hand, must be considered as

a pledge of the friendship of Austria. Russia was also said to be friendly to Napoleon, and the conduct of Alexander toward the members of Buonaparte's family, was boldly appealed to as evidence of the fact. England, it was averred, befriended him, else how could he have escaped from an isle surrounded by her naval force? Prussia, therefore, alone, might be hostile and unappeased; but, unsupported by the other belligerent powers, Prussia must remain passive, or would soon be reduced to reason. The very pleasure in mortifying one, at least, of the late victors of Paris, gave a zest and poignancy to the revolution, which the concurrence of the other great states would, according to Buonaparte, render easy and peaceful. Such news were carefully disseminated through France by Napoleon's adherents. They preceded his march, and prepared the minds of men to receive him as their destined master.

On the 13th, Buonaparte recommenced his journey, and, advancing through Maçon, Châlons, and Dijon, he reached Auxerre on the 17th March. His own mode of travelling rather resembled that of a prince, who, weary of the fatigue of state, wishes to extricate himself, as much as possible, from its trammels, than that of an adventurer coming at the head of an army of insurgents, to snatch a crown from the head of the lawful monarch who wore it. He travelled several hours in advance of his army, often without any guard, or, at most, attended only by a few Polish lancers. The country through which he journeyed was favourable to his pretensions. It had been severely treated by the allies during the military manœuvres of the last campaign, and the dislike of the suffering inhabitants extended itself to the family who had mounted the throne by the influence of these strangers. When, therefore, they saw the late Emperor among them alone, without guards, inquiring, with his usual appearance of active interest, into the extent of their losses, and making liberal promises to repair them, it is no wonder that they should rather remember the battles he had fought in their behalf against the foreigners, than think on the probability that his presence

among them might be the precursor of a second invasion.

The revolutionary fever preceded Buonaparte like an epidemic disorder. The 14th regiment of Lancers, quartered at Auxerre, trampled under foot the white cockade at the first signal; the 6th regiment of Lancers declared also for Napoleon, and without waiting for orders, drove a few soldiers of the household troops from Montereau, and secured that important post, which commands the passage of the Seine.

The dismay of the royal government at the revolt of Lyons was much increased by false tidings which had been previously circulated, giving an account of a pretended victory obtained by the Royalist party in front of that town. The conspiracy was laid so deep, and extended so widely through every branch of the government, that those concerned contrived to send this false report to Paris in a demi-official form, by means of the telegraph. It had the expected effect, first in suspending the preparations of the loyal party, and afterwards in deepening the anxiety which overwhelmed them, when Monsieur, returning almost unattended, brought the news of his bad success.

At this moment of all but desperation, Fouché offered his assistance to the almost defenceless King. It is probable that the more he reflected on the character of his old master, Napoleon, the deeper became his conviction, that they knew each other too well ever to resume an attitude of mutual confidence. Nothing deterred, therefore, by the communications which he had opened with the Imperialists, he now demanded a secret audience of the King. It was refused, but his communications were received, through the medium of two confidential persons deputed by Louis. Fouché's language to them was that of a bold empiric, to whom patients have recourse in a moment of despair, and who confidently undertake the most utterly hopeless cases. Like such, he exacted absolute reliance on his skill—the most scrupulous attention to his injunctions—the most ample reward for his promised services; and as such too, he spoke with the

utmost confidence in the certainty of his remedy, whilst observing a vague yet studious mystery about the ingredients of which it was composed, and the mode in which it would operate. He required of Louis XVIII. that he should surrender all the executive authority to the Duke of Orleans, and all the ministerial offices to himself and those whom he should appoint; which two conditions being granted, he undertook to put a period to Buonaparte's expedition. The Memoirs of this bold intriguer affirm, that he meant to assemble all that remained of the revolutionary party, and oppose the doctrines of Liberty and Equality to those of the glory of France in the sense understood by Buonaparte. What were the means that such politicians, so united, had to oppose to the army of France, Fouché has not informed us; but it is probable, that, to stop the advance of 10,000 armed men, against whom the revolutionists could now scarce even array the mob of the suburbs, the ex-minister of police must have meditated the short sharp remedy of Napoleon's assassination, for accomplishing which, he, if any man, could have found trusty agents.

The King having refused proposals, which went to preserve his sceptre by taking it out of his hands, and by further unexplained means, the morality of which was liable to just suspicion, Fouché saw himself obliged to carry his intrigues to the service of his old master. He became, in consequence, so much an object of suspicion to the Royalists that an order was issued for his arrest. To the police agents, his own old dependants, who came to execute the order, he objected against the informality of their warrant, and stepping into his closet, as if to draw a protest, he descended by a secret stair into his garden, of which he scaled the wall. His next neighbour, into whose garden he escaped, was the Duchess de St. Leu; so that the fugitive arrived, as if by a trick of the stage, in the very midst of a circle of chosen Buonapartists, who received him with triumph, and considered the mode of his coming among them as a full warrant for his fidelity.

Louis XVIII. in his distress, had recourse to the assist-

ance of another man of the Revolution, who, without possessing the abilities of Fouché, was perhaps, had he been disposed to do so, better qualified than he to have served the King's cause. Maréchal Ney was called forth to take the command of an army destined to attack Napoleon in the flank and rear as he marched towards Paris, while the forces at Melun opposed him in front. He had an audience of the King on the 9th of March, when he accepted his appointment with expressions of the most devoted faith to the King, and declared his resolution to bring Buonaparte to Paris like a wild beast in an iron cage. The Maréchal went to Besançon, where, on the 11th of March, he learned that Buonaparte was in possession of Lyons. But he continued to make preparations for resistance, and collected all the troops he could from the adjoining garrisons. To those who objected to the bad disposition of the soldiers, and remarked that he would have difficulty in inducing them to fight, Ney answered determinedly, "They *shall* fight; I will take a musket from a grenadier and begin the action myself;— I will run my sword to the hilt in the first who hesitates to follow my example." To the minister at war he wrote, that all were dazzled by the activity and rapid progress of the invader; that Napoleon was favoured by the common people and the soldiers; but that the officers and civil authorities were loyal, and he still hoped "to see a fortunate close of this mad enterprise".

In these dispositions Ney advanced to Lons-le-Saulnier. Here, on the night betwixt the 13th and 14th March, he received a letter from Napoleon, summoning him to join his standard, as "bravest of the brave", a name which could not but awake a thousand remembrances. He had already sounded both his officers and soldiers, and discovered their unalterable determination to join Buonaparte. He therefore had it only in his choice to retain his command by passing over to the Emperor, or else to return to the King without executing anything which might seem even an effort at realizing his boast, and also without the army over which he had asserted his possession of such influence.

Maréchal Ney was a man of mean birth, who, by the most desperate valour, had risen to the highest ranks in the army. His early education had not endowed him with a delicate sense of honour or a high feeling of principle, and he had not learned either as he advanced in life. He appears to have been a weak man, with more vanity than pride, and who, therefore, was likely to feel the loss of power more than the loss of character. He accordingly resolved upon adhering to Napoleon. Sensible of the incongruity of changing his side so suddenly, he affected to be a deliberate knave, rather than he would content himself with being viewed in his real character, of a volatile, light-principled, and inconsiderate fool. He pretended that the expedition of Napoleon had been long arranged between himself and the other *maréchals*. But we are willing rather to suppose that this was matter of mere invention, than to think that the protestations poured out at the Tuileries, only five days before, were, on the part of this unfortunate man, the effusions of premeditated treachery.

The Maréchal now published an order of the day, declaring that the cause of the Bourbons was lost for ever. It was received by the soldiers with rapture, and Buonaparte's standard and colours were instantly displayed. Many of the officers, however, remonstrated, and left their commands. One, before he went away, broke his sword in two, and threw the pieces at Ney's feet, saying, "It is easier for a man of honour to break iron than to infringe his word".

Ney was received by Napoleon with open arms. His defection did incalculable damage to the King's cause, tending to show that the spirit of treason which possessed the common soldiers, had ascended to and affected the officers of the highest rank in the army.

The King, in the meanwhile, notwithstanding these unpromising circumstances, used every exertion to induce his subjects to continue in their allegiance. He attended in person the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, and was received with such enthusiastic marks of applause, that one would have thought the most active exertions

must have followed. Louis next reviewed the national guards, about 25,000 men, who made a similar display of loyalty. He also inspected the troops of the line, 6000 in number, but his reception was equivocal. They placed their caps on their bayonets in token of respect, but they raised no shout.

Some of those about Louis's person continued to believe that these men were still attached to the King, or that at any rate they ought to be sent to the camp at Melun, which was the last remaining point upon which the royal party could hope to make a stand.

As a last resource, Louis convoked a general council at the Tuileries on the 18th March. The generals present declared there could be no effectual opposition offered to Buonaparte. The royalist nobles contradicted them, and, after some expressions of violence had been uttered, much misbecoming the royal presence, Louis was obliged to break up the meeting, and prepare himself to abandon a capital which the prevalence of his enemies, and the disunion of his friends, left him no longer any chance of defending.

Meantime, the two armies approached each other at Melun; that of the King was commanded by the faithful Macdonald. On the 20th, his troops were drawn up in three lines to receive the invaders, who were said to be advancing from Fontainebleau. There was a long pause of suspense, of a nature which seldom fails to render men more accessible to strong and sudden emotion. The glades of the forest, and the acclivity which ascends to it, were full in view of the royal army, but presented the appearance of a deep solitude. All was silence, except when the regimental bands of music, at the command of the officers, who remained generally faithful, played the airs of *Vive Henri Quatre—O, Richard!—La Belle Gabrielle*, and other tunes connected with the cause and family of the Bourbons. The sounds excited no corresponding sentiments among the soldiers. At length, about noon, the galloping of horse was heard. An open carriage appeared, surrounded by a few hussars, and drawn by four horses. It came on at full speed; and Napoleon

jumping from the vehicle, was in the midst of the ranks which had been formed to oppose him. His escort threw themselves from their horses, mingled with their ancient comrades, and the effect of their exhortations was instantaneous on men whose minds were already half made up to the purpose which they now accomplished. There was a general shout of *Vive Napoleon!*—The last army of the Bourbons passed from their side, and no further obstruction existed betwixt Napoleon and the capital which he was once more—but for a brief space—to inhabit as a sovereign.

Louis XVIII. had anticipated too surely the defection which took place, to await the consequence of its actual arrival. The King departed from Paris, escorted by his household, at one in the morning of the 20th March. Even at that untimely hour, the palace was surrounded by the national guards and many citizens, who wept and entreated him to remain, offering to spend the last drop of their blood for him. But Louis wisely declined accepting of sacrifices which could now have availed nothing. Escorted by his household troops, he took the way to Lisle. Maréchal Macdonald, returning from the fatal position of Melun, assumed the command of this small body, which was, indeed, augmented by many volunteers, but such as considered their zealous wishes, rather than their power of rendering assistance. The King's condition was, however, pitied and respected, and he passed through Abbeville, and other garrison towns, where the soldiers received him with sullen respect; and though indicating that they intended to join his rival, would neither violate his person nor insult his misfortunes. At Lisle he had hoped to make a stand, but Maréchal Mortier, insisting upon the dissatisfied and tumultuary state of the garrison, urged him to proceed, for the safety of his life; and, compelled to a second exile, he departed to Ostend, and from thence to Ghent, where he established his exiled court. Maréchal Macdonald took leave of his majesty on the frontiers, conscious that by emigrating he must lose every prospect of serving in future either France or her monarch. The household troops, about two hundred excepted, were also

disbanded on the frontiers. They had been harassed in their march thither by some light horse, and in their attempt to regain their homes in a state of dispersion, some were slain, and almost all were plundered and insulted.

In the meanwhile, the Revolution took full effect at Paris. Lavalette, one of Buonaparte's most decided adherents, hastened from a place of concealment to assume the management of the post-office in the name of Napoleon, an office which he had enjoyed during his former reign. He was thus enabled to intercept the royal proclamations, and to announce to every department officially the restoration of the Emperor. Excelsman, the oath of fealty to the King, *à toutes épreuves*, scarce dry upon his lips, took down the white flag which floated on the Tuileries, and replaced the three-coloured banner.

It was late in the evening ere Napoleon arrived in the same open carriage which he had used since his landing. There was a singular contrast betwixt his entry and the departure of the King. The latter was accompanied by the sobbings, tears, and kind wishes of those citizens who desired peace and tranquillity, by the wailing of the defenceless, and the anxious fears of the wise and prudent. The former entered amid the shouts of armed columns, who, existing by war and desolation, welcomed with military acclamations the chief who was to restore them to their element. The inhabitants of the suburbs cheered in expectation of employment and gratuities, or by instigation of their ringleaders, who were chiefly under the management of the police, and well prepared for the event. But among the immense crowds of the citizens of Paris, who turned out to see this extraordinary spectacle, few or none joined in the gratulation. The soldiers of the Guard resented their silence, commanded the spectators to shout, struck with the flat of their swords, and pointed their pistols at the multitude, but could not, even by these military means, extort the expected cry of Liberty and Napoleon, though making it plain, by their demeanour, that the last, if not the first, was returned to the Parisians. In the court of the Carousel, and before

the Tuileries, all the adherents of the old Imperial government, and those who, having deserted Napoleon, were eager to expiate their fault, by now being first to acknowledge him, were assembled to give voice to their welcome, which atoned in some degree for the silence of the streets. They crowded around him so closely that he was compelled to exclaim—"My friends, you stifle me!" and his adjutants were obliged to support him in their arms up the grand staircase, and thence into the royal apartments, where he received the all-hail of the principal devisers and abettors of this singular undertaking.

Never, in his bloodiest and most triumphant field of battle, had the terrible ascendancy of Napoleon's genius appeared half so predominant as during his march, or rather his journey, from Cannes to Paris. He who left the same coast disguised like a slave, and weeping like a woman, for fear of assassination, reappeared in grandeur like that of the returning wave, which, the farther it has retreated, is rolled back on the shore with the more terrific and overwhelming violence. His looks seemed to possess the pretended power of northern magicians, and blunted swords and spears. The Bravest of the Brave, who came determined to oppose him as he would a wild beast, recognized his superiority when confronted with him, and sunk again into his satellite. Yet the lustre with which Napoleon shone was not that of a planet, duly moving in its regular sphere, but that of a comet, inspiring forebodings of pestilence and death, and

"with fear of change,
Perplexing nations."

The result of his expedition was thus summed up by one of the most eloquent and best-informed British statesmen:

"Was it," said the accomplished orator, "in the power of language to describe the evil? Wars which had raged for twenty-five years throughout Europe; which had spread blood and desolation from Cadiz to Moscow, and from Naples to Copenhagen which had wasted the

means of human enjoyment, and destroyed the instruments of social improvement; which threatened to diffuse among the European nations the dissolute and ferocious habits of a predatory soldiery—at length by one of those vicissitudes which bid defiance to the foresight of man, had been brought to a close, upon the whole happy beyond all reasonable expectation, with no violent shock to national independence, with some tolerable compromise between the opinions of the age and the reverence due to ancient institutions; with no too signal or mortifying triumph over the legitimate interests or avowable feelings of any numerous body of men, and, above all, without those retaliations against nations or parties which beget new convulsions, often as horrible as those which they close, and perpetuate revenge and hatred and blood from age to age. Europe seemed to breathe after her sufferings. In the midst of this fair prospect, and of these consolatory hopes, Napoleon Buonaparte escaped from Elba; three small vessels reached the coast of Provence; their hopes are instantly dispelled; the work of our toil and fortitude is undone; the blood of Europe is spilt in vain—

‘Ibi omnis effusus labor!’”

When Paris was lost, the bow of the Bourbons was effectually broken; and the attempts of individuals of the family to make a stand against the evil hour were honourable indeed to their own gallantry, but of no advantage to their cause.

The Duke d'Angoulême placed himself at the head of a considerable body of troops, raised by the town of Marseilles, and the royalists of Provence. But being surrounded by General Gilly, he was obliged to lay down his arms, on condition of amnesty to his followers, and free permission to himself to leave France. General Grouchy refused to confirm this capitulation, till Buonaparte's pleasure was known. But the restored Emperor, not displeased, it may be, to make a display of generosity, permitted the Duke d'Angoulême to depart by sea from Cette, only requiring his interference with Louis XVIII.

for returning the crown jewels which the king had removed with him to Ghent.

The Duke of Bourbon had retired to La Vendée to raise the warlike royalists of that faithful province. But it had been previously occupied by soldiers attached to Buonaparte, so judiciously posted as to render an insurrection impossible; and the duke found himself obliged to escape by sea from Nantes.

The Duchess d'Angoulême, the only remaining daughter of Louis XVI., whose childhood and youth had suffered with patient firmness such storms of adversity, showed on this trying occasion that she had the active as well as passive courage becoming the descendant of a long line of princes. She threw herself into Bourdeaux, where the loyalty of Count Lynch, the mayor, and of the citizens in general, promised her determined aid, and the princess herself stood forth amongst them, like one of those heroic women of the age of chivalry, whose looks and words were able in moments of peril to give double edge to men's swords, and double constancy to their hearts. But unhappily there was a considerable garrison of troops of the line in Bourdeaux, who had caught the general spirit of revolt. General Clausel also advanced on the city with a force of the same description. The duchess made a last effort, assembled around her the officers, and laid their duty before them in the most touching and pathetic manner. But when she saw their coldness, and heard their faltering excuses, she turned from them in disdain:—"You fear," she said—"I pity you, and release you from your oaths." She embarked on board an English frigate, and Bourdeaux opened its gates to Clausel, and declared for the Emperor. Thus, notwithstanding the return of Napoleon was far from being acceptable to the French universally, or even generally, all open opposition to his government ceased, and he was acknowledged as Emperor within about twenty days after he landed on the beach at Cannes, with a thousand followers.

But though he was thus replaced on the throne, Napoleon's seat was by no means secure, unless he could

prevail upon the confederated sovereigns of Europe to acknowledge him in the capacity of which their united arms had so lately deprived him. It is true, he had indirectly promised war to his soldiers, by stigmatizing the cessions made by the Bourbons of what he called the territory of France. It is true, also, that then, and till his death's-day, he continued to entertain the rooted idea that Belgium, a possession which France had acquired within twenty years, was an integral portion of that kingdom. It is true, Antwerp and the five hundred sail of the line which were to be built there, continued through his whole life to be the very Delilah of his imagination. The cause of future war was, therefore, blazing in his bosom. But yet at present he felt it necessary for his interest to assure the people of France that his return to the empire would not disturb the treaty of Paris, though it had given the Low Countries to Holland. He spared no device to spread reports of a pacific tendency.

From the commencement of his march it was affirmed by his creatures that he brought with him a treaty concluded with all the powers of Europe for twenty years. It was repeatedly averred that Maria Louisa and her son were on the point of arriving in France, dismissed by her father as a pledge of reconciliation; and when she did not appear, it was insinuated that she was detained by the Emperor Francis as a pledge that Buonaparte should observe his promise of giving the French a free constitution. To such barefaced assertions he was reduced, rather than admit that his return was to be the signal for renewing hostilities with all Europe.

Meantime, Napoleon hesitated not to offer to the allied ministers his willingness to acquiesce in the treaty of Paris; although, according to his uniform reasoning, it involved the humiliation and disgrace of France. He sent a letter to each of the sovereigns, expressing his desire to make peace on the same principles which had been arranged with the Bourbons. To these letters no answers were returned. The decision of the allies had already been adopted.

The Congress at Vienna happened, fortunately, not to

be dissolved, when the news of Buonaparte's escape from Elba was laid before them by Talleyrand, on the 11th March. The astonishing, as well as the sublime, approaches to the ludicrous, and it is a curious physiological fact that the first news of an event which threatened to abolish all their labours seemed so like a trick in a pantomime that laughter was the first emotion it excited from almost every one. The merry mood did not last long; for the jest was neither a sound nor safe one. It was necessary for the Congress, by an unequivocal declaration, to express their sentiments upon this extraordinary occasion. This declaration appeared on the 13th March, and after giving an account of the fact, bore the following denunciation:—

“By thus breaking the convention which had established him in the island of Elba, Buonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended; and, by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe that there can be neither peace nor truce with him.

“The powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Buonaparte has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance. They declare at the same time, that, firmly resolved to maintain entire the treaty of Paris of the 30th of May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall hereafter resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will employ all their means, and will unite all their efforts, that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled; and to provide against every attempt which shall threaten to replunge the world into the disorders of revolution.”

This manifesto was instantly followed by a treaty betwixt Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, renewing and confirming the league entered into at Chaumont. The 1st article declared the resolution of the high contracting parties to maintain and enforce the treaty of Paris, which excluded Buonaparte from the throne of France, and to enforce the decree of outlawry issued against him as above mentioned. 2. Each of the contracting parties agreed to keep constantly in the field

an army of 150,000 men complete, with the due proportion of cavalry and artillery. 3. They agreed not to lay down their arms but by common consent, until either the purpose of the war should have been attained, or Buonaparte should be rendered incapable of disturbing the peace of Europe. After other subordinate articles, the 7th provided, that the other powers of Europe should be invited to accede to the treaty; and the 8th, that the King of France should be particularly called upon to become a party to it. A separate article provided, that the King of Great Britain should have the option of furnishing his contingent in men, or of paying, instead, at the rate of £30 sterling per annum for each cavalry soldier, and £20 per annum for each infantry soldier, which should be wanting to make up his complement. To this treaty a declaration was subjoined, when it was ratified by the Prince Regent, referring to the 8th article of the treaty, and declaring that it should not be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war, with the view of forcibly imposing on France any particular government. The other contracting powers agreed to accept of the accession of his Royal Highness, under this explanation and limitation.

The treaty of Vienna may be considered in a double point of view, first, upon principle, and secondly, as to its mode of expression; and it was commented upon in both respects in the British House of Commons. The expediency of the war was denied by several of the opposition members, on account of the exhausted state of Great Britain, but they generally admitted that the escape of Buonaparte gave a just cause for the declaration of hostilities.

The provocations pleaded by Buonaparte (which seem to have been entirely fanciful, so far as respects any design on his freedom), were, first, the separation from his family. But this was a question with Austria exclusively; for what power was to compel the Emperor Francis to restore his daughter, after the fate of war had flung her again under his paternal protection? Napoleon's feelings in his situation were extremely natural, but those

of the Emperor cannot be blamed, who considered his daughter's honour and happiness as interested in separating her from a man, who was capable of attempting to redeem his broken fortunes by the most desperate means. Much would depend upon the inclination of the illustrious person herself; but, even if some degree of paternal restraint had been exerted, could Napoleon really feel himself justified in renewing a sort of Trojan war with all the powers in Europe, in order to recover his wife, or think, because he was separated from her society by a flinty-hearted father, that he was therefore warranted in invading and subduing the kingdoms of France? The second article of provocation, and we admit it as a just one, was, that Napoleon was left to necessities to which he ought not to have been subjected, by France withholding his pension till the year should elapse. This was a ground of complaint, and a deep one; but against whom? Surely not against the allies, unless Buonaparte had called upon them to make good their treaty; and had stated that France had failed to make good those obligations for which he had their guarantee. England, who was only an accessory to the treaty, had nevertheless already interfered in Buonaparte's behalf, and there can be no doubt that redress would have been granted by the contracting parties, who could not in decency avoid enforcing a treaty, which had been of their own forming. That this guarantee gave Napoleon a right to appeal and to complain, cannot be denied; but that it gave him a right to proceed by violence, without any expostulation previously made, is contrary to all ideas of the law of nations, which enacts, that no aggression can constitute a legitimate cause of war until redress has been refused. This, however, is all mere legal argument. Buonaparte did NOT invade France because she was deficient in paying his pension. He invaded her, because he saw a strong prospect of regaining the throne; nor do we believe that millions of gold would have prevailed on him to forego the opportunity.

His more available ground of defence, however, was that he was recalled by the general voice of the nation of

France; but the whole facts of the case contradicted this statement. His league with the Revolutionists was made reluctantly on their part, nor did that party form any very considerable portion of the nation. "His election," according to Grattan, "was a military election; and when the army disposed of the civil government, it was the march of a military chief over a conquered nation. The nation did not rise to assist Louis, or resist Buonaparte, because the nation could not rise against the army. The mind of France, as well as her constitution, had completely lost, for the present, the power of resistance. They passively yielded to superior force."

In short, the opinion of the House of Commons was so unanimous on the disastrous consequences of Napoleon's quitting Elba, that the minority brought charges against Ministers for not having provided more effectual means to prevent his escape. To these charges it was replied, that Britain was not his keeper; that it was impossible to maintain a line of blockade around Elba; and if it had been otherwise, that Britain had no right to interfere with Buonaparte's motions, so far as concerned short expeditions unconnected with the purpose of escape; although it was avowed, that if a British vessel had detected him in the act of going to France with an armed force, for the purpose of invasion, the right of stopping his progress would have been exercised at every hazard. Still it was urged, they had no title either to establish a police upon the island, the object of which should be to watch its acknowledged Emperor, or to maintain a naval force around it, to apprehend him in case he should attempt an escape. Both would have been in direct contradiction of the treaty of Fontainebleau, to which Britain had acceded, though she was not of the contracting parties.

The style of the declaration of the allies was more generally censured in the British Parliament than its warlike tone. It was contended that, by declaring Napoleon an outlaw, it invoked against him the daggers of individuals, as well as the sword of justice. This charge of encouraging assassination was warmly repelled

by the supporters of Ministry. The purpose of the proclamation, it was said, was merely to point out Napoleon to the French nation, as a person who had forfeited his civil rights, by the act of resuming, contrary to treaty, a position in which, from his temper, habits, and talents, he must again become an object of suspicion and terror to all Europe. His inflexible resolution, his unbounded ambition, his own genius, his power over the mind of others—those great military talents, in short, which, so valuable in war, are in peace so dangerous, had afforded reasons for making the peace of Paris, by which Napoleon was personally excluded from the throne. When Napoleon broke that peace, solemnly concluded with Europe, he forfeited his political rights, and in that view alone the outlawry was to be construed. In consequence of these resolutions, adopted at Vienna and London, all Europe rang with the preparations for war; and the number of troops with which the allies proposed to invade France were rated at no less than one million and eleven thousand soldiers.

Before proceeding farther, it is requisite to say a few words on the subject of Murat. He had been for some time agitated by fears naturally arising from the attack made upon his government at the Congress by Talleyrand. The effect had not, it was true, induced the other powers to decide against him; but he seems to have been conscious that the reports of General Nugent and Lord William Bentinck concurred in representing him as having acted in the last campaign rather the part of a trimmer betwixt two parties, than that of a confederate, sincere, as he professed to be, in favour of the allies. Perhaps his conscience acknowledged this truth, for it certainly seems as if Eugene might have been more hardly pressed, had Murat been disposed to act with energy in behalf of the allies. He felt, therefore, that the throne of Tancred tottered under him, and rashly determined that it was better to brave a danger than to allow time to see whether it might not pass away. Murat had held intercourse with the isle of Elba, and cannot but have known Buonaparte's purpose when he left it; but he ought, at the

same time, to have considered, that if his brother-in-law met with any success, his own alliance would become essential to Austria, who had such anxiety to retain the north of Italy, and must have been purchased on his own terms.

Instead, however, of waiting for an opportunity of profiting by Napoleon's attempt, which could not have failed to arrive, Murat resolved to throw himself into the fray, and carve for himself. He placed himself at the head of an army of 50,000 men, and without explaining his intentions, occupied Rome, the Pope and cardinals flying before him; threatened the whole line of the Po, which the Austrian force was inadequate to maintain; and, on 31st of March, addressed a proclamation to all Italians, summoning them to rise in arms for the liberation of their country. It seemed now clear, that the purpose of this son of a pastry-cook amounted to nothing else than the formation of Italy into one state, and the placing himself on the throne of the Cæsars. The proclamation was signed Joachim Napoleon, which last name, formerly laid aside, he reassumed at this critical period. The appeal to the Italians was in vain. The feuds among the petty states are so numerous, their pretensions so irreconcilable, and their weakness has made them so often the prey of successive conquerors, that they found little inviting in the proposal of union, little arousing in the sound of independence. The proclamation, therefore, had small effect, except upon some of the students at Bologna. Murat marched northward, however, and being much superior in numbers, defeated the Austrian general Bianchi, and occupied Modena and Florence.

Murat's attitude was now an alarming one to Europe. If he should press forward into Lombardy, he might co-operate with Buonaparte, now restored to his crown, and would probably be reinforced by thousands of the veterans of the Viceroy Eugene's army. Austria, therefore, became desirous of peace, and offered to guarantee to him the possession of the kingdom of Naples, with an addition he had long coveted, the marches, namely, of

the Roman See. Britain, at the same time, intimated, that having made truce with Joachim at the instance of Austria, it was to last no longer than his good intelligence with her ally. Murat refused the conditions of the one power, and neglected the remonstrances of the other. "It was too late," he said; "Italy deserves freedom, and she shall be free." Here closed all hopes of peace; Austria declared war against Murat, and expedited the reinforcements sent into Italy; and Britain prepared a descent upon his Neapolitan dominions, where Ferdinand still continued to have many adherents.

Murat's character as a tactician was far inferior to that which he deservedly bore as a soldier in the field of battle, and he was still a worse politician than a general. A repulse sustained in an attempt to pass the Po near Occhio-bello, seems to have disconcerted the plan of his whole campaign, nor did he find himself able to renew the negotiations which he had rashly broken off. He seemed to acknowledge, by his military movements, that he had attempted a scheme far beyond his strength and understanding. He retreated upon his whole line, abandoning Parma, Reggio, Modena, Florence, and all Tuscany, by which last movement he put the Austrians in possession of the best and shortest road to Rome. In consequence, he was pressed on his retreat in front and rear, and compelled to give battle near Tolentino. It was sustained for two days (2nd and 3rd of May), but the Neapolitans could not be brought into close action with the iron-nerved Austrians. It was in vain that Murat placed field-pieces in the rear of his attacking columns, with orders to fire grape on them should they retreat; in vain that he himself set the example of the most desperate courage. The Neapolitan army fled in dispersion and discomfiture. Their guns, ammunition, treasure, and baggage, became the spoil of the Austrians; and in traversing the mountains of Abruzzo, Murat lost half his army without stroke of sword. ✓

The defeated prince was pursued into his Neapolitan dominions, where he learned that the Calabrians were in insurrection, and that an English fleet, escorting an

invading army from Sicily, had appeared in the Bay of Naples. His army, reduced to a handful by repeated skirmishes, in which he had behaved with such temerity as to make his followers think he desired death, was directed to throw itself into Capua. He himself, who had left Naples splendidly appparelled, according to his custom, and at the head of a gallant army, now entered its gates attended only by four lancers, alighted at the palace, and appeared before the queen, pale, haggard, dishevelled, with all the signs of extreme fatigue and dejection. His salutation was in the affecting words, "Madam, I have not been able to find death!" He presently found that remaining at Naples, which was about to fall into other hands, would compromise his liberty, perhaps his life. He took leave of his queen, whom circumstances were about to deprive of that title, cut off his hair, and disguising himself in a gray frock, escaped to the little island of Ischia, and reached, on 25th May, Cannes, which had received Napoleon a few weeks before. His wife, immediately afterwards, alarmed by the tendency of the Neapolitan mob to insurrection, surrendered herself to Commodore Campbell of the *Tremendous*, and was received on board his vessel.

A courier announced Murat's arrival in France to Buonaparte, who, instead of sending consolation to his unhappy relative, is said to have asked with bitter scorn, "Whether Naples and France had made peace since the war of 1814?" The answer seems to imply that although the attempts of Joachim and Napoleon coincided in time, and in other circumstances, so punctually as to make it evident that they had been undertaken in concert, yet that there had been no precise correspondence, far less any formal treaty, betwixt the adventurous brothers. Indeed, Napoleon at all times positively denied that he had the least accession to Murat's wildly-concerted project (*levée des boucliers*), and affirmed that it was essentially injurious to him. Napoleon's account was that when he retired to Elba, he took farewell of Murat by letter, forgiving all that had passed between them, and recommending to his brother-in-law to keep on good terms with the

Austrians, and only to check them if he saw them likely to advance on France. He offered also to guarantee his kingdom. Murat returned an affectionate answer, engaging to prove himself, in his conduct towards Napoleon, more an object of pity than resentment, declining any other guarantee than the word of the Emperor, and declaring that the attachment of his future life was to make amends for the past defection. "But it was Murat's fate to ruin us every way," continued Napoleon; "once by declaring against us, and again by unadvisedly taking our part." He encountered Austria without sufficient means, and being ruined, left her without any counterbalancing power in Italy. From that time it became impossible for Napoleon to negotiate with her.

Receiving the Emperor's account as correct, and allowing that the brothers-in-law played each his own part, it was not to be supposed that they acted entirely without a mutual understanding. Each, indeed, was willing to rest on his own fortunes, well knowing that his claim to the other's assistance would depend chiefly upon his success, and unwilling, besides, to relinquish the privilege of making peace, should it be necessary, at the expense of disowning the kindred enterprise of his brother-in-law. Notwithstanding the splendid details which the *Moniteur* gave of Murat's undertaking, while it yet seemed to promise success, it is certain that Buonaparte endeavoured to propitiate Austria, by the offer of abandoning Murat; and that Murat, could his offers have obtained a hearing after the repulse of Occhio-bello, was ready once more to have deserted Napoleon, whose name he had so lately reassumed. Involved in this maze of selfish policy, Murat had now the mortification to find himself condemned by Napoleon, when he might, indeed, be a burden, but could afford him no aid. Had he arrived at Milan as a victor, and extended a friendly hand across the Alps, how different would have been his reception! But Buonaparte refused to see him in his distress, or to permit him to come to Paris, satisfied that the sight of his misery would be a bitter contradiction to the fables which the French journals had for some time published

of his success. Fouché sent him a message, much like that which enjoined the dishonoured ambassadors of Solomon to tarry at Jericho till their beards grew. It recommended to Murat to remain in seclusion till the recollection of his disgrace should be abated by newer objects of general interest.

Buonaparte had sometimes entertained thoughts of bringing Murat to the army, but was afraid of shocking the French soldiers, who would have felt disgust and horror at seeing the man who had betrayed France. "I did not," he said to his followers at St. Helena, "think I could carry him through, and yet he might have gained us the victory; for there were moments during the battle (of Waterloo) when to have forced two or three of the English squares might have ensured it, and Murat was just the man for the work. In leading a charge of cavalry, never was there an officer more determined, more brave, and more brilliant."

Murat was thus prohibited to come to the court of the Tuileries, where his defection might have been forgiven but his defeat was an inextinguishable offence. He remained in obscurity near Toulon, till his fate called him elsewhere, after the decisive battle of Waterloo.¹ From this episode, for such, however important, it is in the present history, we return to France and our immediate subject.

While Murat was struggling and sinking under his

¹ It is well known that Joachim Murat, escaping with difficulty from France, fled to Corsica, and might have obtained permission to reside upon parole in the Austrian territories, safe and unmolested. He nourished a wild idea, however, of recovering his crown, which induced him to reject these terms of safety, and invade the Neapolitan territories at the head of about two hundred men. That his whole expedition might be an accurate parody on that of Buonaparte to Cannes, he published swaggering proclamations, mingled with a proper quantum of falsehood. A storm dispersed his flotilla. He himself, October 8th, landed at a little fishing town near Monte Leone. He was attacked by the country people, fought as he was wont, but was defeated and made prisoner, tried by martial law, and condemned. The Sicilian royal family have shown themselves no forgiving race, otherwise mercy might have been extended to one, who, though now a private person, had been so lately a king that he might be pardoned for forgetting that he had no longer the power of making peace and war without personal responsibility. Murat met his fate as became *Le Beau Sabreur*. He fastened his wife's picture on his breast, refused to have his eyes bandaged, or to use a seat, received six balls through his heart, and met the death which he had braved with impunity in the thick of many conflicts, and sought in vain in so many others.

evil fate, Buonaparte was actively preparing for the approaching contest. His first attempt, as we have already seen, was to conciliate the allied powers. To satisfy Great Britain, he passed an act abolishing the slave-trade, and made some regulations concerning national education, in which he spoke highly of the systems of Bell and Lancaster. These measures were favourably construed by some of our legislators; and that they were so is a complete proof that Buonaparte understood the temper of our nation. To suppose that, during his ten months of retirement, his mind was actively employed upon the miseries of the negroes, or the deplorable state of ignorance to which his own measures, and the want of early instruction, had reduced the youth of France, would argue but little acquaintance with his habits of ambition. To believe, on the contrary, that he would, at his first arrival in France, make any apparent sacrifices which might attract the good-will of his powerful and dangerous neighbours is more consonant with his schemes, his interests, and his character. The path which he chose to gain the esteem of Britain was by no means injudicious. The abolition of negro slavery, and the instruction of the poor, have (to the honour of our legislature) been frequent and anxious subjects of deliberation in the House of Commons; and to mankind, whether individually or collectively, no species of flattery is more pleasing than that of assent and imitation. It is not a little to the credit of our country that the most avowed enemy of Britain strove to cultivate our good opinion, not by any offers of national advantage, but by appearing to concur in general measures of benevolence, and attention to the benefit of society. Yet, upon the whole, the character of Napoleon was too generally understood, and the purpose of his apparent approximation to British sentiments too obviously affected, for serving to make any general or serious impression in his favour.

With Austria Napoleon acted differently. He was aware that no impression could be made on the Emperor Francis, or his minister, Metternich, and that it had be-

come impossible, with their consent, that he should fulfil his promise of presenting his wife and son to the people on the Champ de Mai. Stratagem remained the only resource; and some Frenchmen at Vienna, with those in Maria Louisa's train, formed a scheme of carrying off the Empress of France and her child. The plot was discovered and prevented, and the most public steps were immediately taken to show that Austria considered all ties with Buonaparte as dissolved for ever. Maria Louisa, by her father's commands, laid aside the arms and liveries of her husband, hitherto displayed by her attendants and carriages, and assumed those of the house of Austria. This decisive event put an end to every hope, so long cherished by Napoleon, that he might find some means of regaining the friendship of his father-in-law.

Nor did the other powers in Europe show themselves more accessible to his advances. He was, therefore, reduced to his own partisans in the French nation, and those won over from other parties, whom he might be able to add to them.

The army had sufficiently shown themselves to be his own, upon grounds which are easily appreciated. The host of public official persons, to whom the name under which they exercised their offices was indifferent, provided the salary continued to be attached to them, formed a large and influential body. And although we, who have never, by such mutations of our political system, been put to the trial of either abandoning our means of living, or submitting to a change of government, may, on hearing quoted names of respectability and celebrity who adopted the latter alternative, exclaim against French versatility, a glance at Britain during the frequent changes of the seventeenth century, may induce us to exchange the exclamation of "poor France!" for that of "poor human nature!" The professors of Cromwell's days, who piously termed themselves followers of Providence, because they complied with every change that came uppermost; and the sect of time-servers, including the honest patriot who complained at the Restoration that he had complied with seven forms of government during

the year, but lost his office by being too late of adhering to the last—would have made in their day a list equally long, and as entertaining, as the celebrated *Dictionnaire de Girouettes*. In matters dependent upon a sudden breeze of sentiment, the mercurial Frenchman is more apt to tack about than the phlegmatic and slowly-moved native of Britain; but when the steady trade-wind of interest prevails for a long season, men in all nations and countries show the same irresistible disposition to trim their sails by it; and in politics as in morals, it will be well to pray against being led into temptation.

Besides those attached to him by mere interest, or from gratitude and respect for his talents, Napoleon had now among his adherents, or rather allies, not as a matter of choice, but of necessity, the Jacobin party, who had been obliged, though unwillingly, to adopt him as the head of a government, which they hoped to regenerate. To these were to be added a much larger and more respectable body, who, far from encouraging his attempt, had testified themselves anxious to oppose it to the last, but who, conceiving the cause of the Bourbons entirely lost, were willing to adhere to Buonaparte, on condition of obtaining a free constitution for France. Many of these acted, of course, on mixed motives; but if we were asked to form a definition of them, we should be induced to give the same, which, laying aside party spirit, we should ascribe to a right English Whig, whom we conceive to be a man of sense and moderation, a lover of laws and liberty, whose chief regard to particular princes and families is founded on what he apprehends to be the public good; and who differs from a sensible Tory so little that there is no great chance of their disputing upon any important constitutional question if it is fairly stated to both. Such, we believe, is the difference betwixt rational Constitutionals and Royalists in France; and, undoubtedly, while all the feelings of the latter induced them to eye with abhorrence the domination of a usurper, there must have been many of the former, who, fearing danger to the independence of France from the intervention of foreign powers, conceived that by advo-

cating the cause of Napoleon they were in some degree making a virtue of necessity, and playing an indifferent game with as much skill as the cards they held would permit. Many patriotic and sensible men, who had retained a regard for liberty during all the governments and all the anarchies which had subsisted for twenty years, endeavoured now to frame a system of government, grounded upon something like freedom, upon the difficulties of Buonaparte. Pressed as he was from abroad, and unsupported at home, save by the soldiery, he would, they conceived, be thrown by necessity under the protection of the nation, and obliged to recruit his adherents by complying with public opinion, and adopting a free government. Under this persuasion a great number of such characters, more or less shaded by attachment to a moderate and limited monarchy, were prepared to acknowledge Buonaparte's re-established authority, in so far as he should be found to deserve it, by concessions on his part.

The conduct and arguments of another portion of the friends of the constitution rather resembled that which might have been adopted in England by moderate and intelligent Tories. Such men were not prepared to resign the cause of their lawful monarch because fortune had for a time declared against him. They were of opinion that, to make a constitution permanent, the monarch must have his rights ascertained and vindicated, as well as those of the people; and that if an usurper were to be acknowledged upon any terms, however plausible, so soon as he had cut his way to success by his sword, the nation would be exposed to perpetual revolutions. Louis, these men might argue, had committed no crime whatever; he was only placed in circumstances which made some persons suppose he might possibly be tempted to meditate changes on the constitution, and on the charter which confirmed it. There was meanness in deserting a good and peaceable king at the command of a revolted army and a discarded usurper. They regretted that their prince must be replaced by foreign bayonets; yet it was perhaps better that a moderate and peaceful government should be restored

even thus, than that the French nation should continue to suffer under the despotic tyranny of their own soldiery. Those reasoners ridiculed the idea of a free constitution which was to be generated betwixt Buonaparte, who, in his former reign, never allowed freedom of thought, word, or action, to exist unrepressed, and the old Revolutionists, who, during their period of power, could be satisfied with no degree of liberty until they destroyed every compact which holds civil society together, and made the country resemble one great bedlam, set on fire by the patients, who remained dancing in the midst of the flames.

Such we conceive to have been the principles on which wise and moderate men on either side acted during this distracted period. It is easy to suppose that their opinions must have been varied by many more and less minute shades, arising from temperament, predilections, prejudices, passions, and feelings of self-interest, and that they were on either side liable to be pushed into exaggeration, or, according to the word which was formed to express that exaggeration—into Ultraism.

Meantime, Napoleon did all that was possible to conciliate the people's affection, and to show himself sincerely desirous of giving France the free constitution which he had promised. He used the advice of Carnot, Siéyes, and Fouché, and certainly profited by several of their lessons. He made it, notwithstanding, a condition, that Carnot and Siéyes should accept each a title and a seat in his House of Peers, to show that they were completely reconciled to the Imperial government; and both the ancient republicans condescended to exchange the *bonnet rouge*, for a coronet, which, considering their former opinions, sate somewhat awkwardly upon their brows.

But although the union of the Imperialists and popular party had been cemented by mutual hatred of the Bourbons, and was still kept together by apprehension of the King's adherents within, and his allies on the exterior, seeds of discord were soon visible between the Emperor and the popular leaders. While the former was eager once more to wield with full energy the sceptre he had

recovered, the latter were continually reminding him, that he had only assumed it in a limited and restricted capacity, as the head of a free government, exercising, indeed, its executive power, but under the restraint of a popular constitution. Napoleon, in the frequent disputes which arose on these important points, was obliged to concede to the demagogues the principles which they insisted upon. But then, for the safety of the state, involved in foreign and domestic dangers, he contended it was necessary to invest the chief magistrate with a vigour beyond the law, a dictatorial authority, temporary in its duration, but nearly absolute in its extent, as had been the manner in the free states of antiquity, when the republic was in imminent danger. Carnot and Fouché, on the other hand, considered that, although it seemed natural, and might be easy, to confer such power at the present moment, the resumption of it by the nation, when it was once vested in the hands of Buonaparte, would be a hopeless experiment. The Emperor, therefore, and his ministers, proceeded to their mutual tasks with no mutual confidence; but, on the contrary, with jealousy, thinly veiled by an affectation of deference on the side of Buonaparte, and respect on that of his counsellors.

The very first sacrifice which the Emperor gave to freedom proved an inconvenient one to his government. This was nothing less than the freedom of the press. It is true that the influence of his minister of police managed, by indirect means, to get possession of most of the journals; so that of sixty writers, employed generally, if not constantly, in periodical composition, five only were now found friendly to the royal cause. The other pens, which a few days before described Napoleon as a species of Ogre, who had devoured the youth of France, now wrote him down a hero and a liberator. Still, when the liberty of the press was once established, it was soon found impossible to prevent it from asserting its right of utterance; and there were found authors to advocate the cause of the Bourbons, from principle, from caprice, from the love of contradiction.

Napoleon, who always showed himself sensitively alive to the public censure, established inspectors of the book-sellers. The minister of police, a friend of liberty, but, as Compté, the editor of *Le Censeur*, neatly observed, only of liberty after the fashion of M. Fouché, used every art in his power to prevent the contagion of freedom from spreading too widely. This M. Compté was a loud, and probably a sincere advocate of freedom, and had been a promoter of Buonaparte's return, as likely to advance the good cause. Seeing the prevailing influence of the military, he published some severe remarks on the undue weight the army assumed in public affairs, which, he hesitated not to say, was bringing France to the condition of Rome, when the empire was disposed of by the Prætorian guards. This stung to the quick; the journal was seized by the police, and the minister endeavoured to palliate the fact in the *Moniteur*, by saying that, though seized, it had been instantly restored. But Compté was not a man to be so silenced; he published a contradiction of the official statement, and declared that his journal had not been restored. He was summoned the next day before the prefect, alternately threatened and wheedled, upbraided at one moment with ungrateful resistance to the cause of the Emperor, and requested at the next to think of something in which government might serve him. Steeled against every proffer and entreaty, Compté only required to be permitted to profit by the restored liberty of the press; nor could the worthy magistrate make him rightly understand that when the Emperor gave all men liberty to publish what pleased themselves, it was under the tacit condition that it should also please the prefect and minister of police. Compté had the spirit to publish the whole affair.

In the meanwhile, proclamations of Louis, forbidding the payment of taxes and announcing the arrival of 1,200,000 men under the walls of Paris, covered these walls every night in spite of the police. A newspaper, called the *Lily*, was also secretly, but generally, circulated, which advocated the royal cause. In the better classes

of society, where Buonaparte was feared and hated, lampoons, satires, pasquinades glided from hand to hand, turning his person, ministers, and government into the most bitter ridicule. Others attacked him with eloquent invective, and demanded what he had in common with the word Liberty, which he now pretended to connect with his reign. He was, they said, the sworn enemy of liberty, the assassin of the Republic, the destroyer of French freedom, which had been so dearly bought; the show of liberty which he held was a trick of legerdemain, executed under protection of his bayonets. Such was his notion of liberty when it destroyed the national representation at St. Cloud; such was the freedom he gave when he established an Oriental despotism in the enlightened kingdom of France; such, when abolishing all free communication of sentiments among citizens, and proscribing every liberal and philosophical idea under the nickname of Ideology. "Can it be forgotten," they continued, "that Heaven and Hell are not more irreconcilable ideas, than Buonaparte and Liberty?—The very word Freedom," they said, "was proscribed under his iron reign, and only first gladdened the ears of Frenchmen, after twelve years of humiliation and despair, on the happy restoration of Louis XVIII.—Ah, miserable impostor!" they exclaimed, "when would he have spoke of liberty, had not the return of Louis familiarized us with freedom and peace?" The spirit of disaffection spread among certain classes of the lower ranks. The market-women (*dames des halles*), so formidable during the time of the Fronde, and in the early years of the Revolution, for their opposition to the court, were now royalists, and, of course, clamorous on the side of the party they espoused. They invented, or some loyal rhymers composed for them, a song, the burden of which demanded back the King, as their father of Ghent. They ridiculed, scolded, and mobbed the commissaries of police, who endeavoured to stop these musical processions of disaffection; surrounded the chief of their number, danced around him, and chanted the obnoxious burden, until, Fouché being ashamed to belie the new doctrines of

liberty of thought, speech, and publication, his agents were instructed to leave these Amazons undisturbed on account of their political sentiments.

- While Buonaparte was unable to form an interest in the saloons, and found that even the *dames des halles* were becoming discontented, he had upon his side the militia of the suburbs; those columns of pikemen so famous in the Revolution, whose furious and rude character added to the terrors, if not to the dignity, of his reign. Let us not be accused of a wish to depreciate honest industry, or hold up to contempt the miseries of poverty. It is not the poverty, but the ignorance and vice, of the rabble of great cities, which render them always disagreeable, and sometimes terrible. They are entitled to protection from the laws, and kindness from the government; but he who would use them as political engines invokes the assistance of a blatant beast with a thousand heads, well furnished with fangs to tear and throats to roar, but devoid of tongues to speak reason, ears to hear it, eyes to see it, or judgment to comprehend it.

For a little time after Buonaparte's return, crowds of artisans of the lowest order assembled under the windows of the Tuileries, and demanded to see the Emperor, whom, on his appearance, they greeted with shouts, as *le Grand Entrepreneur*, or general employer of the class of artisans, in language where the coarse phraseology of their rank was adorned with such flowers of rhetoric as the times of terror had coined. Latterly, the numbers of this assembly were maintained by a distribution of a few *sous* to the shouters.

However disgusted with these degrading exhibitions, Buonaparte felt he could not dispense with this species of force, and was compelled to institute a day of procession, and a solemn festival, in favour of this description of persons, who, from the mode in which they were enrolled, were termed Federates.

On 14th May, the motley and ill-arranged ranks which assembled on this memorable occasion, exhibited, in the eyes of the disgusted and-frightened spectators, all that

is degraded by habitual vice, and hardened by stupidity and profligacy. The portentous procession moved on along the Boulevards to the court of the Tuileries, with shouts, in which the praises of the Emperor were mingled with imprecations, and with the Revolutionary songs (long silenced in Paris)—the Marseillaise Hymn, the Carmagnole, and the Day of Departure. The appearance of the men, the refuse of manufactories, of workhouses, of jails; their rags, their filth, their drunkenness; their ecstasies of blasphemous rage, and no less blasphemous joy, stamped them with the character of the willing perpetrators of the worst horrors of the Revolution. Buonaparte himself was judged, by close observers, to shrink with abhorrence from the assembly he himself had convoked. His guards were under arms, and the field artillery loaded, and turned on the Place de Carrousel, filled with the motley crowd, who, from the contrasted colour of the corn porters and charcoal-men, distinguished in the group, were facetiously called his Gray and Black Mousquetaires. He hastened to dismiss his hideous minions, with a sufficient distribution of praises and of liquor. The national guards conceived themselves insulted on this occasion, because compelled to give their attendance along with the Federates. The troops of the line felt for the degraded character of the Emperor. The haughty character of the French soldiers had kept them from fraternizing with the rabble, even in the cause of Napoleon. They had been observed, on the march from Cannes, to cease their cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, when, upon entering any considerable town, the shout was taken up by the mob of the place, and to suspend their acclamations, rather than mingle them with those of the *pequins*, whom they despised. They now muttered to each other, on seeing the court which Buonaparte seemed compelled to bestow on these degraded artisans, that the conqueror of Marengo and Wagram had sunk into the mere captain of a rabble. In short, the disgraceful character of the alliance thus formed between Buonaparte and the lees of the people, was of a nature incapable of being glossed over even in the flattering pages of the *Moniteur*, which, amidst a flourishing description of this memorable

procession, was compelled to admit that, in some places, the name of the Emperor was incongruously mingled with expressions and songs which recalled an era *unfortunately too famous*.

Fretted by external dangers, and internal disturbances, and by the degrading necessity of appearing every night before a mob who familiarly hailed him as *Père le Viollette*, and, above all, galled by the suggestions of his philosophical counsellors, who, among other innovations, wished him to lay aside the style of Emperor for that of President, or Grand General of the Republic, Napoleon, to rid himself at once of occupations offensive to his haughty disposition, withdrew from the Tuileries to the more retired palace of the Elysée Bourbon, and seemed on a sudden to become once more the Emperor he had been before his abdication. Here he took into his own hands, with the assistance of Benjamin Constant, and other statesmen, the construction of a new constitution. Their system included all those checks and regulations which are understood to form the essence of a free government, and greatly resembled that granted by the Royal Charter.¹ Nevertheless, it was extremely ill received by all parties, but especially by those who expected from Napoleon a constitution more free than that which they had dissolved by driving Louis XVIII. from the throne. There were other grave exceptions stated against the scheme of government.

¹ The following is an abridgment of its declarations:—The legislative power resides in the Emperor and two Chambers. The Chamber of Peers is hereditary, and the Emperor names them. Their number is unlimited. The Second Chamber is elected by the people, and is to consist of 629 members—none are to be under twenty-five years. The President is appointed by the members, but approved of by the Emperor. Members to be paid at the rate settled by the Constituent Assembly. It is to be renewed every five years. The Emperor may prorogue, adjourn, or dissolve the House of Representatives. Sittings to be public. The Electoral Colleges are maintained. Land-tax and direct taxes to be voted only for a year; indirect may be for several years. No levy of men for the army, nor any exchange of territory, but by a law. Taxes to be proposed by the Chamber of Representatives. Ministers to be responsible. Judges to be irremovable. Juries to be established. Right of petition is established—freedom of worship—inviolability of property. The last article says, that “the French people declare that they do not mean to delegate the power of restoring the Bourbons, or any prince of that family; even in case of the exclusion of the Imperial dynasty”.

First, The same objection was stated against this Imperial grant which had been urged with so much vehemence against the royal charter, namely, that it was not a compact between the people and the sovereign, in which the former called the latter to the throne under certain conditions, but a recognition by the sovereign of the liberties of the people. The meeting of the Champ de Mai had indeed been summoned (as intimated in the decrees from Lyons) chiefly with the purpose of forming and adopting the new constitution; but, according to the present system, they were only to have the choice of adopting or rejecting that which Napoleon had prepared for them. The disappointment was great among those philosophers who desired "better bread than is made of wheat", and could not enjoy liberty itself, unless it emanated directly from the will of the people, and was sanctioned by popular discussion. But Napoleon was determined that the convention of the 10th May should have no other concern in the constitution, save to accept it when offered. He would not intrust such an assembly with the revision of the laws by which he was to govern.

Secondly, This new constitution, though presenting an entirely new basis of government, was published under the singular title of an "Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Emperor", and thereby constituted a sort of appendix to a huge mass of unrepealed organic laws, many of them inconsistent with the Additional Act in tenor and in spirit.

Those who had enjoyed the direct confidence of the Emperor while the treaty was framing, endeavoured to persuade themselves that Napoleon meant fairly by France, yet confessed they had found it difficult to enlighten his ideas on the subject of a limited monarchy. They felt that though the Emperor might be induced to contract his authority, yet what remained in his own hand would be wielded as arbitrarily as ever; and likewise that he would never regard his ministers otherwise than as the immediate executors of his pleasure, and responsible to himself alone. He would still continue to transport his whole chancery at his stirrup, and transmit

sealed orders to be executed by a minister whom he had not consulted on their import.

The Royalists triumphed on the publication of this Additional Act: "Was it for this," they said, "you broke your oaths, and banished your monarch, to get the same, or nearly similar, laws imposed on you by a Russian ukase or a Turkish firman, which you heretofore enjoyed by charter, in the same manner as your ancestors, called freemen by excellence, held their rights from their limited sovereigns? and for this have you exchanged a peaceful prince, whose very weakness was your security, for an ambitious warrior, whose strength is your weakness? For this have you a second time gone to war with all Europe—for the Additional Act and the Champ de Mai?"

The more determined Republicans, besides their particular objections to an Upper House, which the Emperor could fill with his own minions, so as effectually to control the representatives of the people, found the proposed constitution utterly devoid of the salt which should savour it. There was no acknowledgment of abstract principles; no dissertation concerning the rights of the government and the governed; no metaphysical discussions on the origin of laws; and they were as much mortified and disappointed as the zealot who hears a discourse on practical morality, when he expected a sermon on the doctrinal points of theology. The unfortunate Additional Act became the subject of attack and raillery on all sides; and was esteemed to possess in so slight a degree the principles of durability, that a bookseller being asked for a copy by a customer, replied, "He did not deal in *periodical publications*."

Under these auspices the Champ de Mai was opened, and that it might be in all respects incongruous, it was held on the 1st of June. Deputies were supposed to attend from all departments, not, as it had been latterly arranged, to canvass the new constitution, but to swear to observe it; and not to receive the Empress Maria Louisa and her son as the pledge of twenty years peace, but to behold the fatal eagles, the signal of instant and bloody war, distributed by the Emperor to the soldiers.

Napoleon and his brothers, whom he had once more collected around him, figured, in quaint and fantastic robes, in the Champ de Mai; he as Emperor, and they as princes of the blood—another subject of discontent to the Republicans. The report of the votes was made, the electors swore to the Additional Act, the drums rolled, the trumpets flourished, the cannon thundered. But the acclamations were few and forced. The Emperor seemed to view the scene as an empty pageant, until he was summoned to the delivery of the eagles to the various new-raised regiments; and then, amid the emblems of past, and, as might be hoped, the auguries of future victories, he was himself again. But, on the whole, the Champ de Mai was, in the language of Paris, *une pièce tombée*, a condemned farce, which was soon to be succeeded by a bloody tragedy.

The meeting of the Chambers was the next subject of interest. The Chamber of Peers did not present, like the corresponding assembly in Britain, members of long descent, ample fortunes, independence of principle, and education corresponding to their rank of hereditary legislators. It consisted in the princes of Napoleon's blood royal, to whom was added Lucien, long estranged from his brother's councils, but who now, instigated by fraternal affection, or tired of literary leisure, having presented his epic poem to a thankless and regardless public, endeavoured to save his brother in his present difficulties, as by his courage and presence of mind he had assisted him during the revolution of Brumaire. There were about one hundred other dignitaries, more than one half of whom were military men, including two or three old Jacobins, such as Siéyes and Carnot, who had taken titles, decorations, and rank, inconsistently with the tenor of their whole life. The rest had been the creatures of Buonaparte's former reign, with some men of letters devoted to his cause, and recently ennobled. This body, which could have no other will than that of the Emperor, was regarded by the Republicans and Constitutionalists with jealousy, and by the citizens with contempt. Buonaparte himself expressed his opinion of it with some-

thing approaching the latter sentiment. He had scarce formed his tools, before he seems to have been convinced of their inefficacy, and of the little influence which they could exercise on the public mind.

It was very different with the second chamber, in which were posted the ancient men of the Revolution, and their newer associates, who looked forward with hope that Buonaparte might yet assume the character of a patriot sovereign, and by his military talents save France for her sake, not for his own. The latter class comprehended many men, not only of talent, but of virtue and public spirit; with too large a proportion, certainly, of those who vainly desired a system of Republican liberty, which so many years of bloody and fruitless experiment should have led even the most extravagant to abandon, as inconsistent with the situation of the country, and the genius of the French nation.

The disputes of the Chamber of Representatives with the executive government commenced on June 4th, the first day of their sitting; and, like those of their predecessors, upon points of idle etiquette. They chose Lanjuinais for their president; a preferment which, alighting on one who had been the defender of Louis XVI., the active and determined resister of the power of Robespierre, and especially, the statesman who drew up the list of crimes in consequence of which Napoleon's forfeiture had been declared in 1814, could not be acceptable to the Emperor. Napoleon being applied to for confirmation of the election, referred the committee for his answer to the chamberlain, who, he stated, would deliver it the next day by the page in waiting. The Chamber took fire, and Napoleon was compelled to return an immediate though reluctant approval of their choice. The next remarkable indication of the temper of the Chamber, was the *extempore* effusion of a deputy named Sibuet, against the use of the epithets of duke, count, and other titles of honour in the Chamber of Representatives. Being observed to read his invective from notes, which was contrary to the form of the Chamber, Sibuet was silenced for the moment as out of order; but the next day, or

soon afterwards, having got his speech by heart, the Chamber was under the necessity of listening to him, and his motion was got rid of with difficulty. On the same day, a list of the persons appointed to the peerage was demanded from Carnot, in his capacity of minister, which he declined to render till the session had commenced. This also occasioned much uproar and violence, which the president could scarce silence by the incessant peal of his bell. The oath to be taken by the deputies was next severely scrutinized, and the Imperialists carried with difficulty a resolution that it should be taken to the Emperor and the constitution, without mention of the nation.

The second meeting, on June 7th, was as tumultuous as the first. A motion was made by Felix Lepelletier that the Chamber should decree to Napoleon the title of Saviour of his Country. This was resisted on the satisfactory ground that the country was not yet saved; and the Chamber passed to the order of the day by acclamation.

Notwithstanding these open intimations of the reviving spirit of Jacobinism, or at least of opposition to the Imperial sway, Napoleon's situation obliged him for the time to address the unruly spirits which he had called together, with the confidence which it was said necromancers found it needful to use towards the dangerous fiends whom they had evoked. His address to both Chambers was sensible, manly, and becoming his situation. He surrendered, in their presence, all his pretensions to absolute power, and professed himself a friend to liberty; demanded the assistance of the Chambers in matters of finance, intimated a desire of some regulations to check the license of the press, and required from the representatives an example of confidence, energy, and patriotism, to encounter the dangers to which the country was exposed. The Peers replied in corresponding terms. Not so the second Chamber; for, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the Imperialists, their reply bore a strong tincture of the sentiments of the opposite party. The Chamber promised, indeed, their unanimous support

in repelling the foreign enemy; but they announced their intention to take under their consideration the constitution, as recognized by the Additional Act, and to point out its defects and imperfections, with the necessary remedies. They also added a moderating hint, directed against the fervour of Napoleon's ambition. "The nation," they said, "nourishes no plans of aggrandizement. Not even the will of a victorious prince will lead them beyond the boundaries of self-defence." In his rejoinder, Napoleon did not suffer these obnoxious hints to escape his notice. He endeavoured to school this refractory assembly into veneration for the constitution, which he declared to be "the pole-star in the tempest"; and judiciously observed, "there was little cause to provide against the intoxications of triumph, when they were about to contend for existence. He stated the crisis to be imminent, and cautioned the Chamber to avoid the conduct of the Roman people in the latter ages of the empire, who could not resist the temptation of engaging furiously in abstract discussions, even while the battering-rams of the common enemy were shaking the gates of the capitol."

Thus parted Buonaparte and his Chambers of Legislature; he to try his fortune in the field of battle, they to their task of altering and modifying the laws, and inspiring a more popular spirit and air into the enactments he had made, in hopes that the dictatorship of the Jacobins might be once again substituted for the dictatorship of the Emperor. All men saw that the Imperialists and Republicans only waited till the field was won that they might contend for the booty; and so little was the nation disposed to sympathize with the active, turbulent, and bustling demagogues, by whom the contest was to be maintained against the Emperor, that almost all predicted with great unconcern their probable expulsion, either by the sword of Buonaparte or the Bourbons.

We are now to consider the preparations made for the invasion of France along the whole eastern frontier, the means of resistance which the talents of the Emperor

presented to his numerous enemies, and the internal situation of the country itself.

While the events now commemorated were passing in France, the allies made the most gigantic preparations for the renewal of war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer of England had achieved a loan of thirty-six millions, upon terms surprisingly moderate, and the command of this treasure had put the whole troops of the coalition into the most active advance.

The seat of the Congress had been removed from Vienna to Frankfort, to be near the theatre of war. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, with the King of Prussia, had once more placed themselves at the head of their respective armies. The whole eastern frontier was menaced by immense forces. One hundred and fifty thousand Austrians, disengaged from Murat, might enter France through Switzerland, the Cantons having acceded to the coalition. An army equal in strength menaced the higher Rhine. Schwartzenberg commanded the Austrians in chief, having under him Bellegarde, and Frimont, Bianchi, and Vincent. Two hundred thousand Russians were pressing towards the frontiers of Alsace. The Archduke Constantine was nominated generalissimo, but Barclay de Tolly, Sacken, Langeron, &c., were the efficient commanders. One hundred and fifty thousand Prussians, under Blucher, occupied Flanders, and were united with about eighty thousand troops, British, or in British pay, under the Duke of Wellington. There were also to be reckoned the contingents of the different princes of Germany, so that the allied forces were computed grossly to amount to upwards of one million of men. The reader must not, however, suppose that such an immense force was, or could be, brought forward at once. They were necessarily disposed on various lines, for the convenience of subsistence, and were to be brought up successively in support of each other.

To meet this immense array, Napoleon, with his usual talent and celerity, had brought forward means of surprising extent. The regular army, diminished by the Bourbons, had been, by calling out the retired officers

and disbanded soldiers, increased from something rather under 100,000 men, to double that number of experienced troops, of the first quality. But this was dust in the balance; and the mode of conscription was so intimately connected with Napoleon's wars of conquest and disaster, that he dared not propose, nor would the Chamber of Representatives have agreed, to have recourse to the old and odious resource of conscription, which, however, Buonaparte trusted he might still find effectual in the month of June, to the number of 300,000. In the meantime, it was proposed to render moveable, for active service, two hundred battalions of the national guard, choosing those most fit for duty, which would make a force of 112,000 men. It was also proposed to levy as many Federates, that is, volunteers of the lower orders, as could be brought together in the different departments. The levy of the national guards was ordered by an Imperial decree of 5th April, 1815, and commissioners, chiefly of the Jacobin faction, were sent down into the different departments, Buonaparte being well pleased at once to employ them in their own sphere and to get rid of their presence at Paris. Their efforts were, however, unable to excite the spirit of the country; for they had either survived their own energies or the nation had been too long accustomed to their mode of oratory to feel any responsive impulse. Liberty and fraternity was no longer a rallying sound, and the summons to arms, by decrees as peremptory as those relating to the conscription, though bearing another name, spread a general spirit of disgust through many departments in the north of France. There and in Brittany the disaffection of the inhabitants appeared in a sullen, dogged stubbornness, rather than in the form of active resistance to Napoleon's decrees. The national guards refused to parade, and, if compelled to do so, took every opportunity to desert and return home; so that it often happened that a battalion, which had mustered six hundred men, dwindled down to a fifth before they had marched two leagues.

In the departments of La Garde, of the Marne, and the

Nether Loire, the white flag was displayed, and the tree of liberty, which had been replanted in many places after the political regeneration of Buonaparte, was cut down. The public mind in many provinces displayed itself as highly unfavourable to Napoleon.

A report drawn up by Fouché, stated in high-coloured language the general disaffection. Napoleon always considered this communication as published with a view of prejudicing his affairs; and as that versatile statesman was already in secret correspondence with the allies, it was probably intended as much to encourage the Royalists, as to dismay the adherents of Napoleon. This arch-intriguer, whom, to use an expression of Junius, treachery itself could not trust, was at one moment nearly caught in his own toils; and although he carried the matter with infinite address, Napoleon would have made him a prisoner, or caused him to be shot, but for the intimation of Carnot, that, if he did so, his own reign would not last an hour longer.

Thus Buonaparte was already, in a great measure, reduced to the office of Generalissimo of the State; and there were not wanting many who dared to entreat him to heal the wounds of the country by a second abdication in favour of his son—a measure which the popular party conceived might avert the impending danger of invasion.

In the meantime, about the middle of May, a short insurrection broke out in La Vendée, under De Autechamp, Suzannet, Sapineau, and especially the brave La Rochejacquelein. The war was neither long nor bloody, for an overpowering force was directed against the insurgents, under Generals Lamarque and Travot. The people were ill prepared for resistance, and the government, menaced them with the greatest severities, the instructions of Carnot to the military having a strong tincture of his ancient education in the school of terror. Yet the Chamber of Deputies did not in all respects sanction the severities of the government. When a member, called Leguevel, made a motion for punishing, with pains and penalties, the Royalists of the west, the assembly heard him with patience and approbation, propose that the

goods and estates of the revolters (whom he qualified as brigands, priests, and Royalists) should be confiscated; but when he added, that not only the insurgents themselves, but their relations in the direct line, whether ascendants or descendants, should be declared outlaws, a general exclamation of horror drove the orator from the tribune.

After a battle near La Roche Servière, which cost the brave La Rochejacquelein his life, the remaining chiefs signed a capitulation, by which they disbanded their followers, and laid down their arms, at the very time when holding out a few days would have made them acquainted with the battle of Waterloo. Released from actual civil war, Napoleon now had leisure to prepare for the external conflict.

The means resorted to by the French government, which we have already alluded to, had enabled Carnot to represent the national means in a most respectable point of view. By his report to the two Chambers, he stated, that on 1st April, 1814, the army had consisted of 450,000 men, who had been reduced by the Bourbons to 175,000. Since the return of Napoleon, the number had been increased to 375,000 combatants of every kind; and before the 1st of August, was expected to amount to half a million. The Imperial Guards, who were termed the country's brightest ornament in time of peace, and its best bulwark in time of war, were recruited to the number of 40,000.

Stupendous efforts had repaired, the report stated, the losses of the artillery during the three disastrous years of 1812, 1813, 1814. Stores, ammunition, arms of every kind, were said to be provided in abundance. The remounting of the cavalry had been accomplished in such a manner as to excite the surprise of everyone. Finally, there was, as a body in reserve, the whole mass of sedentary national guards, so called, because they were not among the chosen bands which had been declared moveable. But the bulk of these were either unfit for service, or unwilling to serve, and could only be relied on for securing the public tranquillity. Corps of Federates had

been formed in all the districts where materials could be found of which to compose them.

From these forces Napoleon selected a grand army to act under his personal orders. They were chosen with great care, and the preparation of their *matériel* was of the most extensive and complete description. The numbers in gross might amount to 150,000; as great a number of troops, perhaps, as can conveniently move upon one plan of operations, or be subjected to one generalissimo. A large deduction is to be made to attain the exact amount of his effective force.

Thus prepared for action, no doubt was made that Buonaparte would open the campaign by assuming offensive operations. To wait till the enemy had assembled their full force on his frontier, would have suited neither the man nor the moment. It was most agreeable to his system, his disposition, and his interest, to rush upon some separate army of the allies, surprise them, according to his own phrase, in delict, and, by its dispersion or annihilation, give courage to France, animate her to fresh exertions in his cause, intimidate the confederated powers, and gain time for sowing in their league the seeds of disunion. Even the Royalists, whose interest was so immediately connected with the defeat of Buonaparte, were dismayed by witnessing his gigantic preparations, and sadly anticipated victories as the first result, though they trusted that, as in 1814, he would be at length worn out by force of numbers and reiterated exertions.

But though all guessed at the mode of tactics which Napoleon would employ, there was a difference of opinion respecting the point on which his first exertions would be made; and in general it was augured, that, trusting to the strength of Lisle, Valenciennes, and other fortified places on the frontiers of Flanders, his first real attack, whatever diversion might be made elsewhere, would take place upon Manheim, with the view of breaking asunder the Austrian and Russian armies as they were forming, or rather of attacking them separately, to prevent their communication in line. If he should succeed in thus overwhelming the advance of the Austrians and Russians,

by directing his main force to this one point before they were fully prepared, it was supposed he might break up the plan of the allies for this campaign.

But Buonaparte was desirous to aim a decisive blow at the most enterprising and venturous of the invading armies. He knew Blucher, and had heard of Wellington; he therefore resolved to move against those generals, while he opposed walls and fortified places to the more slow and cautious advance of the Austrian general, Schwartzenberg, and trusted that distance might render ineffectual the progress of the Russians.

According to this general system, Paris, under the direction of General Haxo, was, on the northern side, placed in a complete state of defence, by a double line of fortifications, so that, if the first were forced, the defenders might retire within the second, instead of being compelled, as in the preceding year, to quit the heights and fall back upon the city. Montmartre was very strongly fortified. The southern part of the city on the opposite side of the Seine was only covered with a few field-works; time, and the open character of the ground, permitting no more. But the Seine itself was relied upon as a barrier, having proved such in 1814.

On the frontiers, similar precautions were observed. Intrenchments were constructed in the five principal passes of the Vosgesian mountains, and all the natural passes and strongholds of Lorraine were put in the best possible state of defence. The posts on the inner line were strengthened with the greatest care. The fine military position under the walls of Lyons was improved with great expense and labour. A *tête-de-pont* was erected at Brotteau; a drawbridge and barricade protected the suburb La Guillotière; redoubts were erected between the Saonne and Rhine, and upon the heights of Pierre-Encise and the Quarter of Saint John. Guise, Vitri, Soissons, Chauteau-Thierry, Langres, and all the towns capable of any defence, were rendered as strong as posts, palisades, redoubts, and field-works could make them. The Russian armies, though pressing fast forward, were not as yet arrived upon the line of operations; and

Napoleon doubtless trusted that these impediments, in front of the Austrian line, would arrest any hasty advance on their part, since the well-known tactics of that school declare against leaving in their rear fortresses or towns possessed by the enemy, however insignificant or slightly garrisoned, or however completely they might be masked.

About now to commence his operations, Napoleon summoned round him his best and most experienced generals. Soult, late minister of war for Louis XVIII., was named major-general. He obeyed, he says, not in any respect as an enemy of the King, but as a citizen and soldier, whose duty it was to obey whomsoever was at the head of the government, as that of the Vicar of Bray subjected him in ghostly submission to each head of the Church *pro tempore*. Ney was ordered to repair to the army at Lisle, "if he wished", so the command was expressed, "to witness the first battle". Macdonald was strongly solicited to accept a command, but declined it with disdain. Davoust, the minister-at-war, undertook to remove his scruples, and spoke to him of what his honour required. "It is not from you," replied the *maréchal*, "that I am to learn sentiments of honour," and persisted in his refusal. D'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gerard, and Mouton de Lobau, acted as lieutenant-generals. The cavalry was placed under the command of Grouchy (whom Napoleon had created a *maréchal*). Pajol, Excelmans, Milhaud, and Kellerman, were his seconds in command. Flahault, Dejean, Labédoyère, and other officers of distinction, acted as the Emperor's aides-de-camp. The artillery were three hundred pieces; the cavalry approached to twenty-five thousand men; the guard to the same number; and there is little doubt that the whole army amounted in effective force to nearly 130,000 soldiers, in the most complete state as to arms and equipment, who now marched to a war which they themselves had occasioned, under an Emperor of their own making, and bore both in their hearts and on their tongues the sentiments of death or victory.

For the protection of the rest of the frontier, during

Napoleon's campaign in Flanders, Suchet was intrusted with the command on the frontiers of Switzerland, with directions to attack Montmellian as soon as possible after the 14th of June, which day Buonaparte had fixed for the commencement of hostilities. Massena was ordered to repair to Metz, to assume the government of that important fortress, and the command of the 3rd and 4th divisions. All preparations being thus made, Napoleon at length announced what had long occupied his secret thoughts. "I go," he said, as he threw himself into his carriage to join his army, "I go to measure myself with Wellington!"

But although Napoleon's expressions were those of confidence and defiance, his internal feelings were of a different complexion. "I no longer felt," as he afterwards expressed himself in his exile, "that complete confidence in final success which accompanied me on former undertakings. Whether it was that I was getting beyond the period of life when men are usually favoured by fortune, or whether the impulse of my career seemed impeded in my own eyes, and to my own imagination, it is certain that I felt a depression of spirit. Fortune, which used to follow my steps to load me with her bounties, was now a severe deity, from whom I might snatch a few favours, but for which she exacted severe retribution. I had no sooner gained an advantage than it was followed by a reverse." With such feelings, not certainly unwarranted by the circumstances under which the campaign was undertaken, nor disproved by the event, Napoleon undertook his shortest and last campaign.

The triple line of strong fortresses possessed by the French on the borders of Belgium, served Napoleon as a curtain behind which he could prepare his levies and unite his forces at pleasure, without any possibility of the allies or their generals being able to observe his motions, or prepare for the attack which such motions indicated. On the other hand, the frontier of Belgium was open to his observation, and he knew perfectly the general disposal of the allied force.

If the French had been prepared to make their medi-

tated attack upon Flanders in the month of May, they would have found no formidable force to oppose them, as at that time the armies of the Prussian general Kleist, and the hereditary Prince of Orange, did not, in all, exceed 50,000 men. But the return of Napoleon, which again awakened the war, was an event as totally unexpected in France as in Flanders, and, therefore, that nation was as much unprepared to make an attack as the allies to repel one. Thus it happened that, while Napoleon was exerting himself to collect a sufficient army by the means we have mentioned, the Duke of Wellington, who arrived at Brussels from Vienna in the beginning of April, had leisure to garrison and supply the strong places of Ostend, Antwerp, and Nieuport, which the French had not dismantled, and to fortify Ypres, Tournay, Mons, and Ath. He had also leisure to receive his reinforcements from England, and to collect the German, Dutch, and Belgian contingents.

Thus collected and reinforced, the Duke of Wellington's army might contain about 30,000 English troops. They were not, however, those veteran soldiers who had served under him during the Peninsular war; the flower of which had been despatched upon the American expedition. Most were second battalions, or regiments which had been lately filled up with new recruits. The foreigners were 15,000 Hanoverians, with the celebrated German Legion, 8000 strong, which had so often distinguished itself in Spain; 5000 Brunswickers, under their gallant duke; and about 17,000 Belgians, Dutch, and Nassau troops, commanded by the Prince of Orange.

Great and just reliance was placed upon the Germans; but some apprehensions were entertained for the steadiness of the Belgian troops. Discontents had prevailed among them, which, at one period, had broken out in open mutiny, and was not subdued without bloodshed. Most of them had served in the French ranks, and it was feared some of them might preserve predilections and correspondences dangerous to the general cause. Buonaparte was under the same belief. He brought in his train several Belgian officers, believing there would be

a movement in his favour soon as he entered the Netherlands. But the Flemings are a people of sound sense and feeling. Whatever jealousies might have been instilled into them for their religion and privileges under the reign of a Protestant and a Dutch sovereign, these were swallowed up in their apprehensions for the returning tyranny of Napoleon. Some of these troops behaved with distinguished valour; and most of them supported the ancient military character of the Walloons. The Dutch corps were in general enthusiastically attached to the Prince of Orange, and the cause of independence.

The Prussian army had been recruited to its highest war-establishment, within an incredibly short space of time after Buonaparte's return had been made public, and was reinforced in a manner surprising to those who do not reflect how much the resources of a state depend on the zeal of the inhabitants. Their enthusiastic hatred to France, founded partly on the recollection of former injuries, partly on that of recent success, was animated at once by feelings of triumph and of revenge, and they marched to this new war as to a national crusade against an inveterate enemy, whom, when at their feet, they had treated with injudicious clemency. Blucher was, however, deprived of a valuable part of his army by the discontent of Saxon troops. A mutiny had broken out among them when the Congress announced their intention of transferring part of the Saxon dominions to Prussia; much bloodshed had ensued, and it was judged most prudent that the troops of Saxony should remain in garrison in the German fortresses.

Prince Blucher arrived at Liege with the Prussian army, which was concentrated on the Sambre and Meuse rivers, occupying Charleroi, Namur, Givet, and Liege. The Duke of Wellington covered Brussels, where he had fixed his headquarters, communicating by his left with the right of the Prussians. There was a general idea that Napoleon's threatened advance would take place on Namur, as he was likely to find least opposition at that dismantled city.

The Duke of Wellington's first corps, under the Prince

of Orange, with two divisions of British, two of Hanoverians, and two of Belgians, occupied Enghien, Brain le Comte, and Nivelles, and served as a reserve to the Prussian division under Ziethen, which was at Charleroi. The second division, commanded by Lord Hill, included two British, two Hanoverian, and one Belgian divisions. It was cantoned at Halle, Oudenarde, and Grammont. The reserve, under Picton, who, at Lord Wellington's special request, had accepted the situation of second in command, consisted of the remaining two British divisions, with three of the Hanoverians, and was stationed at Brussels and Ghent. The cavalry occupied Grammont and Nieve.

The Anglo-Belgic army was so disposed, therefore, as might enable the divisions to combine with each other, and with the Prussians, upon the earliest authentic intelligence of the enemy's being put in motion. At the same time, the various corps were necessarily, to a certain degree, detached, both for the purpose of being more easily maintained (especially the cavalry), and also because, from the impossibility of foreseeing in what direction the French Emperor might make his attack, it was necessary to maintain such an extensive line of defence as to be prepared for his arrival upon any given point. This is the necessary inconvenience attached to a defensive position, where, if the resisting general should concentrate his whole forces upon any one point of the line to be defended, the enemy would, of course, choose to make their assault on some of the other points, which such concentration must necessarily leave comparatively open.

In the meantime, Napoleon in person advanced to Vervins on 12th June, with his Guard, who had marched from Paris. The other divisions of his selected grand army had been assembled on the frontier, and the whole, consisting of five divisions of infantry and four of cavalry, were combined at Beaumont on the 14th of the same month, with a degree of secrecy and expedition which showed the usual "genius" of their commander. Napoleon reviewed the troops in person, reminded them

that the day was the anniversary of the great victories of Marengo and Friedland, and called on them to remember that the enemies whom they had then defeated, were the same which were now arrayed against them. "Are they and we," he asked, "no longer the same men?" The address produced the strongest effect on the minds of the French soldiery, always sensitively alive to military and national glory.

Upon the 15th June, the French army was in motion in every direction. Their advanced-guard of light troops swept the western bank of the Sambre clear of all the allied corps of observation. They then advanced upon Charleroi, which was well defended by the Prussians under General Ziethen, who was at length compelled to retire on the large village of Gosselies. Here his retreat was cut off by the second division of the French army, and Ziethen was compelled to take the route of Fleurus, by which he united himself with the Prussian force, which lay about the villages of Ligny and St. Amand. The Prussian general had, however, obeyed his orders, by making such protracted resistance as gave time for the alarm being taken. In the attack and retreat, he lost four or five guns, and a considerable number in killed and wounded.

By this movement the plan of Napoleon was made manifest. It was at once most scientific and adventurous. His numbers were unequal to sustain a conflict with the armies of Blucher and Wellington united, but by forcing his way so as to separate the one enemy from the other, he would gain the advantage of acting against either individually with the gross of his forces, while he could spare enough of detached troops to keep the other in check. To accomplish this masterly manœuvre, it was necessary to push onwards upon a part of the British advance, which occupied the position of Quatre-bras, and the yet more advanced post of Frasnes, where some of the Nassau troops were stationed. But the extreme rapidity of Napoleon's forced marches had in some measure prevented the execution of his plan, by dispersing *his forces so much that, at a time when every hour was*

of consequence, he was compelled to remain at Charleroi until his wearied and over-marched army had collected.

In the meantime, Ney was detached against Frasnes and Quatre-bras, but the troops of Namur kept their post on the evening of the 15th. It is possible the French *maréchal* might have succeeded had he attacked at Frasnes with his whole force; but hearing a cannonade in the direction of Fleurus (which was that of Ziethen's action), he detached a division to support the French in that quarter. For this exercise of his own judgment, instead of yielding precise obedience to his orders, Ney was reprimanded; a circumstance curiously contrasted with the case of Grouchy, upon whom Napoleon laid the whole blame of the defeat at Waterloo, because he *did* follow his orders precisely, and press the Prussians at Wavre, instead of being diverted from that object by the cannonade on his left.*

The manœuvre meditated by Napoleon thus failed, though it had nearly been successful. He continued, however, to entertain the same purpose of dividing, if possible, the British army from the Prussians.

The British general received intelligence of the advance of the French, at Brussels, at six o'clock on the evening of the 15th,¹ but it was not of sufficient certainty to enable him to put his army in motion, on an occasion when a false movement might have been irretrievable ruin. About eleven of the same night, the certain accounts reached Brussels that the advance of the French was upon the line of the Sambre. Reinforcements were hastily moved on Quatre-bras, and the Duke of Wellington arrived there in person at an early hour on the 16th, and instantly rode from that position to Bric, where he had a meeting with Blücher. It appeared at this time that the whole French force was about to be directed against the Prussians.

Blücher was prepared to receive them. Three of his divisions, to the number of 80,000 men, had been got into position on a chain of gentle heights, running from

¹ The reader will find this statement corrected, on some points, in a note later on.

Bric to Sombref; in front of their line lay the villages of the Greater and Lesser St. Amand, as also that of Ligny, all of which were strongly occupied. From the extremity of his right, Blucher could communicate with the British at Quatre-bras, upon which the Duke of Wellington was, as fast as distance would permit, concentrating his army. The fourth Prussian division, being that of Bulow, stationed between Liege and Hainault, was at too great a distance to be brought up, though every effort was made for the purpose. Blucher undertook, however, notwithstanding the absence of Bulow, to receive a battle in this position, trusting to the support of the English army, who, by a flank movement to the left, were to march to his assistance.

Napoleon had, in the meantime, settled his own plan of battle. He determined to leave Ney, with a division of 45,000 men, with instructions to drive the English from Quatre-bras, ere their army was concentrated and reinforced, and thus prevent their co-operating with Blucher, while he himself, with the main body of his army, attacked the Prussian position at Ligny. Ney being thus on the French left wing at Frasnés and Quatre-bras, and Buonaparte on the right at Ligny, a division under D'Erlon, amounting to 10,000 men, served as a centre of the army, and was placed near Marchiennes, from which it might march laterally either to support Ney or Napoleon, whichever might require assistance. As two battles thus took place on the 16th June, it is necessary to take distinct notice of both.

That of Ligny was the principal action. The French Emperor was unable to concentrate his forces, so as to commence the attack upon the Prussians, until three o'clock in the afternoon, at which hour it began with uncommon fury all along the Prussian line. After a continued attack of two hours, the French had only obtained possession of a part of the village of St. Amand. The position of the Prussians, however, was thus far defective that the main part of their army being drawn up on the heights, and the remainder occupying villages which lay at their foot, the reinforcements despatched to

the latter were necessarily exposed, during their descent, to the fire from the French artillery, placed on the meadows below. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, by which the Prussians suffered much, Napoleon thought the issue of the contest so doubtful, that he sent for D'Erlon's division, which, as we have mentioned, was stationed near Marchiennes, half-way betwixt Quatrebras and Ligny. In the meanwhile, observing that Blucher drew his reserves together on St. Amand, he changed his point of attack, and directed all his force against Ligny, of which, after a desperate resistance, he at length obtained possession. The French Guards, supported by their heavy cavalry, ascended the heights, and attacked the Prussian position in the rear of Ligny. The reserves of the Prussian infantry having been despatched to St. Amand, Blucher had no means of repelling this attack, save by his cavalry. He placed himself at their head, and charged in the most determined manner, but without success. The cavalry of Blucher were forced back in disorder.

The prince maréchal, as he directed the retreat, was involved in one of the charges of cavalry, his horse struck down by a cannon-shot, and he himself prostrated on the ground. His aide-de-camp threw himself beside the veteran, determined to share his fate, and had the precaution to fling a cloak over him, to prevent his being recognized by the French. The enemy's cuirassiers passed over him, and it was not until they were repulsed, and in their turn pursued by the Prussian cavalry, that the gallant veteran was raised and remounted. Blucher's death, or captivity, at that eventful moment, might have had most sinister effects on the event of the campaign, as it may be fairly doubted whether anything short of his personal influence and exertion could, after this hard-fought and unfortunate day, have again brought the Prussian army into action on the eventful 18th of June. When relieved, and again mounted, Blucher directed the retreat upon Tilly, and achieved it unmolested by the enemy, who did not continue their pursuit beyond the heights which the Prussians had been constrained to abandon.

Such was the battle of Ligny, in which the Prussians, as Blucher truly said, "lost the field, but not their honour". The victory was attended with none of those decisive consequences which were wont to mark the successes of Buonaparte. There were no corps cut off or dispersed, no regiments which fled or flung down their arms, no line of defence forced, and no permanent advantage gained. Above all, there was not a man who lost heart or courage. The Prussians are believed to have lost in this bloody action at least 10,000 men; the *Moniteur* makes the number of the killed and wounded 15,000, and General Gourgaud, dissatisfied with this liberal allowance, rates them afterwards at no less than 25,000 men, while writing under Napoleon's dictation. The loss of the victors was, by the official accounts, estimated at 3000 men, which ought to have been more than tripled. Still, the French Emperor had struck a great blow—overpowered a stubborn and inveterate enemy, and opened the campaign with favourable auspices. The degree of advantage, however, which Napoleon might have derived from the Prussian retreat was greatly limited by the indifferent success of Ney against the forces of Lord Wellington. Of this second action we have now to give some account.

Frasnes had been evacuated by the British, who, on the morning of the 16th, were in position at Quatre-bras, a point of importance, as four roads diverge from it in different directions; so that the British general might communicate from his left with the Prussian right at St. Amand, besides having in his rear a causeway open for his retreat. On the left of the causeway, leading from Charleroi to Brussels, is a wood, called Bois de Bossu, which, during the early part of the day, was strongly contested by the sharpshooters on both sides, but at length carried by the French, and maintained for a time. About three o'clock in the afternoon the main attack commenced, but was repulsed. The British infantry, however, and particularly the 42nd Highlanders, suffered severely from an unexpected charge of lancers, whose approach was hid from them by the character of the

ground, intersected with hedges and covered with heavy crops of rye. Two companies of the Highlanders were cut off, not having time to form the square; the others succeeded in getting into order, and beating off the lancers. Ney then attempted a general charge of heavy cavalry; but they were received with such a galling fire from the British infantry, joined to a battery of two guns, that it could not be sustained; the whole causeway was strewn with men and horses, and the fugitives, who escaped to the rear, announced the loss of an action which was far from being decided, considering that the British had few infantry and artillery, though reinforcements of both were coming fast forward.

The French, as already noticed, had, about three o'clock, obtained possession of the Bois de Bossu and driven out the Belgians. They were in turn themselves expelled by the British guards, who successfully resisted every attempt made by the French to penetrate into the wood during the day.

As the English reinforcements arrived in succession, Maréchal Ney became desirous of an addition of numbers, and sent to procure the assistance of D'Erlon's division, posted, as has been said, near Marchiennes. But these troops had been previously ordered to succour Buonaparte's own army. As the affair of Ligny was, however, over before they arrived, the division was again sent back towards Frasnes to assist Ney; but his battle was also by this time over, and thus D'Erlon's troops marched from one flank to the other, without firing a musket in the course of the day. The battle of Quatre-bras terminated with the light. The British retained possession of the field, which they had maintained with so much obstinacy, because the Duke of Wellington conceived that Blücher would be able to make his ground good at Ligny, and was consequently desirous that the armies should retain the line of communication which they had occupied in the morning.

But the Prussians, evacuating all the villages which they held in the neighbourhood of Ligny, had concentrated their forces to retreat upon the river Dyle, in the

vicinity of Wavre. By this retrograde movement, they were placed about six leagues to the rear of their former position, and had united themselves to Bulow's division, which had not been engaged in the affair at Ligny. Blucher had effected this retreat, not only without pursuit by the French, but without their knowing for some time in what direction he had gone.

This doubt respecting Blucher's movements occasioned an uncertainty and delay in those of the French which were afterwards attended with the very worst consequences. Napoleon, or General Gourgaud in his name, does not hesitate to assert that the cause of this delay rested with Maréchal Grouchy, on whom was devolved the duty of following up the Prussian retreat: "If Maréchal Grouchy," says the accusation, "had been at Wavre on the 17th, and in communication with *my* (Napoleon's) right, Blucher would not have dared to send any detachment of his army against me on the 18th; or if he had, I would have destroyed them." But the maréchal appears to make a victorious defence. Grouchy says that he sought out the Emperor on the night of the 16th, so soon as the Prussian retreat commenced, but that he could not see him till he returned to Fleurus; nor did he obtain any answer to his request of obtaining some infantry to assist his cavalry in following Blucher and his retreating army, excepting an intimation that he would receive orders next day. He states, that he went again to headquarters in the morning of the 17th, aware of the full importance of following the Prussians closely up, but that he could not see Buonaparte till half-past seven, and then was obliged to follow him to the field of battle of the preceding day, previous to receiving his commands. Napoleon talked with various persons on different subjects, without giving Grouchy any orders until near noon, when he suddenly resolved to send the maréchal with an army of 32,000 men, not upon Wavre, for he did not know that the Prussians had taken that direction, but to follow Blucher wherever he might have gone. Lastly, Grouchy affirms that the troops of Gérard and Vandamme, who were placed under his command,

were not ready to move until three o'clock. Thus, according to the maréchal's very distinct narrative, the first orders for the pursuit were not given till about noon on the 17th, and the troops were not in a capacity to obey them until three hours after they were received. For this delay Grouchy blames Excelmans and Gérard, who commanded under him. His corps, at any rate, was not in motion until three o'clock upon the 17th.

Neither could his march, when begun, be directed with certainty on Wavre. The first traces of the Prussians which he could receive, seemed to intimate, on the contrary, that they were retiring towards Namur, which induced Grouchy to push the pursuit in the latter direction, and occasioned the loss of some hours. From all these concurring reasons, the maréchal shows distinctly, that he could not have attained Wavre on the evening of the 17th June, because he had no orders to go there till noon, nor troops ready to march till three o'clock; nor had either Napoleon or his general any foreknowledge of the motions of Blücher, which might induce them to believe Wavre was the true point of his retreat. It was not till he found the English resolved to make a stand at Waterloo, and the Prussians determined to communicate with them, that Napoleon became aware of the plan arranged betwixt Wellington and Blücher, to concentrate the Prussian and English armies at Waterloo. This was the enigma on which his fate depended, and he failed to solve it. But it was more agreeable, and much more convenient, for Napoleon to blame Grouchy, than to acknowledge that he himself had been surprised by the circumstances in which he unexpectedly found himself on the 18th. ✓

Meantime, having detached Grouchy to pursue the Prussians, Napoleon himself moved laterally towards Frasnes, and there united himself with the body commanded by Maréchal Ney. His purpose was to attack the Duke of Wellington, whom he expected still to find in the position of Quatre-bras.

But about seven in the morning, the Duke, having received intelligence of the Prince Maréchal Blücher's

retreat to Wavre, commenced a retreat on his part towards Waterloo, in order to recover his communication with the Prussians, and resume the execution of the plan of co-operation, which had been in some degree disconcerted by the sudden irruption of the French, and the loss of the battle of Ligny by the Prussians. The retreat was conducted with the greatest regularity, though it was as usual unpleasant to the feelings of the soldier. The news of the battle of Ligny spread through the ranks, and even the most sanguine did not venture to hope that the Prussians would be soon able to renew the engagement. The weather was dreadful, as the rain fell in torrents; but this so far favoured the British, by rendering the ploughed fields impracticable for horse, that their march was covered from the attacks of the French cavalry on the flanks, and the operations of those by whom they were pursued were confined to the causeway.

At Genappe, however, a small town, where a narrow bridge over the river Dyle can only be approached by a confined street, there was an attack on the British rear, which the English light cavalry were unable to repel; but the heavy cavalry being brought up, repulsed the French, who gave the rear of the army no farther disturbance for the day.

At five in the evening, the Duke of Wellington arrived on the memorable field of WATERLOO, which he had long before fixed as the position in which he had, in certain events, determined to make a stand for covering Brussels.

The scene of this celebrated action must be familiar to most readers, either from description or recollection. The English army occupied a chain of heights, extending from a ravine and village, termed Merke Braine, on the right, to a hamlet called Ter la Haye, on the left. Corresponding to this chain of heights there runs one somewhat parallel to them, on which the French were posted. A small valley winds between them of various breadth at different points, but not generally exceeding half a mile. The declivity on either side into the valley has a varied, but on the whole a gentle slope, diversified by a number of undulating irregularities of ground. The field

is crossed by two highroads, or causeways, both leading to Brussels—one from Charleroi through Quatre-bras and Genappe, by which the British army had just retreated, and another from Nivelles. These roads traverse the valley, and meet behind the village of Mont St. Jean, which was in the rear of the British army. The farmhouse of Mont St. Jean, which must be carefully distinguished from the hamlet, was much closer to the rear of the British than the latter. On the Charleroi causeway in front of the line, there is another farmhouse, called La Haye Sainte, situated nearly at the foot of the declivity leading into the valley. On the opposite chain of eminences a village called La Belle Alliance gives name to the range of heights. It exactly fronts Mont St. Jean, and these two points formed the respective centres of the French and English positions.

An old-fashioned Flemish villa, called Goumont, or Hougomont, stood in the midst of the valley, surrounded with gardens, offices, and a wood, about two acres in extent, of tall beech-trees. Behind the heights of Mont St. Jean the ground again sinks into a hollow, which served to afford some sort of shelter to the second line of the British. In the rear of this second valley is the great and extensive forest of Soignies, through which runs the causeway to Brussels. On that road, two miles in the rear of the British army, is placed the small town of Waterloo.

There might be a difference of opinion in a mere military question, whether the English general ought to have hazarded a battle for the defence of Brussels, or whether, falling back on the strong city of Antwerp, it might have been safer to wait the arrival of the reinforcements which were in expectation. But in a moral and political point of view, the protecting Brussels was of the last importance. Napoleon has declared that, had he gained the battle of Waterloo, he had the means of revolutionizing Belgium; and although he was doubtless too sanguine in this declaration, yet unquestionably the French had many partisans in a country which they had so long

possessed. The gaining of the battle of Ligny had no marked results, still less had the indecisive action at Quatre-bras; but had these been followed by the retreat of the English army to Antwerp, and the capture of Brussels, the capital city of the Netherlands, they would then have attained the rank of great and decisive victories.

Napoleon, indeed, pretended to look to still more triumphant results from such a victory, and to expect nothing less than the dissolution of the European Alliance as the reward of a decided defeat of the English in Belgium. So long as it was not mentioned by what means this was to be accomplished, those who had no less confidence in Napoleon's intrigues than his military talents must have supposed that he had already in preparation among the foreign powers some deep scheme, tending to sap the foundation of their alliance, and ready to be carried into action when he should attain a certain point of success. But when it is explained that these extensive expectations rested on Napoleon's belief that a single defeat of the Duke of Wellington would occasion a total change of government in England; that the statesmen of the Opposition would enter into office as a thing of course, and instantly conclude a peace with him; and that the coalition, thus deprived of subsidies, must therefore instantly withdraw the armies which were touching the French frontier on its whole northern and eastern line—Napoleon's extravagant speculations can only serve to show how very little he must have known of the English nation, with which he had been fighting so long. The war with France had been prosecuted more than twenty years, and though many of these were years of bad success and defeat, the nation had persevered in a resistance which terminated at last in complete triumph. The national opinion of the great general who led the British troops was too strongly rooted to give way upon a single misfortune; and the event of the campaign of 1814, in which Napoleon, repeatedly victorious, was at length totally defeated and dethroned, would have encouraged a more fickle people than the English to continue the war notwithstanding a single defeat, if such an event had

unhappily occurred. The Duke had the almost impregnable fortress and sea-port of Antwerp in his rear, and might have waited there the reinforcements from America. Blucher had often shown how little he was disheartened by defeat; at worst, he would have fallen back on a Russian army of 200,000 men, who were advancing on the Rhine. The hopes, therefore, that the battle of Waterloo, if gained by the French, would have finished the war, must be abandoned as visionary, whether we regard the firm and manly character of the great personage at the head of the British monarchy, the state of parties in the House of Commons, where many distinguished members of the Opposition had joined the Ministry on the question of the war, or the general feeling of the country, who saw with resentment the new irruption of Napoleon. It cannot, however, be denied that any success gained by Napoleon in this first campaign would have greatly added to his influence both in France and other countries, and might have endangered the possession of Flanders. The Duke of Wellington resolved, therefore, to protect Brussels, if possible, even by the risk of a general action.

By the march from Quatre-bras to Waterloo the Duke had restored his communication with Blucher, which had been dislocated by the retreat of the Prussians to Wavre. When established there, Blucher was once more upon the same line with the British, the distance between the Prussian right flank and the British left being about five leagues or five leagues and a half. The ground which lay between the two extreme points, called the heights of St. Lambert, was exceedingly rugged and wooded; and the cross-roads which traversed it, forming the sole means of communication between the English and Prussians, were dreadfully broken up by the late tempestuous weather.

The Duke despatched intelligence of his position in front of Waterloo to Prince Blucher, acquainting him at the same time with his resolution to give Napoleon the battle which he seemed to desire, providing the Prince would afford him the support of two divisions of the Prussian

army. The answer was worthy of the indefatigable and indomitable old man, who was never so much disconcerted by defeat as to prevent his being willing and ready for combat on the succeeding day. He sent for reply, that he would move to the Duke of Wellington's support, not with two divisions only, but with his whole army; and that he asked no time to prepare for the movement, longer than was necessary to supply food and serve out cartridges to his soldiers.

It was three o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th, when the British came on the field, and took up their bivouac for the night in the order of battle in which they were to fight the next day. It was much later before Napoleon reached the heights of Belle Alliance in person, and his army did not come up in full force till the morning of the 18th. Great part of the French had passed the night in the little village of Genappe, and Napoleon's own quarters had been at the farmhouse called Caillou, about a mile in the rear of La Belle Alliance.

In the morning, when Napoleon had formed his line of battle, his brother Jerome, to whom he ascribed the possession of very considerable military talents, commanded on the left, Counts Reille and D'Erlon the centre, and Count Lobau on the right. *Maréchals* Soult and Ney acted as lieutenant-generals to the Emperor. The French force on the field consisted probably of about 75,000 men. The English army did not exceed that number, at the highest computation. Each army was commanded by the chief under whom they had offered to defy the world. So far the forces were equal. But the French had the very great advantage of being trained and experienced soldiers of the same nation, whereas the English, in the Duke of Wellington's army, did not exceed 35,000; and although the German Legion were veteran troops, the other soldiers under his command were those of the German contingents, lately levied, unaccustomed to act together, and in some instances suspected to be lukewarm to the cause in which they were engaged; so that it would have been imprudent to trust more to their assistance and co-operation than could

possibly be avoided. In Buonaparte's mode of calculating, allowing one Frenchman to stand as equal to one Englishman, and one Englishman or Frenchman against two of any other nation, the inequality of force on the Duke of Wellington's side was very considerable.

The British army thus composed was divided into two lines. The right of the first line consisted of the second and fourth English divisions, the third and sixth Hanoverians, and the first corps of Belgians, under Lord Hill. The centre was composed of the corps of the Prince of Orange, with the Brunswickers and troops of Nassau, having the guards, under General Cooke, on the right, and the division of General Alten on the left. The left wing consisted of the divisions of Picton, Lambert, and Kempt. The second line was in most instances formed of the troops deemed least worthy of confidence, or which had suffered too severely in the action of the 16th to be again exposed until extremity. It was placed behind the declivity of the heights to the rear, in order to be sheltered from the cannonade, but sustained much loss from shells during the action. The cavalry were stationed in the rear, distributed all along the line, but chiefly posted on the left of the centre, to the east of the Charleroi causeway. The farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, in the front of the centre, was garrisoned, but there was not time to prepare it effectually for defence. The villa, gardens, and farmyard of Hougomont formed a strong advanced post towards the centre of the right. The whole British position formed a sort of curve, the centre of which was nearest to the enemy, and the extremities, particularly on their right, drawn considerably backward.

The plans of these two great generals were extremely simple. The object of the Duke of Wellington was to maintain his line of defence until the Prussians coming up should give him a decided superiority of force. They were expected about eleven or twelve o'clock; but the extreme badness of the roads, owing to the violence of the storm, detained them several hours later.

Napoleon's scheme was equally plain and decided. He

trusted, by his usual rapidity of attack, to break and destroy the British army before the Prussians should arrive in the field; after which, he calculated to have an opportunity of destroying the Prussians, by attacking them on their march through the broken ground interposed betwixt them and the British. In these expectations he was the more confident that he believed Grouchy's force, detached on the 17th in pursuit of Blucher, was sufficient to retard, if not altogether to check, the march of the Prussians. His grounds for entertaining this latter opinion, were, as we shall afterwards show, too hastily adopted.

Commencing the action according to his usual system, Napoleon kept his guard in reserve, in order to take opportunity of charging with them when repeated attacks of column after column, and squadron after squadron, should induce his wearied enemy to show some symptoms of irresolution. But Napoleon's movements were not very rapid. His army had suffered by the storm even more than the English, who were in bivouac at three in the afternoon of the 17th June; while the French were still under march, and could not get into line on the heights of La Belle Alliance until ten or eleven o'clock of the 18th. The English army had thus some leisure to take food, and to prepare their arms before the action; and Napoleon lost several hours ere he could commence the attack. Time was, indeed, inestimably precious for both parties, and hours, nay minutes, were of importance. But of this Napoleon was less aware than was the Duke of Wellington.

The tempest which had raged with tropical violence all night, abated in the morning; but the weather continued gusty and stormy during the whole day. Betwixt eleven and twelve, before noon, on the memorable 18th June, this dreadful and decisive action commenced with a cannonade on the part of the French, instantly followed by an attack, commanded by Jerome, on the advanced post of Hougomont. The troops of Nassau, which occupied the wood around the chateau, were driven out by the French, but the utmost efforts of the assailants were

unable to force the house, garden, and farm offices, which a party of the guards sustained with the most dauntless resolution. The French redoubled their efforts, and precipitated themselves in numbers on the exterior hedge, which screens the garden-wall, not perhaps aware of the internal defence afforded by the latter. They fell in great numbers on this point by the fire of the defenders, to which they were exposed in every direction. The number of their troops, however, enabled them, by possession of the wood, to mask Huogomont for a time, and to push on with their cavalry and artillery against the British right, which formed in squares to receive them. The fire was incessant, but without apparent advantage on either side. The attack was at length repelled so far that the British again opened their communication with Hougomont, and that important garrison was reinforced by Colonel Hepburn and a body of the guards.

Meantime, the fire of artillery having become general along the line, the force of the French attack was transferred to the British centre. It was made with the most desperate fury, and received with the most stubborn resolution. The assault was here made upon the farmhouse of Saint Jean by four columns of infantry, and a large mass of cuirassiers, who took the advance. The cuirassiers came with the utmost intrepidity along the Genappe causeway, where they were encountered and charged by the English heavy cavalry; and a combat was maintained at the sword's point, till the French were driven back on their own position, where they were protected by their artillery. The four columns of French infantry engaged in the same attack forced their way forward beyond the farm of La Haye Sainte, and dispersing a Belgian regiment, were in the act of establishing themselves in the centre of the British position when they were attacked by the brigade of General Pack, brought up from the second line by General Picton, while, at the same time, a brigade of British heavy cavalry wheeled round their own infantry, and attacked the French charging columns in flank, at the moment when they were checked by the fire of the musketry.

The results were decisive. The French columns were broken with great slaughter, and two eagles, with more than 2000 men, were made prisoners. The latter were sent instantly off for Brussels.

The British cavalry, however, followed their success too far. They got involved among the French infantry and some hostile cavalry which were detached to support them, and were obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this part of the action, the gallant General Picton, so distinguished for enterprise and bravery, met his death, as did General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry.

About this period the French made themselves masters of the farm of La Haye Sainte, cutting to pieces about two hundred Hanoverian sharpshooters, by whom it was most gallantly defended. The French retained this post for some time, till they were at last driven out of it by shells.

Shortly after this event, the scene of conflict again shifted to the right, where a general attack of French cavalry was made on the squares, chiefly towards the centre of the British right, or between that and the causeway. They came up with the most dauntless resolution, in despite of the continued fire of thirty pieces of artillery, placed in front of the line, and compelled the artillerymen by whom they were served to retreat within the squares. The enemy had no means, however, to secure the guns, or even to spike them, and at every favourable moment the British artillerymen sallied from their place of refuge, again manned their pieces, and fired on the assailants—a manœuvre which seems peculiar to the British service. The cuirassiers, however, continued their dreadful onset, and rode up to the squares in the full confidence, apparently, of sweeping them before the impetuosity of their charge. Their onset and reception was like a furious ocean pouring itself against a chain of insulated rocks. The British square stood unmoved, and never gave fire until the cavalry were within ten yards, when men rolled one way, horses galloped another, and the cuirassiers were in every instance driven back.

The French authors have pretended that squares were broken, and colours taken; but this assertion, upon the united testimony of every British officer present, is a positive untruth. This was not, however, the fault of the cuirassiers, who displayed an almost frantic valour. They rallied again and again, and returned to the onset, till the British could recognize even the faces of individuals among their enemies. Some rode close up to the bayonets, fired their pistols, and cut with their swords with reckless and useless valour. Some stood at gaze, and were destroyed by the musketry and artillery. Some squadrons, passing through the intervals of the first line, charged the squares of Belgians posted there, with as little success. At length the cuirassiers suffered so severely on every hand that they were compelled to abandon the attempt which they had made with such intrepid and desperate courage. In this unheard-of struggle, the greater part of the French heavy cavalry were absolutely destroyed. Buonaparte hints at it in his bulletin as an attempt made without orders, and continued only by the desperate courage of the soldiers and their officers. It is certain that, in the destruction of this noble body of cuirassiers, he lost the corps which might have been most effectual in covering his retreat. After the broken remains of this fine cavalry were drawn off, the French confined themselves for a time to a heavy cannonade, from which the British sheltered themselves in part by lying down on the ground, while the enemy prepared for an attack on another quarter, and to be conducted in a different manner.

It was now about six o'clock, and during this long succession of the most furious attacks, the French had gained no success save occupying for a time the wood around Hougomont, from which they had been expelled, and the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, which had been also recovered. The British, on the other hand, had suffered very severely, but had not lost one inch of ground, save the two posts now regained. Ten thousand men were, however, killed and wounded; some of the foreign regiments had given way, though others had shown the

most desperate valour. And the ranks were thinned both by the actual fugitives, and by the absence of individuals who left the bloody field for the purpose of carrying off the wounded, and some of whom might naturally be in no hurry to return to so fatal a scene. ✓

But the French, besides losing about 15,000 men, together with a column of prisoners more than 2000 in number, began now to be disturbed by the operations of the Prussians on their right flank; and the secret of the Duke of Wellington was disclosing itself by its consequences. Blucher, faithful to his engagement, had, early in the morning, put in motion Bulow's division, which had not been engaged at Ligny, to communicate with the English army, and operate a diversion on the right flank and rear of the French. But although there were only about twelve or fourteen miles between Wavre and the field of Waterloo, yet the march was, by unavoidable circumstances, much delayed. The rugged face of the country, together with the state of the roads, so often referred to, offered the most serious obstacles to the progress of the Prussians, especially as they moved with an unusually large train of artillery. A fire, also, which broke out in Wavre, on the morning of the 18th, prevented Bulow's corps from marching through that town, and obliged them to pursue a circuitous and inconvenient route. After traversing, with great difficulty, the cross-roads by Chapelle Lambert, Bulow, with the 4th Prussian corps, who had been expected by the Duke of Wellington about eleven o'clock, announced his arrival by a distant fire, about half-past four. The first Prussian corps, following the same route with Bulow, was yet later in coming up. The second division made a lateral movement in the same direction as the fourth and first, but by the hamlet of Ohain, nearer to the English flank. The Emperor instantly opposed to Bulow, who appeared long before the others, the 6th French corps, which he had kept in reserve for that service; and, as only the advanced guard was come up, they succeeded in keeping the Prussians in check for the moment. The first and second Prussian corps appeared on the field still later than the

fourth. The third corps had put themselves in motion to follow in the same direction, when they were furiously attacked by the French under Maréchal Grouchy, who, as already stated, was detached to engage the attention of Blücher, whose whole force he believed he had before him.

Instead of being surprised, as an ordinary general might have been, with this attack upon his rear, Blücher contented himself with sending back orders to Thielman, who commanded the third corps, to defend himself as well as he could upon the line of the Dyle. In the meantime, without weakening the army under his own command, by detaching any part of it to support Thielman, the veteran rather hastened than suspended his march towards the field of battle, where he was aware that the war was likely to be decided in a manner so complete as would leave victory or defeat on every other point a matter of subordinate consideration.

At half-past six, or thereabouts, the second grand division of the Prussian army began to enter into communication with the British left, by the village of Ohain, while Bulow pressed forward from Chapelle Lambert on the French right and rear, by a hollow, or valley, called Frischemont. It became now evident that the Prussians were to enter seriously into the battle, and with great force. Napoleon had still the means of opposing them, and of achieving a retreat, at the certainty, however, of being attacked upon the ensuing day by the combined armies of Britain and Prussia. His celebrated Guard had not yet taken any part in the conflict, and would now have been capable of affording him protection after a battle which, hitherto, he had fought at disadvantage, but without being defeated. But the circumstances by which he was surrounded must have pressed on his mind at once. He had no succours to look for; a reunion with Grouchy was the only resource which could strengthen his forces; the Russians were advancing upon the Rhine with forced marches; the Republicans at Paris were agitating schemes against his authority. It seemed as if all must be decided on that day, and on that field. Sur-

rounded by these ill-omened circumstances, a desperate effort for victory, ere the Prussians could act effectually, might perhaps yet drive the English from their position; and he determined to venture on this daring experiment.

About seven o'clock, Napoleon's Guard were formed in two columns, under his own eye, near the bottom of the declivity of La Belle Alliance. They were put under command of the dauntless Ney. Buonaparte told the soldiers, and, indeed, imposed the same fiction on their commander, that the Prussians whom they saw on the right were retreating before Grouchy. Perhaps he might himself believe that this was true. The Guard answered, for the last time, with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*, and moved resolutely forward, having, for their support, four battalions of the Old Guard in reserve, who stood prepared to protect the advance of their comrades. A gradual change had taken place in the English line of battle, in consequence of the repeated repulse of the French. Advancing by slow degrees, the right, which at the beginning of the conflict presented a segment of a convex circle, now resembled one that was concave, the extreme right, which had been thrown back, being now rather brought forward, so that their fire both of artillery and infantry fell upon the flank of the French, who had also to sustain that which was poured on their front from the heights. The British were arranged in a line of four men deep, to meet the advancing column of the French Guard, and poured upon them a storm of musketry which never ceased an instant. The soldiers fired independently, as it is called; each man loading and discharging his piece as fast as he could. At length the British moved forward, as if to close round the heads of the columns, and at the same time continued to pour their shot upon the enemy's flanks. The French gallantly attempted to deploy, for the purpose of returning the discharge; but in their effort to do so, under so dreadful a fire, they stopped, staggered, became disordered, were blended into one mass, and at length gave way, retiring, or rather flying, in the utmost confusion.

This was the last effort of the enemy, and Napoleon

gave orders for the retreat; to protect which he had now no troops left, save the last four battalions of the Old Guard, which had been stationed in the rear of the attacking columns. These threw themselves into squares and stood firm. But at this moment the Duke of Wellington commanded the whole British line to advance, so that whatever the bravery and skill of these gallant veterans, they also were thrown into disorder, and swept away in the general rout, in spite of the efforts of Ney, who, having had his horse killed, fought sword in hand, and on foot, in the front of the battle, till the very last. That *maréchal*, whose military virtues at least cannot be challenged, bore personal evidence against two circumstances, industriously circulated by the friends of Napoleon. One of these fictions occurs in his own bulletin, which charges the loss of the battle to a panic fear, brought about by the treachery of some unknown persons, who raised the cry of "*Sauve qui peut!*" Another figment, greedily credited at Paris, bore that the four battalions of Old Guard, the last who maintained the semblance of order, answered a summons to surrender by the magnanimous reply, "The Guard can die, but cannot yield!" And one edition of the story adds that thereupon the battalions made a half wheel inwards, and discharged their muskets into each other's bosoms, to save themselves from dying by the hands of the English. Neither the original reply, nor the pretended self-sacrifice of the Guard, have the slightest foundation. Cambronne, in whose mouth the speech was placed, gave up his sword, and remained prisoner; and the military conduct of the French Guard is better eulogized by the undisputed truth that they fought to extremity, with the most unyielding constancy, than by imputing to them an act of regimental suicide upon the lost field of battle. Every attribute of brave men they have a just right to claim. It is no compliment to ascribe to them that of madmen. Whether the words were used by Cambronne or no, the Guard well deserved to have them inscribed on their monument.

Whilst this decisive movement took place, Bulow, who had concentrated his troops, and was at length qualified

to act in force, carried the village of Planchenois in the French rear, and was now firing so close on their right wing, that the cannonade annoyed the British who were in pursuit, and was suspended in consequence. Moving in oblique lines, the British and Prussian armies came into contact with each other on the heights so lately occupied by the French, and celebrated the victory with loud shouts of mutual congratulation.

The French army was now in total and inextricable confusion and rout; and when the victorious generals met at the farmhouse of La Belle Alliance, it was agreed that the Prussians, who were fresh in comparison, should follow up the chase, a duty for which the British, exhausted by the fatigues of a battle of eight hours, were totally inadequate.

During the whole action Napoleon maintained the utmost serenity. He remained on the heights of La Belle Alliance, keeping pretty near the centre, from which he had a full view of the field, which does not exceed a mile and a half in length. He expressed no solicitude on the fate of the battle for a long time, noticed the behaviour of particular regiments, and praised the English several times, always, however, talking of them as an assured prey. When forming his Guard for the last fatal effort, he descended near them, half down the causeway from La Belle Alliance, to bestow upon them what proved his parting exhortation. He watched intently their progress with a spyglass, and refused to listen to one or two aides-de-camp, who at that moment came from the right to inform him of the appearance of the Prussians. At length, on seeing the attacking columns stagger and become confused, his countenance, said our informer, became pale as that of a corpse, and muttering to himself, "They are mingled together", he said to his attendants, "All is lost for the present", and rode off the field, not stopping or taking refreshment till he reached Charleroi, where he paused for a moment in a meadow, and occupied a tent which had been pitched for his accommodation.¹

¹ Our informant on these points, was Lacoste, a Flemish peasant, who was

Meantime, the pursuit of his discomfited army was followed up by Blücher with the most determined perseverance. He accelerated the march of the Prussian advanced guard, and despatched every man and horse of his cavalry upon the pursuit of the fugitive French. At Genappe they attempted something like defence, by barricading the bridge and streets; but the Prussians forced them in a moment, and although the French were sufficiently numerous for resistance, their disorder was so irremediable, and their moral courage was so absolutely quelled for the moment, that in many cases they were slaughtered like sheep. They were driven from bivouac to bivouac, without exhibiting even the shadow of their usual courage. One hundred and fifty guns were left in the hands of the English, and a like number taken by the Prussians in course of the pursuit. The latter obtained possession also of all Napoleon's baggage, and of his carriage, where, amongst many articles of curiosity, was found a proclamation intended to be made public at Brussels the next day.

The loss on the British side during this dreadful battle was, as the Duke of Wellington, no user of exaggerated expressions, truly termed it, *immense*. One hundred officers slain, five hundred wounded, many of them to death, fifteen thousand men killed and wounded (independent of the Prussian loss at Wavre) threw half Britain into mourning. Many officers of distinction fell. It required all the glory, and all the solid advantages, of this immortal day, to reconcile the mind to the high price at which it was purchased. The commander-in-chief, compelled to be on every point of danger, was repeatedly in the greatest jeopardy. Only the Duke himself, and one gentleman of his numerous staff, escaped unwounded in horse and person.

It would be difficult to form a guess at the extent of the French loss. Besides those who fell in the battle

compelled to act as Buonaparte's guide, remained with him during the whole action, and accompanied him to Charleroi. He seemed a shrewd, sensible man in his way, and told his story with the utmost simplicity. The author saw him, and heard his narrative, very shortly after the action.

and flight, great numbers deserted. We do not believe, that of 75,000 men, the half were ever again collected under arms.

Having finished our account of this memorable action, we are led to notice the communications and criticisms of Napoleon himself on the subject, partly as illustrative of the narrative, but much more as indicating his own character.

The account of the battle of Waterloo, dictated by Napoleon to Gourgaud, so severely exposed by General Grouchy as a mere military romance, full of gratuitous suppositions, misrepresentations, and absolute falsehoods, accuses the subordinate generals who fought under Buonaparte of having greatly degenerated from their original character. Ney and Grouchy are particularly aimed at; the former by name, the latter by obvious implication. It is said they had lost that energy and enterprising genius by which they had formerly been distinguished, and to which France owed her triumphs. They had become timorous and circumspect in all their operations; and although their personal bravery remains, their greatest object was to compromise themselves as little as possible. This general remark, intended, of course, to pave the way for transferring from the Emperor to his lieutenants the blame of the miscarriage of the campaign, is both unjust and ungrateful. Had they lost energy who struggled to the very last in the field of Waterloo, long after the Emperor had left the field? Was Grouchy undecided in his operations, who brought his own division safe to Paris, in spite of all the obstacles opposed to him by a victorious army, three times the amount of his own in numbers? Both these officers had given up, for the sake of Napoleon, the rank and appointments which they might have peacefully borne under the Bourbons. Did it indicate the reluctance to commit themselves, with which they are charged, that they ventured on the decided step of joining his desperate career, not only abandoning all regard to their interest and their safety but compromising their character as men of loyalty in the face of all Europe, and exposing themselves to certain

death if the Bourbons should be successful? Those who fight with the cord around their neck, which was decidedly the case with Grouchy and Ney, must have headed the forlorn hope; and is it consistent with human nature, in such circumstances, to believe that they, whose fortune and safety depended on the victory, personally brave as they are admitted to be, should have loitered in the rear when their fate was in the balance?

He who was unjust to his own followers can scarce be expected to be candid towards an enemy. The Duke of Wellington has, upon all occasions, been willing to render the military character of Napoleon that justice which a generous mind is scrupulously accurate in dispensing to an adversary, and has readily admitted that the conduct of Buonaparte and his army, on this memorable occasion, was fully adequate to the support of their high reputation. It may be said that the victor can afford to bestow praise on the vanquished, but that it requires a superior degree of candour in the vanquished to do justice to the conqueror. Napoleon, at any rate, does not seem to have attained, in this particular, to the pitch of a great or exalted mind, since both he and the various persons whom he employed as the means of circulating his statements, concur in a very futile attempt to excuse the defeat at Waterloo, by a set of apologies founded in a great degree upon misrepresentation. The allegations, which are designed to prove the incapacity of the British general, and to show that the battle of Waterloo was only lost by a combination of extraordinary fatalities, may be considered in their order.¹

The first, and most frequently repeated, is the charge that the Duke of Wellington, on the 15th, was surprised in his cantonments, and could not collect his army fast enough at Quatre-bras. In this his Grace would have been doubtless highly censurable if Napoleon had, by express information, or any distinct movement indicative of his purpose, shown upon which point he meant to

¹ In answer to Napoleon's efforts at throwing the blame of defeat everywhere but on the plain fact of his having got the worst of it, Sir Walter Scott also gives as an Appendix Captain John W. Pringle's "Remarks on the Campaign of 1815".

advance. But the chivalrous practice of fixing a field of combat has been long out of date; and Napoleon, beyond all generals, possessed the art of masking his own movements, and misleading his enemy concerning the actual point on which he meditated an attack. The Duke and Prince Blucher were, therefore, obliged to provide for the concentration of their forces upon different points, according as Buonaparte's selection should be manifested; and in order to be ready to assemble their forces upon any one position, they must, by spreading their cantonments, in some degree delay the movement upon all. The Duke could not stir from Brussels, or concentrate his forces, until he had certain information of those of the enemy; and it is said that a French statesman who had promised to send him a copy of the plan of Buonaparte's campaign, contrived, by a trick of policy, to evade keeping his word. We do not mean to deny the talent and activity displayed by Buonaparte, who, if he could have brought forward his whole army upon the evening of the 15th of June, might probably have succeeded in preventing the meditated junction of Blucher and Wellington. But the celebrated prayer for annihilation of time and space¹ would be as little reasonable in the mouth of a general as of a lover, and, fettered by the limitations against which that modest petition is directed, Buonaparte failed in bringing forward in due time a sufficient body of forces to carry all before him at Quatre-bras; while, on the other hand, the Duke of Wellington, from the same obstacles of time and space, could not assemble a force sufficient to drive Ney before him, and enable him to advance to the support of Blucher during the action of Ligny.²

¹ "Ye gods, annihilate but time and space,
And make two lovers happy!"—*Pope*.

² "The fiction of the Duke of Wellington having been surprised on this great occasion, has maintained its place in almost all narratives of the war for fifteen years. The duke's magnanimous silence under such treatment, for so long a period, will be appreciated by posterity. The facts of the case are now given from the most unquestionable authority. At half-past one o'clock, P.M., of Thursday the 15th, a Prussian officer of high rank arrived at Wellington's headquarters in Brussels, with the intelligence of Napoleon's decisive operations. By two o'clock, orders were despatched to all the cantonments of the duke's army, for the divisions to break up and concentrate on the left of

The choice of the field of Waterloo is also charged against the Duke of Wellington as an act of weak judgment; because, although possessed of all the requisites for maintaining battle or pursuing victory, and, above all, of the facilities for communicating with the Prussian army, it had not, according to the imperial critic, the means of affording security in case of a retreat, since there was only one communication to the rear—that by the causeway of Brussels, the rest of the position being screened by the forest of Soignies, in front of which the British army was formed, and through which, it is assumed, retreat was impossible.

Taking the principle of this criticism as accurate, it may be answered that a general would never halt or fight at all, if he were to refuse combat on every other save a field of battle which possessed all the various excellences which may be predicated of one in theory. The commander must consider whether the ground suits his present exigencies, without looking at other circumstances which may be less pressing at the time. Generals have been known to choose by preference the ground from which there could be no retiring; like invaders who burn their ships, as a pledge that they will follow their enterprise to the last. And although provision for a safe retreat is certainly in most cases a desirable circumstance, yet it has been dispensed with by good generals, and by none more frequently than by Napoleon himself. Was not the battle of Essling fought without any possible mode of retreat save the frail bridges over the Danube? Was not that of Wagram debated under similar circumstances? And, to complete the whole, did

Quatre-bras, his grace's design being that his whole force should be assembled there by eleven o'clock on the next night, Friday the 16th. It was at first intended to put off a ball announced for the evening of Thursday, at the Duchess of Richmond's hotel in Brussels; but on reflection it seemed highly important that the population of that city should be kept, as far as possible, in ignorance as to the course of events, and the Duke of Wellington desired that the ball should proceed accordingly; nay, the general officers received his commands to appear in the ball room, each taking care to quit the apartment as quietly as possible at ten o'clock, and proceed to join his respective division *en route*. This arrangement was carried into strict execution. The duke himself retired at twelve o'clock, and left Brussels at six o'clock next morning for Quatre-bras."—*Hist. of Nap. Buonaparte*, Family Library, vol. ii., p. 309.

not Napoleon, while censuring the Duke of Wellington for fighting in front of a forest, himself enter upon conflict with a defile in his rear, formed by the narrow streets and narrower bridge of Genappe, by which alone, if defeated, he could cross the Dyle?—It might, therefore, be presumed that if the Duke of Wellington chose a position from which retreat was difficult, he must have considered the necessity of retreat as unlikely, and reckoned with confidence on being able to make good his stand until the Prussians should come up to join him.

Even this does not exhaust the question; for the English general-officers unite in considering the forest of Soignies as a very advantageous feature in the field; and, far from apprehending the least inconvenience from its existence, the Duke of Wellington regarded it as affording a position, which, if his first and second line had been unhappily forced, he might have nevertheless made good against the whole French army. The hamlet of Mont Saint Jean, in front, affords an excellent key to the position of an army compelled to occupy the forest. The wood itself is everywhere passable for men and horses, the trees being tall, and without either low boughs or underwood; and, singular as the discrepancy between the opinions of distinguished soldiers may seem, we have never met an English officer who did not look on the forest of Soignies as affording an admirable position for making a final stand. In support of their opinion they refer to the defence of the Bois de Bossu near Quatre-bras, against the reiterated attacks of *Maréchal Ney*. This impeachment of the Duke of Wellington may therefore be set aside, as inconsistent with the principles of British warfare. All that can be added is that there are cases in which national habits and manners may render a position advantageous to soldiers of one country, which is perilous or destructive to those of another.

The next subject of invidious criticism, is of a nature so singular that, did it not originate with a great man, in peculiar circumstances of adversity, it might be almost termed ludicrous. Napoleon expresses himself as dissatis-

fied, because he was defeated in the common and vulgar proceeding of downright fighting, and by no special manœuvres or peculiar display of military art on the part of the victor. But if it can afford any consolation to those who cherish his fame, it is easy to show that Napoleon fell a victim to a scheme of tactics early conceived, and persevered in under circumstances which, in the case of ordinary men, would have occasioned its being abandoned; resumed after events which seemed so adverse that nothing save dauntless courage and unlimited confidence could have enabled the chiefs to proceed in their purpose; and carried into execution, without Napoleon's being able to penetrate the purpose of the allied generals, until it was impossible to prevent the annihilation of his army;—that he fell, in short, by a grand plan of strategy, worthy of being compared to that of any of his own admirable campaigns.

To prove what we have said, it is only necessary to remark that the natural bases and points of retreat of the Prussian and English armies were different; the former being directed on Maestricht, the other on Antwerp, where each expected their reinforcements. Regardless of this, and with full confidence in each other, the Prince Maréchal Blucher, and the Duke of Wellington, agreed to act in conjunction against the French army. The union of their forces, for which both were prepared, was destined to have taken place at Ligny, where the Duke designed to have supported the Prussians, and where Blucher hazarded an action in expectation of his ally's assistance. The active movements of Napoleon, and the impossibility of the English force being sufficiently concentrated at Quatre-bras to afford the means of overpowering Ney and the force in their front, prevented their making a lateral march to relieve Blucher at that critical period. Otherwise, the parts of the bloody drama, as afterwards acted, would have been reversed, and the British army would have moved to support the Prussians at Ligny, as the Prussians came to the aid of the British at Waterloo.

Napoleon had the merit of disconcerting this plan for

the time; but he did not, and could not, discover that the allied generals retained, after the loss of the battle of Ligny, the same purpose which they had adopted on the commencement of the campaign. He imagined, as did all around him, that Blucher must retreat on Namur, or in such a direction as would effectually accomplish a separation betwixt him and the English, as it was natural to think a defeated army should approach towards its own resources, instead of attempting further offensive operations. At all events, Napoleon was in this respect so much mistaken as to believe that if Blucher did retire on the same line with the English, the means which the Prussian retained for co-operating with his allies were so limited, and (perhaps he might think) the spirit of the general so subdued, that *Maréchal* Grouchy, with 32,000 men, would be sufficient to keep the whole Prussian force in check. The *maréchal* was accordingly, as we have seen, despatched much too late, without any other instructions than to follow and engage the attention of the Prussians. Misled by the demonstration of Blucher, he at first took the road to Namur, and thus, without any fault on his part, lost time, which was inconceivably precious.

Buonaparte's subsequent accounts of this action blame *Maréchal* Grouchy for not discovering Blucher's real direction, which he had no means of ascertaining, and for not obeying orders which were never given to him, and which could not be given, because Napoleon was as ignorant as the *maréchal*, that Blucher had formed the determination, at all events, to unite himself with Wellington. This purpose of acting in co-operation, formed and persevered in, was to the French Emperor the riddle of the Sphinx, and he was destroyed because he could not discover it. Indeed, he ridiculed even the idea of such an event. One of his officers, according to Baron Muffling, having hinted at the mere possibility of a junction between the Prussian army and that of Wellington, he smiled contemptuously at the thought. "The Prussian army," he said, "is defeated—It cannot rally for three days—I have 75,000 men, the English

only 50,000. The town of Brussels awaits me with open arms. The English Opposition waits but for my success to raise their heads. Then adieu subsidies, and farewell coalition!" In like manner, Napoleon frankly acknowledged, while on board the *Northumberland*, that he had no idea that the Duke of Wellington meant to fight, and therefore omitted to reconnoitre the ground with sufficient accuracy. It is well known that, when he observed them still in their position on the morning of the 18th, he exclaimed, "I have them, then, these English!"

It was half-past eleven, just about the time that the battle of Waterloo commenced, that Grouchy, as already hinted, overtook the rear of the Prussians. A strong force, appearing to be the whole of the Prussian army, lay before the French *maréchal*, who, from the character of the ground, had no means of ascertaining their numbers, or of discovering the fact that three divisions of Blucher's army were already on the march to their right, through the passes of Saint Lambert; and that it was only Thielman's division which remained upon the Dyle. Still less could he know, what could only be known to the Duke and Blucher, that the English were determined to give battle in the position at Waterloo. He heard, indeed, a heavy cannonade in that direction, but that might have proceeded from an attack on the British rear-guard, the Duke being, in the general opinion of the French army, in full retreat upon Antwerp. At any rate, the *maréchal*'s orders were to attack the enemy which he found before him. He could not but remember, that Ney had been reprimanded for detaching a part of his force on the 16th, in consequence of a distant cannonade; and he was naturally desirous to avoid censure for the self-same cause. Even if Napoleon was seriously engaged with the English, it seemed the business of Grouchy to occupy the large force which he observed at Wavre, and disposed along the Dyle, to prevent their attempting anything against Napoleon, if, contrary to probability, the Emperor should be engaged in a general battle. Lastly, as Grouchy was to form his resolution under the idea of having the whole Prussian force before him,

which was estimated at 80,000 men, it would have been impossible for him to detach from an army of 32,000 any considerable body to the assistance of Napoleon; and in attacking with such inadequate numbers, he showed his devotion, at the risk of being totally destroyed.

He engaged, however, in battle without any hesitation, and attacked the line of the Prussians along the Dyle at every accessible point; to wit, at Wavre, at the mill of Bielge, and at the village of Limale. The points of attack were desperately defended by the Prussians under Thielman, so that Grouchy could only occupy that part of Wavre which was on his own side of the Dyle. About four o'clock, and consequently when the fate of the battle of Waterloo was nearly decided, Grouchy received from Maréchal Soult the only order which reached him during the day, requiring him to manœuvre so as to unite himself to the right flank of the Emperor, but at the same time acquainting him with the (false) intelligence, that the battle was gained upon the line of Waterloo. A postscript informed Grouchy that Bulow was appearing upon Napoleon's right flank, and that if he could come up with speed, he would take the Prussian *flagrante delicto*.

These orders were quite intelligible. But two things were necessary to their being carried into execution. First, that Grouchy should get clear of Thielman, the enemy with whom he was closely engaged, and who would not fail to pursue the French maréchal if he retreated or moved to his left flank, without having repulsed him. Secondly, it was indispensable he should pass the small river Dyle, defended by Thielman's division, since the road leading through the woods of Chapelle Lambert was that by which he could best execute his march towards Waterloo. Grouchy redoubled his efforts to force the Dyle, but he could not succeed till night, and then but partially; for the Prussians continued to hold the mill of Bielge, and remained in force within a cannon-shot of Grouchy's position.

In the morning, the maréchal, anxious to learn with certainty the fate of Napoleon, though believing, accord-

ing to Soult's letter, that he was victorious, sent out reconnoitring parties. When he learned the truth, he commenced a retreat, which he conducted with such talent that, though closely pursued by the Prussians, then in all the animation of triumph, and though sustaining considerable loss, he was enabled to bring his corps unbroken under the walls of Paris. Weighing all these circumstances, it appears that Buonaparte had no right to count upon the assistance of Grouchy, far less to throw censure on that general for not coming to his assistance, since he scrupulously obeyed the orders he received; and when at four o'clock, that of attacking and pressing the Prussian rear was qualified by the directions of Soult, to close up to Buonaparte's right wing, Grouchy was engaged in an obstinate engagement with Thielman, whom he must necessarily defeat before he could cross the Dyle, to accomplish the junction proposed.

The movement of Blucher, therefore, was a masterpiece of courage and judgment, since the Prince Maréchal left one division of his army to maintain a doubtful onset against Grouchy, and involved himself with the other three in that flank movement through the woods of Saint Lambert, by which he paid with interest the debt which he owed Napoleon for a similar movement, previous to the affairs of Champ-Aubert and Montmirail, in 1814.

The same system which placed Blucher in motion, required that the Duke of Wellington should maintain his position, by confining himself to a strictly defensive contest. The British, as they were to keep their place at all risks, so on no temptation of partial success were they to be induced to advance. Every step which they might have driven the French backward, before the coming up of the Prussians, would have been a disadvantage as far as it went, since the object was not to beat the enemy by the efforts of the English only, which, in the state of the two armies, might only have amounted to a repulse, but to detain them in the position of La Belle Alliance, until the army of Blucher should come up. When Napoleon, therefore, objects to the conduct of the

Duke of Wellington on the 18th, that he did not manoeuvre in the time of action, he objects to the very circumstance which rendered the victory of the day so decisive. He was himself decoyed into, and detained in a position, until his destruction was rendered inevitable.

It has been a favourite assertion with almost all the French, and some English writers, that the English were on the point of being defeated when the Prussian force came up. The contrary is the truth. The French had attacked, and the British had resisted, from past eleven until near seven o'clock; and though the battle was most bloody, the former had gained no advantage save at the wood of Hougomont, and the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte; both they gained, but speedily lost. Baron Muffling has given the most explicit testimony, "that the battle could have afforded no favourable result to the enemy, even if the Prussians had never come up". He was an eye-witness, and an unquestionable judge, and willing, doubtless, to carry the immediate glory acquired by his countrymen on this memorable occasion, and in which he had a large personal stake, as high as truth and honour will permit. At the time when Napoleon made the last effort, Bulow's troops were indeed upon the field, but had not made any physical impression by their weapons, or excited any moral dread by their appearance. Napoleon announced to all his Guard, whom he collected and formed for that final exertion, that the Prussians whom they saw were closely pursued by the French of Grouchy's army. He himself, perhaps, had that persuasion; for the fire of Grouchy's artillery, supposed to be a league and a half, but in reality nearly three leagues distant, was distinctly heard; and some one of Napoleon's suite saw the smoke from the heights above Wavre. "The battle," he said, "is won; we must force the English position, and throw them upon the defiles. —*Allons! La Garde en avant!*" Accordingly, they then made the attack in the evening, when they were totally repulsed, and chased back upon, and beyond, their own position. Thus, before the Prussians came into serious

action, Napoleon had done his utmost, and had not a corps remaining in order, excepting four battalions of the Old Guard. It cannot be therefore said that our allies afforded the British army protection from an enemy that was totally disorganized; but that for which the Prussians *do* deserve the gratitude of Britain and of Europe, is the generous and courageous confidence with which they marched at so many risks to assist in the action, and the activity and zeal with which they completed the victory. It is universally acknowledged that the British army, exhausted by so long a conflict, could not have availed themselves of the disorder of their enemy at its conclusion; while, on the contrary, nothing could exceed the dexterity and rapidity with which the Prussians conducted the pursuit. The laurels of Waterloo must be divided—the British won the battle, the Prussians achieved and rendered available the victory.”

Immense as the direct and immediate consequences of the battle of Waterloo certainly were, being the total loss of the campaign, and the entire destruction of Napoleon's fine army, the more remote contingencies to which it gave rise were so much more important that it may be doubted whether there was ever in the civilized world a great battle followed by so many and such extraordinary results.

That part of the French army which escaped from the field of Waterloo, fled in the most terrible disorder towards the frontiers of France. Napoleon himself continued his flight from Charleroi, in the neighbourhood of which was his first place of halting, and hurried on to Philippeville. From this point, he designed, it was said, to have marched to place himself at the head of Grouchy's army. But no troops of any kind having been rallied, and Charleroi having been almost instantly occupied by the Prussian pursuers, a report became current that the division was destroyed, and Grouchy himself made prisoner. Napoleon, therefore, pursued his own retreat, leaving orders, which were not attended to, that the relics of the army should be rallied at Avesnes. Soult

could only succeed in gathering together a few thousands, as far within the French territory as Laon. Meanwhile, Buonaparte, travelling post, had reached Paris, and brought thither the news of his own defeat.

On the 19th of June the public ear of the capital had been stunned by the report of a hundred pieces of cannon, which announced the victory at Ligny, and the public prints had contained the most gasconading accounts of that action; of the forcing the passage of the Sambre, the action at Charleroi, and the battle of Quatre-bras. The Imperialists were in the highest state of exultation, the Republicans doubtful, and the Royalists dejected. On the morning of the 21st, the third day after the fatal action, it was at first whispered, and then openly said, that Napoleon had returned alone from the army on the preceding night, and was now in the palace of Bourbon-Elysée. The fatal truth was not long in transpiring—he had lost a dreadful and decisive pitched battle, and the French army, which had left the capital so confident, so full of hope, pride, and determination, was totally destroyed.

Many reasons have been given for Napoleon's not remaining with his army on this occasion, and endeavouring at least to bring it into a state of reorganization; but the secret seems to be explained by his apprehension of the faction of Republicans and Constitutionalists in Paris. He must have remembered that Fouché, and others of that party, had advised him to end the distresses of France by his abdication of the crown, even before he placed himself at the head of his army. He was aware that what they had ventured to suggest in his moment of strength, they would not hesitate to demand and extort from him in the hour of his weakness, and that the Chamber of Representatives would endeavour to obtain peace for themselves by sacrificing him. "He is known," says an author already quoted, friendly to his fame, "to have said, after the disasters of the Russian campaign, that he would confound the Parisians by his presence, and fall among them like a thunderbolt. But there are things which succeed only because they have never been

done before, and for that reason ought never to be attempted again. His fifth flight from his army occasioned the entire abandonment of himself and his cause by all who might have forgiven him his misfortune, but required that he should be the first to arise from the blow."

It was a curious indication of public spirit in Paris, that, upon the news of this appalling misfortune, the national funds rose, immediately after the first shock of the tidings was past; so soon, that is, as men had time to consider the probable consequence of the success of the allies. It seemed as if public credit revived upon any intelligence, however disastrous otherwise, which promised to abridge the reign of Buonaparte.

The anticipations of Napoleon did not deceive him. It was plain, that, whatever deference the Jacobins had for him in his hour of strength, they had no compassion for his period of weakness. They felt the opportunity favourable to get rid of him, and did not disguise their purpose to do so.

The two Chambers hastily assembled. La Fayette addressed that of the Representatives in the character of an old friend of freedom, spoke of the sinister reports that were spread abroad, and invited the members to rally under the three-coloured banner of liberty, equality, and public order, by adopting five resolutions. The first declared that the independence of the nation was menaced; the second declared the sittings of the Chambers permanent, and denounced the pains of treason against whoever should attempt to dissolve them; the third announced that the troops had deserved well of their country; the fourth called out the national guard; the fifth invited the Ministers to repair to the Assembly.

These propositions intimated the apprehensions of the Chamber of Representatives, that they might be a second time dissolved by an armed force, and, at the same time, announced their purpose to place themselves at the head of affairs, without further respect to the Emperor. They were adopted, all but the fourth concerning the national guard, which was considered as premature. Regnault

de St. Jean d'Angely attempted to read a bulletin, giving an imperfect and inconsistent account of what had passed on the frontiers; but the representatives became clamorous, and demanded the attendance of the Ministers. At length, after a delay of three or four hours, Carnot, Caulaincourt, Davoust, and Fouché entered the hall with Lucien Buonaparte.

The Chamber formed itself into a secret committee, before which the ministers laid the full extent of the disaster, and announced that the Emperor had named Caulaincourt, Fouché, and Carnot, as commissioners to treat of peace with the allies. The Ministers were bluntly reminded by the Republican members, and particularly by Henry Lacoste, that they had no basis for any negotiations which could be proposed in the Emperor's name, since the allied powers had declared war against Napoleon, who was now in plain terms pronounced, by more than one member, the sole obstacle betwixt the nation and peace. Universal applause followed from all parts of the hall, and left Lucien no longer in doubt that the representatives intended to separate their cause from that of his brother. He omitted no art of conciliation or entreaty, and—more eloquent probably in prose than in poetry—appealed to their love of glory, their generosity, their fidelity, and the oaths which they had so lately sworn. “We *have* been faithful,” replied Fayette; “we have followed your brother to the sands of Egypt—to the snows of Russia. The bones of Frenchmen, scattered in every region, attest our fidelity.” All seemed to unite in one sentiment, that the abdication of Buonaparte was a measure absolutely necessary. Davoust, the minister-at-war, arose, and disclaimed, with protestations, any intention of acting against the freedom or independence of the Chamber. This was, in fact, to espouse their cause. A committee of five members was appointed to concert measures with Ministers. Even the latter official persons, though named by the Emperor, were not supposed to be warmly attached to him. Carnot and Fouché were the natural leaders of the popular party, and Caulaincourt was supposed to be on indifferent terms with

Napoleon, whose Ministers, therefore, seemed to adopt the interest of the Chamber in preference to his. Lucien saw that his brother's authority was ended, unless it could be maintained by violence. The Chamber of Peers might have been more friendly to the Imperial cause, but their constitution gave them as little confidence in themselves as weight with the public. They adopted the three first resolutions of the Lower Chamber, and named a committee of public safety.

The line of conduct which the Representatives meant to pursue was now obvious; they had spoken out, and named the sacrifice which they exacted from Buonaparte, being nothing less than abdication. It remained to be known whether the Emperor would adopt measures of resistance, or submit to this encroachment. If there could be a point of right, where both were so far wrong, it certainly lay with Napoleon. These very Representatives were, by voluntary consent, as far as oaths and engagements can bind men, his subjects, convoked in his name, and having no political existence excepting as a part of his new constitutional government. However great his faults to the people of France, he had committed none towards these accomplices of his usurpation, nor were they legislators otherwise than as he was their Emperor. Their right to discard and trample upon him in his adversity consisted only in their having the power to do so; and the readiness which they showed to exercise that power, spoke as little for their faith as for their generosity. At the same time, our commiseration for fallen greatness is lost in our sense of that justice which makes the associates and tools of a usurper the readiest implements of his ruin.

When Buonaparte returned to Paris his first interview was with Carnot, of whom he demanded, in his usual tone of authority, an instant supply of treasure, and a levy of 300,000 men. The Minister replied, that he could have neither the one nor the other. Napoleon then summoned Maret, Duke of Bassano, and other confidential persons of his court. But when his civil counsellors talked of defence, the word wrung from him the

bitter ejaculation, "Ah, my old guard, could they but defend themselves like you!" A sad confession, that the military truncheon, his best emblem of command, was broken in his grip. Lucien urged his brother to maintain his authority, and dissolve the Chambers by force; but Napoleon, aware that the national guard might take the part of the Representatives, declined an action so full of hazard. Davoust, was, however, sounded concerning his willingness to act against the Chambers, but he positively refused to do so. Some idea was held out by Fouché to Napoleon, of his being admitted to the powers of a dictator; but this could be only thrown out as a proposal for the purpose of amusing him. In the meantime, arrived the news of the result of the meeting of the Representatives in secret committee. ✓

The gauntlet was now thrown down, and it was necessary that Napoleon should resist or yield; declare himself absolute, and dissolve the Chambers by violence; or abdicate the authority he had so lately resumed. Lucien, finding him still undetermined, hesitated not to say that the smoke of the battle of Mont Saint Jean had turned his brain. In fact, his conduct at this crisis was not that of a great man. He dared neither venture on the desperate measures which might, for a short time, have preserved his power, nor could he bring himself to the dignified step of an apparently voluntary resignation. He clung to what could no longer avail him, like the distracted criminal, who, wanting resolution to meet his fate by a voluntary effort, must be pushed from the scaffold by the hand of the executioner.

Buonaparte held, upon the night of the 21st, a sort of general council comprehending the Ministers of every description; the president and four members of the Chamber of Peers, the president, and four vice-presidents, of the Representatives, with other official persons and counsellors of state. The Emperor laid before this assembly the state of the nation, and required their advice. Regnault (who was the Imperial orator in ordinary) seconded the statement with a proposal that measures be taken to recruit with heroes the heroic army, and

bring succours to what, by a happily-selected phrase, he termed the "astonished eagle". He opined, therefore, that the Chambers should make an appeal to French valour, while the Emperor was treating of peace "in the most steady and dignified manner". Fayette stated, that resistance would but aggravate the calamities of France. The allies stood pledged to demand a particular sacrifice when they first engaged in the war; they were not likely to recede from it after this decisive victory. One measure alone he saw betwixt the country and a bloody and ruinous conflict, and he referred to the great and generous spirit of the Emperor to discover its nature. Maret, Duke of Bassano, long Buonaparte's most confidential friend, and fatally so, because (more a courtier than a statesman) he attended rather to soothe his humour than to guide his councils, took fire at this suggestion. He called for severe measures against the Royalists and the disaffected; a revolutionary police, and revolutionary punishments. "Had such," he said, "been earlier resorted to, a person" (meaning probably Fouché) "who now hears me, would not be now smiling at the misfortunes of his country, and Wellington would not be marching upon Paris." This speech was received with a burst of disapprobation, which even the presence of the Emperor, in whose cause Maret was thus vehement, proved unable to restrain; hisses and clamour drowned the voice of the speaker. Carnot, who had juster views of the military strength, or rather weakness, of France at the moment, was desirous, democrat as he was, to retain the advantage of Napoleon's talents. He is said to have wept when the abdication was insisted upon. Lanjuinais and Constant supported the sentiments of Fayette. But the Emperor appeared gloomy, dissatisfied, and uncertain, and the council broke up without coming to any determination.

For another anxious night the decision of Buonaparte was suspended. Had the nation, or even the Ministers, been unanimous in a resolution to defend themselves, unquestionably France might have been exposed to the final chance of war, with some prospect of a struggle on Napoleon's part; though, when it is considered within

how short a time the allies introduced, within the limits of France, an armed force amounting to 800,000 effective men, it does not appear how his resistance could have eventually proved successful. It would be injustice to deny Napoleon a natural feeling of the evils which must have been endured by the nation in such a protracted contest, and we readily suppose him unwilling to have effected a brief continuation of his reign, by becoming the cause of so much misery to the fine country which he had so long ruled. Like most men in difficulties, he received much more advice than offers of assistance. The best counsel was, perhaps, that of an American gentleman, who advised him instantly to retreat to the North American States, where he could not indeed enjoy the royal privileges and ceremonial, to which he was more attached than philosophy warrants, but where that general respect would have been paid to him, which his splendid talents, and wonderful career of adventure, were so well calculated to enforce. But now, as at Moscow, he lingered too long in forming a decided opinion; for, though the importunity of friends and opponents wrung from him the resignation which was demanded at all hands, yet it was clogged by conditions which could only be made in the hope of retaining a predominant interest in the government by which his own was to be succeeded.

On the morning of the 22nd June, only four days after the defeat at Waterloo, the Chamber of Representatives assembled at nine in the morning, and expressed the utmost impatience to receive the Act of Abdication. A motion was made by Duchesne that it should be peremptorily demanded from the Emperor, when this degree of violence was rendered unnecessary by his compliance. It was presented by Fouché, whose intrigues were thus far crowned with success, and was couched in the following terms:—

“Frenchmen!—In commencing war for maintaining the national independence, I relied on the union of all efforts, of all wills, and the concurrence of all the national authorities. I had reason to hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of the powers against me.

“Circumstances appear to me changed. I offer myself as a sacri-

fice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in their declarations, and have really directed them only against my power! My political life is terminated, and I proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., Emperor of the French.

"The present Ministers will provisionally form the council of the government. The interest which I take in my son induces me to invite the Chambers to form, without delay, the regency by a law.

"Unite all for the public safety, in order to remain an independent nation. (Signed) "NAPOLEON."

The Republican party having thus obtained a victory, proposed instantly several new models for settling the form of a constitution, in the room of that which, exactly three weeks before, they had sworn to in the Champ de Mai. This was judged somewhat premature; and they resolved for the present to content themselves with nominating a Provisional Government, vesting the executive powers of the state in five persons—two to be chosen from Buonaparte's House of Peers, and three from that of the Representatives.

In the meanwhile, to preserve the decency due to the late Emperor, the Chamber named a committee to wait on him with an address of thanks, in which they carefully avoided all mention and recognition of his son. Napoleon, for the last time, received the committee delegated to present the address, in the imperial habit, and surrounded by his state-officers and guards. He seemed pale and pensive, but firm and collected, and heard with a steady indifference the praises which they bestowed on his patriotic sacrifice. His answer recommended unanimity, and the speedy preparation of means of defence; but at the conclusion he reminded them that his abdication was conditional, and comprehended the interests of his son.

Lanjuinais, President of the Chamber, replied, with profound respect, that the Chamber had given him no directions respecting the subject which Napoleon pressed upon. "I told you," said he, turning to his brother Lucien, "they would not, could not do it.—Tell the Assembly," he said, again addressing the President, "that I recommend my son to their protection. It is in his favour I have abdicated."

Thus the succession of Napoleon II. came to be now the point of debate between the abdicated Emperor and the legislative bodies. It is certain the appointment could not have been rendered acceptable to the allies; and the influence which Buonaparte and his friends were likely to have in a regency were strong arguments for all in France who had opposed him in the struggle, uniting to set aside his family and dynasty.

Upon the same 22nd June, a strange scene took place in the Chamber of Peers. The government had received intelligence that Maréchal Grouchy, whom we left on the banks of the Dyle, near Wavre, and who continued his action with Thielman, to whom he was opposed, till deep in the night, had, on hearing the loss of the battle at Waterloo, effected a most able retreat through Namur, defended himself against several attacks, and finally made his way to Laon. This good news encouraged Carnot to render a brilliant account to the Chamber, of Grouchy being at the head of an untouched army of upwards of 60,000 men (Grouchy's whole force at Wavre having been only 32,000); of Soult collecting 20,000 of the old guard at Mezières; of 10,000 new levies despatched from the interior to join the rallied forces, with 200 pieces of cannon. Ney, half frantic at hearing these exaggerated statements, and his mind galled with the sense of Napoleon's injustice towards him, as expressed in the bulletins, started up, and spoke like a possessed person under the power of the exorcist. There was a reckless desperation in the manner of his contradicting the minister. It seemed as if he wished the state of the world undone in his own undoing. "The report," he said, "was false—false in every respect. Dare they tell eye-witnesses of the disastrous day of the 18th that we have yet 60,000 soldiers embodied? Grouchy cannot have under him 20,000, or 25,000 soldiers, at the utmost. Had he possessed a greater force, he might have covered the retreat, and the Emperor would have been still in command of an army on the frontiers. Not a man of the guard," he said, "will ever rally more. I myself commanded them—I myself witnessed their total exter-

mination, ere I left the field of battle. They are annihilated.—The enemy are at Nivelles with 80,000 men; they may, if they please, be at Paris in six days. There is no safety for France but in instant propositions of peace." On being contradicted by General Flahault, Ney resumed his sinister statement with even more vehemence; and at length, striking at once into the topic which all felt but none had ventured yet to name, he said in a low, but distinct voice—"Yes! I repeat it—your only course is by negotiation—you must recall the Bourbons; and, for me, I will retire to the United States."

The most bitter reproaches were heaped on Ney for this last expression. Lavalette and Carnot especially appeared incensed against him. Ney replied with sullen contempt to those who blamed his conduct, "I am not one of those to whom their interest is everything; what should I gain by the restoration of Louis, except being shot for desertion? but I must speak the truth, for the sake of the country." This strange scene sunk deep into the minds of thinking men, who were thenceforward induced to view the subsequent sounding resolutions, and bustling debates of the Chambers, as empty noise, unsupported by the state of the national resources.

After this debate on the state of the means of defence, there followed one scarce less stormy, in the House of Peers, upon the reading of the Act of Abdication. Lucien Buonaparte took up the question of the succession, and insisted upon the instant recognition of his nephew, according to the rules of the constitution. The Count de Pontecoulant interrupted the orator, demanding by what right Lucien, an Italian prince, and an alien, presumed to name a sovereign to the French empire, where he himself had not even the privileges of a denizen? To this objection—a strange one, certainly, coming from lips which had sworn faith but twenty-two days before to a constitution recognizing Lucien not only as a denizen, but as one of the blood-royal of France, the prince answered, that he was a Frenchman by his sentiments, and by virtue of the laws. Pontecoulant then objected

to accept as sovereign a child residing in a different kingdom; and Labédoyère, observing the hesitation of the assembly, started up, and demeaning himself with unrestrained fury, exhibited the same blind and devoted attachment to Napoleon which had prompted him to show the example of defection at Grenoble.

"The Emperor," he said, "had abdicated solely in behalf of his son. His resignation was null if his son was not instantly proclaimed. And who were they who opposed this generous resolution? Those whose voices had been always at the sovereign's devotion while in prosperity; who had fled from him in adversity, and who were already hastening to receive the yoke of foreigners. Yes," continued this impetuous young man, aiding his speech with the most violent gestures, and overpowering, by the loudness of his tone, the murmurs of the assembly, "if you refuse to acknowledge the Imperial Prince, I declare that Napoleon must again draw his sword—again shed blood. At the head of the brave Frenchmen who have bled in his cause, we will rally around him; and woe to the base generals who are perhaps even now meditating new treasons! I demand that they be impeached, and punished as deserters of the national standard—that their names be given to infamy, their houses razed, their families proscribed and exiled. We will endure no traitors amongst us. Napoleon, in resigning his power to save the nation, has done his duty to himself, but the nation is not worthy of him, since she has a second time compelled him to abdicate; she who vowed to abide by him in prosperity and reverses." The ravings of this daring enthusiast, who was, in fact, giving language to the feelings of a great part of the French army, were at length drowned in a general cry of order. "You forget yourself," exclaimed Massena. "You believe yourself still in the *corps de garde*," said Lameth. Labédoyère strove to go on, but was silenced by the general clamour, which at length put an end to this scandalous scene.

The peers, like the deputies of the Lower Chamber, having eluded the express recognition of Napoleon II.,

the two chambers proceeded to name the members of the provisional government. These were Carnot, Fouché, Caulaincourt, Grenier, and Quinette. In their proclamation they stated that Napoleon had resigned, and that his son had been *proclaimed* (which, by the way, was not true); calling on the nation for exertions, sacrifices, and unanimity, and promising, if not an actually new constitution, as had been usual on such occasions, yet such a complete revision and repair of that which was now three weeks old as should make it in every respect as good as new.

This address had little effect either on the troops or the Federates, who, like Labédoyère, were of opinion that Napoleon's abdication could only be received on his own terms. These men assembled in armed parties, and paraded under Buonaparte's windows, at the palace of Bourbon-Elysée. Money and liquor were delivered to them, which increased their cries of *Vive Napoleon! Vive l'Empereur!* They insulted the national guards, and seemed disposed to attack the residence of Fouché. On the other hand, the national guards were 30,000 men in number, disposed in general to support order, and many of them leaning to the side of Louis XVIII. A moment of internal convulsion seemed inevitable; for it was said that, if Napoleon II. was not instantly acknowledged, Buonaparte would come down and dissolve the Chamber with an armed force.

On the meeting of the 24th June, the important question of succession was decided, or rather evaded, as follows:—Manuel, generally understood to be the organ of Fouché in the House of Representatives, made a long speech to show that there was no occasion for a formal recognition of the succession of Napoleon II., since he was, by the terms of the constitution, already in possession of the throne. When the orator had given this deep reason that their sovereign should neither be acknowledged nor proclaimed, purely because he *was* their sovereign, all arose and shouted, *Vive Napoleon II.!* But when there was a proposal to swear allegiance to the new Emperor, there was a general cry of "No oaths! No

oaths!" as if there existed a consciousness in the Chamber of having been too lavish of these ill-redeemed pledges, and a general disgust at commencing a new course of perjury.

The Chamber of Representatives thus silenced, if they did not satisfy, the Imperialist party, by a sort of incidental and ostensible acknowledgment of the young Napoleon's right to the crown; while at the same time, by declaring the Provisional Government to be a necessary guarantee for the liberties of the subject, they prevented the interference either of Napoleon himself, or any of his friends, in the administration of the country. Yet, notwithstanding the simulated nature of their compliance with the special condition of Napoleon's resignation, the Chambers and Provisional Government were as strict in exacting from the abdicated sovereign the terms of his bargain, as if they had paid him the stipulated value in sterling, instead of counterfeit, coin. Thus they exacted from him a proclamation, addressed in his own name, to the soldiers, in order to confirm the fact of his abdication, which the troops were unwilling to believe on any authority inferior to his own. In this address, there are, however, expressions which show his sense of the compulsion under which he acted. After an exhortation to the soldiers to continue in their career of honour, and an assurance of the interest which he should always take in their exploits, follows this passage:—"Both you and I have been calumniated. Men, very unfit to appreciate our labours, have seen, in the marks of attachment which you have given me, a zeal of which I was the sole object. Let your future successes tell them that it was the country, above all things, which you served in obeying me; and that, if I had any share in your affections, I owed it to my ardent love for France, our common mother."

These expressions were highly disagreeable to the Chamber of Representatives, who at the same time regarded the presence of Napoleon in the capital as dangerous to their own power and to the public tranquillity. The suburbs, with their fierce inmates, continued to be agitated, and soldiers, the straggling relics of the field of

Waterloo, were daily gathering under the walls of Paris, furious at their recent defeat, and calling on their Emperor to lead them to vengeance. There seems to have been little to prevent Napoleon from still placing himself at the head of a small but formidable array. To remove him from this temptation, the Provisional Government required him to retire to the palace of Malmaison, near St. Germain, so long the favourite abode of the discarded Josephine. Napoleon had not been within its walls a single day, before, surrounded by Fouché's police, he found that he, who, not a month since, had disposed of the fate of myriads, was no longer the free master of his own actions. He was watched and controlled, though without the use of actual force, and now, for the first time, felt what it was to lose that free agency, of which his despotism had for so many years deprived so large a portion of mankind. Yet he seemed to submit to his fate with indifference, or only expressed impatience when beset by his personal creditors, who, understanding that he was not likely to remain long in France, attempted to extort from him a settlement of their claims. The petty persecution was given way to by the government, as one of several expedients to abridge his residence in France; and they had the means of using force, if all should fail.

Short as was the time he lingered at Malmaison, incredible as it may be thought, Napoleon was almost forgotten in Paris. "No one," says a well-informed author living in that city during the crisis, "except the immediate friends of government, pretends to know whether he is still at Malmaison, or seems to think it a question of importance to ask. On Saturday last, Count M—— saw him there; he was tranquil, but quite lost. His friends now pretend that, since his return from Elba, he has never been quite the man he was." There was, however, a reason for his protracting his residence at Malmaison, more honourable than mere human reluctance to submit to inevitable calamity.

The English and Prussian forces were now approaching Paris by rapid marches; every town falling before them which could have been reckoned upon as a bar to

their progress. When Paris was again to be girt round with hostile armies, honourable as well as political feelings might lead Napoleon to hope that the Representatives might be inclined to waive all personal animosity, and, having recourse to his extraordinary talents and his influence over the minds of the army and federates, by which alone the capital could be defended, might permit him once more to assume the sword for protection of Paris. He offered to command the army as general in chief, in behalf of his son. He offered to take share in the defence, as an ordinary citizen. But the internal discord had gone too far. The popular party, which then prevailed, saw more danger in the success of Napoleon than in the superiority of the allies. The latter they hoped to conciliate by treaty. They doubted, with good reason, the power of resisting them by force; and if such resistance was, or could be maintained by Napoleon, they feared his supremacy, in a military command, at least as much as the predominance of the allies. His services were therefore declined by them.

Like skilful anglers, the Provisional Government had been gradually drawing their nets around Napoleon, and it was now time, as they thought, to drag him upon the shallows. They proceeded to place him under a sort of arrest, by directing General Beker, an officer with whom Napoleon had been on indifferent terms, to watch over, and, if necessary, to restrain his movements in such a manner that it should be impossible for him to make his escape, and to use measures to induce him to leave Malmaison for Rochefort, where the means were provided for his departure out of France. Orders were at the same time given for two frigates to transport him to the United States of America; and the *surveillance* of General Beker and the police was to continue until the late Emperor was on board the vessels. This order was qualified by directions that all possible care should be taken to ensure the safety of Napoleon's person. A corresponding order was transmitted by Davoust, who, giving way to one of those equivocal bursts of feeling, by which men compromise a conflict between their senti-

ments and their duty or their interest, refused to sign it himself, but ordered his secretary to do so, which, as he observed, would be quite the same.

Napoleon submitted to his destiny with resignation and dignity. He received General Beker with ease, and even cheerfulness; and the latter, with feelings which did him honour, felt the task committed to him the more painful, that he had experienced the personal enmity of the individual who was now intrusted to his custody. About forty persons, of different ranks and degrees, honourably dedicated their services to the adversity of the Emperor whom they had served in prosperity.

Yet, amid all these preparations for departure, a long-ing hope remained that his exile might be dispensed with. He heard the distant cannonade as the war-horse hears the trumpet. Again he offered his services to march against Blücher as a simple volunteer, undertaking that, when he had repulsed the invaders, he would then proceed on his journey of expatriation. He had such hopes of his request being granted as to have his horses brought out and in readiness to enable him to join the army. But the Provisional Government anew declined an offer, the acceptance of which would, indeed, have ruined all hopes of treating with the allies. Fouché, on hearing Napoleon's proposal, is said to have exclaimed, "Is he laughing at us!" Indeed, his joining the troops would have soon made him master of the destiny of the Provisional Government, whatever might have been the final result.

On the 29th of June, Napoleon departed from Malmaison; on the 3rd of July he arrived at Rochefort. General Beker accompanied him, nor does his journey seem to have been marked by any circumstances worthy of remark. Wherever he came, the troops received him with acclamation; the citizens respected the misfortunes of one who had been well-nigh master of the world, and were silent where they could not applaud.

Thus, the reign of the Emperor Napoleon was completely ended. But, before adverting to his future fate, we must complete, in a few words, the consequences of his abdication.

The Provisional Government had sent commissioners to the Duke of Wellington, to request passports for Napoleon to the States of America. The Duke had no instructions from his government to grant them. The Prussian and English generals alike declined all overtures made for the establishment, or acknowledgment, either of the present Provisional Administration, or any plan which they endeavoured to suggest, short of the restoration of the Bourbons to the seat of government. The Provisional Commissioners endeavoured, with as little success, to awaken the spirit of national defence. They had lost the road to the soldiers' hearts. The thoughts of patriotism had in the army become indissolubly united with the person and the qualities of Napoleon. It was in vain that deputies, with scarfs, and proclamations of public right, and invocation of the ancient watchwords of the Revolution, endeavoured to awaken the spirit of 1794. The soldiers and federates answered sullenly, "Why should we fight any more? we have no longer an Emperor."

Meanwhile, the Royalist party assumed courage, and showed themselves in arms in several of the departments, directed the public opinion in many others, and gained great accessions from the Constitutionals. Indeed, if any of the latter still continued to dread the restoration of the Bourbons, it was partly from the fear of reaction and retaliation on the side of the successful Royalists, and partly because it was apprehended that the late events might have made on the mind of Louis an impression unfavourable to constitutional limitations, a disgust to those by whom they were recommended and supported, and a propensity to resume the arbitrary measures by which his ancestors had governed their kingdom. Those who nourished those apprehensions could not but allow, that they were founded on the fickleness and ingratitude of the people, who had shown themselves unworthy of, and easily induced to conspire against, the mild and easy rule of a limited monarchy. But they involved, nevertheless, tremendous consequences, if the King should be disposed to act upon rigorous and vindic-

tive principles; and it was such an apprehension on the part of some, joined to the fears of others for personal consequences, the sullen shame of a third party, and the hatred of the army to the princes whom they had betrayed, which procured for the Provisional Government a show of obedience.

It was thus that the Chambers continued their resistance to receiving their legitimate monarch, though unable to excite any enthusiasm save that expressed in the momentary explosions discharged within their own place of meeting, which gratified no ears, and heated no brains but their own. In the meanwhile, the armies of Soult and Grouchy were driven under the walls of Paris, where they were speedily followed by the English and the Prussians. The natural gallantry of the French then dictated a resistance, which was honourable to their arms, though totally unsuccessful. The allies, instead of renewing the doubtful attack on Montmartre, crossed the Seine, and attacked Paris on the undefended side. There was not, as in 1814, a hostile army to endanger the communications on their rear. The French, however, showed great bravery, both by an attempt to defend Versailles, and in a *coup-de-main* of General Exelmans, by which he attempted to recover that town. But at length, in consequence of the result of a council of war held in Paris on the night betwixt the 2nd and 3rd of July, an armistice was concluded, by which the capital was surrendered to the allies, and the French army was drawn off behind the Loire.

The allies suspended their operations until the French troops should be brought to submit to their destined movement in retreat, against which they struggled with vain enthusiasm. Permitting their violence to subside, they delayed their own occupation of Paris until the 7th of July, when it had been completely evacuated. The British and Prussians then took military possession, in a manner strictly regular, but arguing a different state of feelings on both parts, from those exhibited in the joyous procession of the allies along the Boulevards in 1814. The Provisional Government continued their sittings,

though Fouché, the chief among them, had been long intriguing (and ever since the battle of Waterloo, with apparent sincerity) for the second restoration of the Bourbon family, on such terms as should secure the liberties of France. They received, on the 6th of July, the final resolution of the allied sovereigns that they considered all authority emanating from the usurped power of Napoleon Buonaparte as null, and of no effect; and that Louis XVIII., who was presently at Saint Denis, would on the next day, or day after at farthest, enter his capital and resume his regal authority.

On the 7th of July, the Provisional Commission dissolved itself. The Chamber of Peers, when they heard the act of surrender, dispersed in silence; but that of the Representatives continued to sit, vote, and debate for several hours. The president then prorogued the meeting till eight the next morning, in defiance of the cries of several members, who called on him to maintain the literal permanence of the sitting. The next morning, the members who attended found the hall sentinelled by the national guard, who refused them admittance, and heard the exclamations and complaints of the deputies with great disregard. Nay, the disappointed and indignant legislators were subjected to the ridicule of the idle spectators, who accompanied the arrival and retreat of each individual with laughter and acclamation, loud in proportion to the apparent excess of his mortification.

On the 8th of July, Louis re-entered his capital, attended by a very large body of the national guards and royal volunteers, as well as by his household troops. In the rear of these soldiers came a numerous état-major, among whom were distinguished the Maréchals Victor, Marmont, Macdonald, Oudinot, Gouvion St. Cyr, Moncey, and Lefebvre. An immense concourse of citizens received, with acclamations, the legitimate monarch; and the females were observed to be particularly eager in their expressions of joy. Thus was Louis again installed in the palace of his ancestors, over which the white banner once more floated. Here, therefore, ended that short space, filled with so much that is wonderful, that

period of an Hundred Days, in which the events of a century seemed to be contained.

Our history returns to its principal object. Buonaparte arrived at Rochefort upon the 3rd July; so short had been the space between the bloody cast of the die at Waterloo and his finding himself an exile. Yet even this brief space of fifteen days had made his retreat difficult, if not impracticable. Means, indeed, were provided for his transportation. The two French frigates, the *Saale* and the *Medusa*, together with the *Balladière*, a corvette, and the *Epervier*, a large brig, waited Buonaparte's presence, and orders to sail for America from their station under the Isle d'Aix. But, as Napoleon himself said shortly afterwards, wherever there was water to swim a ship, there he was sure to find the British flag.

The news of the defeat at Waterloo had been the signal to the Admiralty to cover the western coast of France with cruisers, in order to prevent the possibility of Napoleon's escaping by sea from any of the ports in that direction. Admiral Lord Keith, an officer of great experience and activity, then commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, had made a most judicious disposition of the fleet under his command, by stationing an inner line of cruisers, of various descriptions, off the principal ports between Brest and Bayonne, with an exterior line, necessarily more widely extended, betwixt Ushant and Cape Finisterre. The commanders of these vessels had the strictest orders to suffer no vessel to pass unexamined. No less than thirty ships of different descriptions maintained this blockade. According to this arrangement, the British line-of-battle ship, the *Bellerophon*, cruised off Rochefort, with the occasional assistance of the *Slaney*, the *Phæbe*, and other small vessels, sometimes present, and sometimes detached, as the service might require. Captain Maitland, who commanded the *Bellerophon*, is a man of high character in his profession, of birth, of firmness of mind, and of the most indisputable honour. It is necessary to mention these circumstances, because the national character of England herself is deeply concerned and identified

with that of Captain Maitland in the narrative which follows.

The several orders under which this officer acted, expressed the utmost anxiety about intercepting Buonaparte's flight, and canvassed the different probabilities concerning its direction. His attention was at a later date particularly directed to the frigates in Aix roads, and the report concerning their destination. Admiral Hotham writes to Captain Maitland, 8th July, 1815, the following order:—

"The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having every reason to believe that Napoleon Buonaparte meditates his escape, with his family, from France to America, you are hereby required and directed, in pursuance of orders from their Lordships, signified to me by Admiral the Right Honourable Viscount Keith, to keep the most vigilant look-out, for the purpose of intercepting him; and to make the strictest search of any vessel you may fall in with; and if you should be so fortunate as to intercept him, you are to transfer him and his family to the ship you command, and, there keeping him in careful custody, return to the nearest port in England (going into Torbay in preference to Plymouth) with all possible expedition; and, on your arrival, you are not to permit any communication whatever with the shore, except as hereinafter directed; and you will be held responsible for keeping the whole transaction a profound secret, until you receive their Lordships' further orders.

"In case you should arrive at a port where there is a flag-officer, you are to send to acquaint him with the circumstances, strictly charging the officer sent on shore with your letter not to divulge its contents; and if there should be no flag-officer at the port where you arrive, you are to send one letter express to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and another to Admiral Lord Keith, with strict injunctions of secrecy to each officer who may be the bearer of them."

We give these orders at full length, to show that they left Captain Maitland no authority to make conditions or stipulations of surrender, or to treat Napoleon otherwise than as an ordinary prisoner of war.

Captain Maitland proceeded to exercise all the vigilance which an occasion so interesting demanded; and it was soon evident that the presence of the *Bellerophon* was an absolute bar to Napoleon's escape by means of the frigates, unless it should be attempted by open force. In this latter case, the British officer had formed his plan of

bearing down upon and disabling the one vessel, and throwing on board of her a hundred men selected for the purpose, while the *Bellerophon* set sail with all speed in pursuit of her consort, and thus made sure of both. He had also two small vessels, the *Slaney* and the *Phœbe*, which he could attach to the pursuit of the frigate, so as at least to keep her in view. This plan might have failed by accident, but it was so judiciously laid as to have every chance of being successful; and it seems that Napoleon received no encouragement from the commanders of the frigates to try the event of a forcible escape.

The scheme of a secret flight was next meditated. A *chasse-marée*, a peculiar species of vessel, used only in the coasting trade, was to be fitted up and manned with young probationers of the navy, equivalent to our midshipmen. This, it was thought, might elude the vigilance of such British cruisers as were in-shore; but then it must have been a suspicious object at sea, and the possibility of its being able to make the voyage to America, was considered as precarious. A Danish corvette was next purchased, and as, in leaving the harbour, it was certain she would be brought to and examined by the English, a place of concealment was contrived, being a cask supplied with air-tubes, to be stowed in the hold of the vessel, in which it was intended Napoleon should lie concealed. But the extreme rigour with which the search was likely to be prosecuted, and the corpulence of Buonaparte, which would not permit him to remain long in a close or constrained position, made this as well as other hopeless contrivances be laid aside.

There were undoubtedly at this time many proposals made to the ex-Emperor by the army, who, compelled to retreat behind the Loire, were still animated by a thirst of revenge, and a sense of injured honour. There is no doubt that they would have received Napoleon with acclamation; but if he could not, or would not, pursue a course so desperate in 1814, when he had still a considerable army, and a respectable extent of territory remaining, it must have seemed much more inelligible in 1815,

when his numbers were so much more disproportioned than they had formerly been, and when his best generals had embraced the cause of the Bourbons, or fled out of France. Napoleon's condition, had he embraced this alternative, would have been that of the chief of a roving tribe of warriors, struggling for existence, with equal misery to themselves and the countries through which they wandered, until at length broken down and destroyed by superior force.

Rejecting this expedient, and all others having been found equally objectionable, the only alternative which remained was to surrender his person, either to the allied powers as a body, or to any one of them in particular. The former course would have been difficult, unless Napoleon had adopted the idea of resorting to it earlier, which, in the view of his escape by sea, he had omitted to do. Neither had he time to negotiate with any of the allied sovereigns, or of travelling back to Paris for the purpose with any chance of personal safety, for the Royalists were now everywhere holding the ascendancy, and more than one of his generals had been attacked and killed by them.

He was cooped up, therefore, in Rochefort, although the white flag was already about to be hoisted there, and the commandant respectfully hinted the necessity of his departure. It must have been anticipated by Napoleon that he might be soon deprived of the cover of the batteries of the isle of Aix. The fact is (though we believe not generally known), that on the 13th July, Lord Castlereagh wrote to Admiral Sir Henry Hotham, commanding off Cape Finisterre, suggesting to him the propriety of attacking, with a part of his force, the two frigates in the roads of the isle d'Aix, having first informed the commandant that they did so in the capacity of allies of the King of France, and placing it upon his responsibility if he fired on them from the batteries. Napoleon could not, indeed, know for certain, that such a plan was actually in existence, and about to be attempted, but yet must have been aware of its probability, when the Royalist party were becoming everywhere superior, and

their emblems were assumed in the neighbouring town of Rochelle. It is, therefore, in vain to state Buonaparte's subsequent conduct as a voluntary confidence reposed by him in the honour of England. He was precisely in the condition of the commandant of a besieged town, who has the choice of surrendering or encountering the risks of a storm. Neither was it open for him to contend that he selected the British, out of all the other allied powers, with whom to treat upon this occasion. Like the commandant in the case above supposed, he was under the necessity of surrendering to those who were the immediate besiegers, and, therefore, he was compelled to apply for terms of safety to him who alone possessed the direct power of granting it, that is, to Captain Frederick Maitland, of the *Bellerophon*.

Napoleon opened a communication with this officer on the 10th July, by two of his attendants, General Savary and Count Las Cases, under pretence of inquiring about a safe-conduct—a passport which Napoleon pretended to expect from England, and which, he said, had been promised to him, without stating by whom. Under this round assertion, for which there was not the slightest ground, Messrs. Savary and Las Cases desired to know, whether Captain Maitland would permit the frigates to sail with him uninterrupted, or at least give him leave to proceed in a neutral vessel. Captain Maitland, without hesitation, declared that he would not permit any armed vessel to put to sea from the port of Rochefort. “It was equally out of his power,” he stated, “to allow the Emperor to proceed in a neutral vessel, without the sanction of Admiral Hotham, his commanding officer.” He offered to write to that officer, however, and the French gentlemen having assented, he wrote, in their presence, to the admiral, announcing the communication he had received, and requesting orders for his guidance. This was all but a prelude to the real subject of negotiation. The Duke of Rovigo (Savary) and Count Las Cases remained two or three hours on board, and said all they could to impress Captain Maitland with the idea that Napoleon's retirement was a matter of choice, not of compulsion,

and that it was the interest of Britain to consent to his going to America; a measure, they said, which was solely dictated to him by humanity, and a desire to save human blood. Captain Maitland asked the natural question, which we give in his own words:—

“Supposing the British government should be induced to grant a passport for Buonaparte's going to America, what pledge could he give that he would not return, and put England, as well as all Europe, to the same expense of blood and treasure that has just been incurred?”

General Savary made the following reply:—‘When the Emperor first abdicated the throne of France, his removal was brought about by a faction, at the head of which was Talleyrand, and the sense of the nation was not consulted: but in the present instance he has voluntarily resigned the power. The influence he once had over the French people is past; a very considerable change has taken place in their sentiments towards him, since he went to Elba; and he could never regain the power he had over their minds; therefore, he would prefer retiring into obscurity, where he might end his days in peace and tranquillity; and were he solicited to ascend the throne again, he would decline it.’

“If that is the case,” said Captain Maitland, ‘why not ask an asylum in England?’ Savary answered, ‘There are many reasons for his not wishing to reside in England; the climate is too damp and cold; it is too near France; he would be, as it were, in the centre of every change and revolution that might take place there, and would be subject to suspicion; he has been accustomed to consider the English as his most inveterate enemies, and they have been induced to look upon him as a monster, without one of the virtues of a human being.’”

Captain Knight of the *Falmouth* was present during the whole of this conversation, from which Captain Maitland, like an able diplomatist, drew a conclusion respecting the affairs of Napoleon, exactly opposite from that which they endeavoured to impress upon him, and concluded that he must be in extremity.

On the 14th July, Count Las Cases again came on board the *Bellerophon*, now attended by General Count L'Allemand. The pretext of the visit was, to learn whether Captain Maitland had received any answer from the admiral. Captain Maitland observed, the visit on that account was unnecessary, as he would have forwarded the answer so soon as received; and added, he did

not approve of frequent communication by flags of truce; thus repelling rather than inviting them. The conference was resumed after breakfast, Captain Maitland having, in the meantime, sent for Captain Sartorius of the *Slaney*, to be witness of what passed. In this most important conference, we hold it unjust to Captain Maitland to use any other words than his own, copied from his Journal, the original of which we have ourselves had the advantage of seeing:—

"When breakfast was over, we retired to the after-cabin. Count Las Cases then said, 'The Emperor is so anxious to spare the further effusion of human blood that he will proceed to America in any way the British Government chooses to sanction, either in a French ship of war, a vessel armed *en flute*, a merchant vessel, or even in a British ship of war.' To this I answered, 'I have no authority to agree to any arrangement of that sort, nor do I believe my Government would consent to it; but I think I may venture to receive him into this ship, and convey him to England; if, however,' I added, '*he adopts that plan, I cannot enter into any promise as to the reception he may meet with, as, even in the case I have mentioned, I shall be acting on my own responsibility, and cannot be sure that it would meet with the approbation of the British Government.*'"

"There was a great deal of conversation on this subject, in the course of which Lucien Buonaparte's name was mentioned, and the manner in which he had lived in England alluded to; but I invariably assured Las Cases most explicitly that I had no authority to make conditions of any sort, as to Napoleon's reception in England. In fact, I could not have done otherwise, since, with the exception of the order, I had no instructions for my guidance, and was, of course, in total ignorance of the intention of his Majesty's Ministers as to his future disposal. One of the last observations Las Cases made, before quitting the ship, was, 'Under all circumstances, I have little doubt that you will see the Emperor on board the *Bellerophon*;' and, in fact, Buonaparte must have determined on that step before Las Cases came on board, as his letter to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent is dated the 13th of July, the day before this conversation."

The Count Las Cases gives nearly a similar detail of circumstances, with a colouring which is exaggerated, and an arrangement of dates which is certainly inaccurate. It must also be noticed that Count Las Cases dissembled his acquaintance with the English language; and, therefore, if any mistake had occurred betwixt him and Captain Maitland, who spoke French with difficulty,

he had himself so far to blame for it. Of the visit on board the *Bellerophon* on the 10th, after giving the same statement as Captain Maitland, concerning the application for the passports, the Count states, "It was suggested to us to go to England, and we were assured we had no room to fear any bad treatment".

On the 14th, being the date of his second visit, he states that there was a repetition of the invitation to England, and the terms on which it was recommended. "Captain Maitland," he says, "told him, that if the Emperor chose immediately to embark, he had authority to receive him on board, and conduct him to England." This is so expressed as to lead the reader to believe that Captain Maitland spoke to the Count of some new directions or orders which he had received, or pretended to have received, concerning Buonaparte. Such an inference would be entirely erroneous; no new, or extended authority was received by Captain Maitland, nor was he capable of insinuating the existence of such. His sole instructions were contained in the orders of Admiral Hotham, quoted at p. 138, directing him, should he be so fortunate as to intercept Buonaparte, to transfer him to the ship he commanded, to make sail for a British port, and, when arrived there, to communicate instantly with the port-admiral, or with the Admiralty.

Count Las Cases makes Captain Maitland proceed to assure him and Savary, that, "in his own private opinion, Napoleon would find in England all the respect and good treatment to which he could make any pretension; that there the Princes and Ministers did not exercise the absolute authority used on the continent, and that the English people had a liberality of opinion, and generosity of sentiment, superior to that entertained by sovereigns". Count Las Cases states himself to have replied to the panegyric on England, by an oration in praise of Buonaparte, in which he described him as retiring from a contest which he had yet the means of supporting, in order that his name and rights might not serve as a pretext to prolong civil war. The Count, according to his own narrative, concluded by saying, that, "under all the cir-

cumstances, he thought the Emperor might come on board the *Bellerophon*, and go to England with Captain Maitland, for the purpose of receiving passports for America". Captain Maitland desired it should be understood that he by no means warranted that such would be granted.

- "At the bottom of my heart," says Las Cases, "I never supposed the passports would be granted to us; but, as the Emperor had resolved to remain in future a personal stranger to political events, we saw, without alarm, the probability that we might be prevented from leaving England; but to that point all our fears and suppositions were limited. Such, too, was doubtless the belief of Maitland. I do him, as well as the other officers, the justice to believe that he was sincere and of good faith in the painting they drew us of the sentiments of the English nation."

The envoys returned to Napoleon, who held, according to Las Cases, a sort of council, in which they considered all the chances. The plan of the Danish vessel, and that of the *chasse-marée*, were given up as too perilous; the British cruiser was pronounced too strong to be attacked; there remained only the alternative of Napoleon's joining the troops, and renewing the war, or accepting Captain Maitland's offer by going on board the *Bellerophon*. The former was rejected; the latter plan adopted, and "then", says M. Las Cases, "*Napoleon wrote to the Prince Regent*". The letter follows, but it is remarkable that the date is omitted. This is probably the reason why Count Las Cases did not discover that his memory was betraying him, since that date must have reminded him that the letter was written *before*, not *after*, the conference of the 14th July.

From this narrative two things are plain; I. That no terms of capitulation were made with Captain Maitland. II. That it is the object of Count Las Cases to insinuate the belief that it was in consequence of the arguments used by Captain Maitland, supported by the British officers present, that Las Cases was induced to recommend, and Napoleon to adopt, the step of surrendering himself

on board the *Bellerophon*. But this whole inference is disproved by two small ciphers; the date, namely, of *13th of July* on the letter addressed to the Prince Regent, which, therefore, could not, in the nature of things, have been written in consequence of a conference betwixt Las Cases and Captain Maitland, and a consultation betwixt Napoleon and his followers; which conference and consultation did not take place till the *14th of July*. The resolution was taken and the letter written the day before all those glowing descriptions of the English people were put into the mouth of Captain Maitland; and the faith of Napoleon was grounded upon the impersonal suggestion to go to England, made, to Las Cases and Savary on their first visit to the *Bellerophon*. The visit of the 14th, doubtless, confirmed the resolution which had been adopted the preceding day.

No delay now intervened. On the same 14th of July, General Baron Gourgaud was sent off with the letter, so often mentioned, addressed to the Prince Regent, which was in these well-known terms:

“*Rocheport, July 13th, 1815.*”

“ROYAL HIGHNESS;

“A victim to the factions which distract my country, and to the enmity of the greatest powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career, and I come, like Themistocles, to throw myself upon the hospitality of the British people. I put myself under the protection of their laws; which I claim from your Royal Highness, as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies.

“NAPOLEON.”

Captain Maitland informed Count Las Cases that he would despatch General Gourgaud to England, by the *Slaney*, and himself prepare to receive Napoleon and his suite. General Gourgaud proposed to write to Count Bertrand instantly, when, in presence and hearing of his brother officers, Captains Sartorius and Gambier, Captain Maitland gave another instance of his anxiety not to be misunderstood on this important occasion.

“When General Gourgaud was about to write the letter, to prevent any future misunderstanding, I said, ‘M. Las Cases, you will

recollect that I am not authorized to stipulate as to the reception of Buonaparte in England, but that he must consider himself entirely at the disposal of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent'. He answered, 'I am perfectly aware of that, and have already acquainted the Emperor with what you said on the subject'."

Captain Maitland subjoins the following natural and just remark:—

"It might, perhaps, have been better if this declaration had been given in an official written form; and could I have foreseen the discussions which afterwards took place, and which will appear in the sequel, I undoubtedly should have done so; but, as I repeatedly made it in the presence of witnesses, it did not occur to me as being necessary; and how could a stronger proof be adduced that no stipulations were agreed to respecting the reception of Buonaparte in England, than the fact of their not being reduced to writing? which certainly would have been the case had any favourable terms been demanded on the part of M. Las Cases, and agreed to by me."

To conclude the evidence on this subject we add Captain Maitland's letter, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty on 14th July:

"For the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I have to acquaint you that the Count Las Cases and General L'Allemand this day came on board his Majesty's ship under my command, with a proposal from Count Bertrand for me to receive on board Napoleon Buonaparte, for the purpose of throwing himself on the generosity of the Prince Regent. Conceiving myself authorized by their lordships' secret order, I have acceded to the proposal, and he is to embark on board this ship to-morrow morning. That no misunderstanding might arise, I have explicitly and clearly explained to Count Las Cases that I have no authority whatever for granting terms of any sort, but that all I can do is to carry him and his suite to England, to be received in such manner as his Royal Highness may deem expedient."

Is it in human nature to suppose that a British officer, with two others of the same rank as witnesses of the whole negotiation, would have expressed himself otherwise than as truth warranted, in a case which was sure to be so strictly inquired into?

On the 15th July, 1815, Napoleon finally left France, to the history of which he had added so much of victory, and so much of defeat; the country which his rise had

saved from civil discord and foreign invasion, and which his fall consigned to both; in a word, that fair land to which he had been so long as a Deity, and was in future to be of less import than the meanest peasant on the soil. He was accompanied by four of his generals—Bertrand, Savary, L'Allemand, and Montholon, and by Count Las Cases, repeatedly mentioned as counsellor of state. Of these, Bertrand and Montholon had their ladies on board, with three children belonging to Count Bertrand, and one of Count Montholon's. The son of Las Cases accompanied the Emperor as a page. There were nine officers of inferior rank, and thirty-nine domestics. The principal persons were received on board the *Bellerophon*, the others in the corvette.

Buonaparte came out of Aix roads on board of the *Epervier*. Wind and tide being against the brig, Captain Maitland sent the barge of the *Bellerophon* to transport him to that ship. Most of the officers and crew of the *Epervier* had tears in their eyes, and they continued to cheer the Emperor while their voices could be heard. He was received on board the *Bellerophon* respectfully, but without any salute or distinguished honours. As Captain Maitland advanced to meet him on the quarter-deck, Napoleon pulled off his hat, and, addressing him in a firm tone of voice, said, "I come to place myself under the protection of your prince and laws". His manner was uncommonly pleasing, and he displayed much address in seizing upon opportunities of saying things flattering to the hearers whom he wished to conciliate.

As when formerly on board Captain Usher's vessel, Buonaparte showed great curiosity concerning the discipline of the ship, and expressed considerable surprise that the British vessels should so easily defeat the French ships, which were heavier, larger, and better manned than they. Captain Maitland accounted for this by the greater experience of the men and officers. The ex-Emperor examined the marines also, and, pleased with their appearance, said to Bertrand, "How much might be done with an hundred thousand such men!" In the management of the vessel, he particularly admired the silence

and good order of the crew while going through their manœuvres, in comparison to a French vessel, "where every one", he said, "talks and gives orders at once". When about to quit the *Bellerophon* he adverted to the same subject, saying there had been less noise on board that vessel, with six hundred men, in the whole passage from Rochefort, than the crew of the *Epervier*, with only one hundred, had contrived to make between the Isle d'Aix and Basque roads.

He spoke, too, of the British army in an equal style of praise, and was joined by his officers in doing so. One of the French officers observing that the English cavalry were superb, Captain Maitland observed that in England they had a higher opinion of the infantry. "You are right," said the French gentleman; "there is none such in the world; there is no making an impression on them; you might as well attempt to charge through a wall; and their fire is tremendous." Bertrand reported to Captain Maitland that Napoleon had communicated to him his opinion of the Duke of Wellington in the following words: "The Duke of Wellington, in the management of an army, is fully equal to myself, with the advantage of possessing more prudence". This we conceive to be the genuine unbiassed opinion of one great soldier concerning another. It is a pity that Napoleon could on other occasions express himself in a strain of depreciation, which could only lower him who used it, towards a rival in the art of war.

During the whole passage, notwithstanding his situation and the painful uncertainty under which he laboured, Napoleon seemed always tranquil and in good temper; at times he even approached to cheerfulness. He spoke with tenderness of his wife and family, complained of being separated from them, and had tears in his eyes when he showed their portraits to Captain Maitland. His health seemed perfectly good; but he was occasionally subject to somnolency, proceeding, perhaps, from the exhaustion of a constitution which had gone through such severe service.

On 23rd July they passed Ushant. Napoleon remained

long on deck, and cast many a melancholy look to the coast of France, but made no observations. At day-break on 24th, the *Bellerophon* was off Dartmouth; and Buonaparte was struck, first with the boldness of the coast, and then, as he entered Torbay, with the well-known beauty of the scenery. "It reminded him," he said, "of Porto Ferrajo, in Elba;" an association which must, at the moment, have awakened strange remembrances in the mind of the deposed Emperor.

The *Bellerophon* had hardly anchored when orders came from the admiral, Lord Keith, which were soon after seconded by others from the Admiralty, enjoining that no one, of whatever rank or station, should be permitted to come on board the *Bellerophon*, excepting the officers and men belonging to the ship. On the 26th, the vessel received orders to move round to Plymouth Sound.

In the meantime, the newspapers which were brought on board tended to impress anxiety and consternation among the unhappy fugitives. The report was generally circulated by these periodical publications that Buonaparte would not be permitted to land, but would be presently sent off to St. Helena, as the safest place for detaining him as a prisoner of war. Napoleon himself became alarmed, and anxiously desirous of seeing Lord Keith, who had expressed himself sensible of some kindness which his nephew, Captain Elphinstone of the 7th Hussars, had received from the Emperor, when wounded and made prisoner at Waterloo. Such an interview accordingly took place betwixt the noble admiral and the late Emperor, upon the 28th July, but without any results of importance, as Lord Keith was not then possessed of the decision of the British Government.

That frenzy of popular curiosity, which, predominating in all free states, seems to be carried to the utmost excess by the English nation, caused such numbers of boats to surround the *Bellerophon*, that, notwithstanding the peremptory orders of the Admiralty, and in spite of the efforts of the man-of-war's boats, which maintained constant guard round the vessel, it was almost impossible to keep them at the prescribed distance of a cable's-length

from the ship. They incurred the risk of being run down, of being, as they might apprehend, shot (for muskets were discharged for the purpose of intimidation), of all the dangers of a naval combat, rather than lose the opportunity of seeing the Emperor whom they had heard so much of. When he appeared he was greeted with huzzas, which he returned with bows, but could not help expressing his wonder at the eagerness of popular curiosity, which he was not accustomed to see in such a pitch of excitement.

On the evening of the 30th of July, Major-general Sir Henry Bunbury, one of the Under Secretaries of State, arrived, bringing with him the final intentions of the British Government, for the disposal of Buonaparte and his suite. Upon the 31st, Lord Keith and Sir Henry waited upon the ex-Emperor, on board of the *Bellerophon*, to communicate to him the displeasing tidings. They were accompanied by Mr. Meike, the secretary of Lord Keith, whose presence was deemed necessary as a witness to what passed. Napoleon received the Admiral and Under Secretary of State with becoming dignity and calmness. The letter of Lord Melville (First Lord of the Admiralty) was read to the ex-Emperor, announcing his future destination. It stated that "it would be inconsistent with the duty of the British Ministers to their sovereign and his allies to leave *General Buonaparte* the means or opportunity of again disturbing the peace of Europe—announced that the island of St. Helena was selected for his future residence, and selected as such, because its local situation would permit his enjoying more freedom than could be compatible with adequate security elsewhere—that, with the exception of Generals Savary and L'Allemand, the General might select three officers, together with his surgeon, to attend him to St. Helena—that twelve domestics would also be allowed". The same document stated that "the persons who might attend upon him would be liable to a certain degree of restraint, and could not be permitted to leave the island without the sanction of the British Government". Lastly, it was announced that "Rear-Admiral Sir George Cock-

burn, appointed to the chief command of the Cape of Good Hope, would be presently ready to sail, for the purpose of conveying General Buonaparte to St. Helena, and therefore it was desirable that he should without delay make choice of the persons who were to form his suite".

The letter was read in French to Buonaparte by Sir Henry Bunbury. He listened without impatience, interruption, or emotion of any kind. When he was requested to state if he had any reply, he began, with great calmness of manner and mildness of countenance, to declare that he solemnly protested against the orders which had been read—that the British Ministry had no right to dispose of him in the way proposed—that he appealed to the British people and the laws—and asked what was the tribunal which he ought to appeal to. "I am come," he continued, "voluntarily to throw myself on the hospitality of your nation. I am not a prisoner of war, and if I was, have a right to be treated according to the law of nations. But I am come to this country a passenger on board one of your vessels, after a previous negotiation with the commander. If he had told me I was to be a prisoner, I would not have come. I asked him if he was willing to receive me on board, and convey me to England. *Admiral* Maitland said he was, having received special orders of government concerning me. It was a snare, then, which had been spread for me; I came on board a British vessel as I would have entered one of their towns—a vessel, a village, it is the same thing. As for the island of St. Helena, it would be my sentence of death. I demand to be received as an English citizen. How many years entitle me to be domiciliated?"

Sir Henry Bunbury answered that he believed four were necessary. "Well, then," continued Napoleon, "let the Prince Regent during that time place me under any superintendence he thinks proper—let me be placed in a country-house in the centre of the island, thirty leagues from every seaport—place a commissioned officer about me, to examine my correspondence and superintend my actions; or if the Prince Regent should require my word of honour, perhaps I might give it. I might then enjoy

a certain degree of personal liberty, and I should have the freedom of literature. In St. Helena I could not live three months; to my habits and constitution it would be death. I am used to ride twenty miles a day—what am I to do on that little rock at the end of the world? No! Botany Bay is better than St. Helena—I prefer death to St. Helena—And what good is my death to do you? I am no longer a sovereign. What danger could result from my living as a private person in the heart of England, and restricted in any way which the Government should think proper?"

He referred repeatedly to the manner of his coming on board the *Bellerophon*, insisting upon his being perfectly free in his choice, and that he had preferred confiding to the hospitality and generosity of the British nation.

"Otherwise," he said, "why should I not have gone to my father-in-law, or to the Emperor Alexander, who is my personal friend? We have become enemies, because he wanted to annex Poland to his dominions, and my popularity among the Poles was in his way. But otherwise he was my friend, and he would not have treated me in this way. If your Government act thus, it will disgrace you in the eyes of Europe. Even your own people will blame it. Besides, you do not know the feeling that my death will create both in France and Italy. There is, at present, a high opinion of England in these countries. If you kill me, it will be lost, and the lives of many English will be sacrificed. What was there to force me to the step I took? The tri-coloured flag was still flying at Bourdeaux, Nantes, and Rochefort. The army has not even yet submitted. Or, if I had chosen to remain in France, what was there to prevent me from remaining concealed for years amongst a people so much attached to me?"

He then returned to his negotiation with Captain Maitland, and dwelt on the honours and attentions shown to him personally by that officer and Admiral Hotham. "And, after all, it was only a snare for me!" He again enlarged on the disgrace to England which was impend-

ing. "I hold out to the Prince Regent," he said, "the brightest page in his history, in placing myself at his discretion. I have made war upon you for twenty years, and I give you the highest proof of confidence by voluntarily giving myself into the hands of my most inveterate and constant enemies. Remember," he continued, "what I have been, and how I stood among the sovereigns of Europe. *This* courted my protection—that gave me his daughter—all sought for my friendship. I was Emperor, acknowledged by all the powers in Europe, except Great Britain, and she had acknowledged me as Chief Consul. Your Government has no right to term me *General Buonaparte*," he added, pointing with his finger to the offensive epithet in Lord Melville's letter. "I am Prince, or Consul, and ought to be treated as such, if treated with at all. When I was at Elba, I was at least as much a sovereign in that island as Louis on the throne of France. We had both our respective flags, our ships, our troops. Mine, to be sure," he said with a smile, "were rather on a small scale—I had six hundred soldiers, and he had two hundred thousand. At length, I made war upon him, defeated him, and dethroned him. But there was nothing in this to deprive me of my rank as one of the sovereigns of Europe!"

During this interesting scene, Napoleon spoke with little interruption from Lord Keith and Sir Henry Bunbury, who declined replying to his remonstrances, stating themselves to be unauthorized to enter into discussions, as their only duty was to convey the intentions of Government to Napoleon, and transmit his answer, if he charged them with any. He repeated again and again his determination not to go to St. Helena, and his desire to be suffered to remain in Great Britain.

Sir Henry Bunbury then said he was certain that St. Helena had been selected as the place of his residence, because its local situation allowed freer scope for exercise and indulgence than could have been permitted in any part of Great Britain.

"No, no," repeated Buonaparte, with animation, "I will not go there! You would not go there, sir, were it

your own case—nor, my lord, would you.” Lord Keith bowed and answered—“He had been already at St. Helena four times”. Napoleon went on reiterating his protestations against being imprisoned, or sent to St. Helena. “I will not go thither,” he repeated; “I am not a Hercules” (with a smile), “but you shall not conduct me to St. Helena. I prefer death in this place. You found me free, send me back again; replace me in the condition in which I was, or permit me to go to America.”

He dwelt much on his resolution to die rather than to go to St. Helena; he had no great reason, he said, to wish for life. He urged the Admiral to take no farther steps to remove him into the *Northumberland*, before Government should have been informed of what he had said, and have signified their final decision. He conjured Sir Henry Bunbury to use no delay in communicating his answer to Government, and referred himself to Sir Henry to put it into form. After some cursory questions and pauses, he again returned to the pressing subject, and urged the same arguments as before. “He had expected,” he said, “to have had liberty to land, and settle himself in the country, some commissioner being named to attend him, who would be of great use for a year or two to teach him what he had to do. You could choose,” he said, “some respectable man, for the English service must have officers distinguished for probity and honour; and do not put about me an intriguing person, who would only play the spy, and make cabals.” He declared again his determination not to go to St. Helena; and this interesting interview was concluded.

After the Admiral and Sir Henry Bunbury had left the cabin, Napoleon recalled Lord Keith, whom, in respect of his former attention to his lordship’s relative, Captain Elphinstone, he might consider as more favourable to his person.

Napoleon opened the conversation by asking Lord Keith’s advice how to conduct himself. Lord Keith replied that he was an officer, and had discharged his

duty, and left with him the heads of his instructions. If he considered it necessary to renew the discussion, Sir Henry Bunbury must be called in. Buonaparte said that was unnecessary. "Can you," said he, "after what is passed, detain me until I hear from London?" Lord Keith replied that must depend on the instructions brought by the other admiral, with which he was unacquainted. "Was there any tribunal," he asked, "to which he could apply?" Lord Keith answered that he was no civilian, but believed that there was none whatever. He added that he was satisfied there was every disposition on the part of the British Government to render his situation as comfortable as prudence would permit. "How so?" said Napoleon, lifting the paper from the table, and speaking with animation. Upon Lord Keith's observing that it was surely preferable to being confined to a smaller space in England, or being sent to France, or perhaps to Russia. "Russia!" exclaimed Buonaparte, "God preserve me from it!"

During this remarkable scene Napoleon's manner was perfectly calm and collected, his voice equal and firm, his tones very pleasing. Once or twice only he spoke more rapidly, and in a harsher key. He used little gesticulation, and his attitudes were ungraceful; but the action of the head was dignified, and the countenance remarkably soft and placid, without any marks of severity. He seemed to have made up his mind, anticipating what was to be announced, and perfectly prepared to reply. In expressing his positive determination not to go to St. Helena, he left it to his hearers to infer, whether he meant to prevent his removal by suicide, or to resist it by force.

The interest attaching to the foregoing interview betwixt Napoleon and the gentlemen sent to announce his doom loses much, when we regard it in a great measure as an empty personification of feeling, a well-painted passion which was not in reality felt. Napoleon, as will presently appear, was not serious in averring that he had any encouragement from Captain Maitland

to come on board his ship, save in the character of a prisoner, to be placed at the Prince Regent's discretion. Neither had he the most distant idea of preventing his removal to the *Northumberland*, either by violence to himself or anyone else. Both topics of declamation were only used for show—the one to alarm the sense of honour entertained by the Prince Regent and the people of England, and the other, to work upon their humanity.

There is little doubt that Napoleon saw the probability of the St. Helena voyage, so soon as he surrendered himself to the captain of the *Bellerophon*. He had affirmed, that there was a purpose of transferring him to St. Helena or St. Lucie, even before he left Elba; and if he thought the English capable of sending him to such banishment while he was under the protection of the treaty of Fontainebleau, he could hardly suppose that they would scruple to execute such a purpose, after his own conduct had deprived him of all the immunities with which that treaty had invested him.

Nevertheless, while aware that his experiment might possibly thus terminate, Napoleon may have hoped a better issue, and conceived himself capable of cajoling the Prince Regent and his administration into hazarding the safety and the peace of Europe, in order to display a Quixotic generosity towards an individual whose only plea for deserving it was that he had been for twenty years their mortal enemy. Such hopes he may have entertained; for it cannot be thought that he would acknowledge even to himself the personal disqualifications which rendered him, in the eyes of all Europe, unworthy of trust or confidence. His expectation of a favourable reception did not go so far, in all likelihood, as those of the individual among his followers who believed that Napoleon would receive the Order of the Garter from the Prince Regent; but he might hope to be permitted to reside in Britain on the same terms as his brother Lucien had done.

Doubtless he calculated upon, and perhaps overrated, all these more favourable chances. Yet, if the worst

should arrive, he saw even in that *worst*, that island of St. Helena itself, the certainty of personal safety, which he could not be assured of in any despotic country, where, as he himself must have known pretty well, an obnoxious prisoner, or *detenu*, may lose his life *par négligence*, without any bustle or alarm being excited upon the occasion. Upon the 16th August, while on his passage, to St. Helena, he frankly acknowledged that though he had been deceived in the reception he had expected from the English, still, harshly and unfairly as he thought himself treated, he found comfort from knowing that he was under the protection of British laws, which he could not have enjoyed had he gone to another country, where his fate would have depended upon the caprice of an individual. This we believe to be the real secret of his rendition to England, in preference to his father-in-law of Austria, or his friend in Russia. He might, in the first-named country, be kept in custody, more or less severe, but he would be at least secure from perishing of some political disease. Even while at St. Helena, he allowed, in an interval of good-tempered candour, that, comparing one place of exile to another, St. Helena was entitled to the preference. In higher latitudes, he observed, they would have suffered from cold, and in any other tropical island they would have been burned to death. At St. Helena the country was wild and savage, the climate monotonous and unfavourable to health, but the temperature was mild and pleasing.

The allegation on which Napoleon had insisted so much, namely, that Captain Maitland had pledged himself for his good reception in England, and received him on board his vessel, not as a prisoner, but as a guest, became now an important subject of investigation. All the while Napoleon had been on board the *Bellerophon*, he had expressed the greatest respect for Captain Maitland, and a sense of his civilities totally inconsistent with the idea that he conceived himself betrayed by him. He had even sounded that officer, by the means of Madame Bertrand, to know whether he would accept a present of his portrait set with diamonds, which Captain Maitland

requested might not be offered, as he was determined to decline it.

On the 6th of August, Count Las Cases, for the first time, hinted to Captain Maitland, that he had understood him to have given an assurance, that Napoleon should be well received in England. Captain Maitland replied, it was impossible the Count could mistake him so far, since he had expressly stated he could make no promises; but that he thought his orders would bear him out in receiving Napoleon on board, and conveying him to England. He reminded the Count that he had questioned him (Captain Maitland) repeatedly, as to his private opinion, to which he could only answer that he had no reason to think Napoleon would be ill received. Las Cases had nothing to offer in reply. Upon the same 6th August, Napoleon himself spoke upon the subject, and it will be observed how very different his language was to Captain Maitland from that which he held in his absence. "They say," he remarked, "that I made no conditions. *Certainly I made no conditions.* How could an individual enter into terms with a nation? I wanted nothing of them but hospitality, or, as the ancients would express it, air and water. As for you, Captain, I have no cause of complaint; your conduct has been that of a man of honour."

The investigation of this matter did not end here, for the ungrounded assertion that Captain Maitland had granted some conditions, expressed or implied, was no sooner repelled than it was again revived.

On the 7th, Count Las Cases having a parting interview with Lord Keith, for the purpose of delivering to him a protest on the part of Buonaparte, "I was in the act of telling him," said the Count, "that Captain Maitland had said he was authorized to carry us to London, without letting us suspect that we were to be regarded as prisoners of war; and that the captain could not deny that we came freely and in good faith; that the letter from the Emperor to the Prince of Wales, of the existence of which I had given Captain Maitland information, must necessarily have created tacit conditions, since he had

made no observation on it." Here the Admiral's impatience, nay, anger, broke forth. He said to him sharply, that in that case Captain Maitland was a fool, since his instructions contained not a word to such a purpose; and this he should surely know, since it was he, Lord Keith, who issued them. Count Las Cases still persevered, stating that his lordship spoke with a hasty severity, for which he might be himself responsible; since the other officers, as well as Rear-admiral Hotham, had expressed themselves to the same effect, which could not have been the case had the letter of instructions been so clearly expressed, and so positive, as his lordship seemed to think.

Lord Keith, upon this statement of Count Las Cases, called upon Captain Maitland for the most ample account he could give of the communications which he had had with the Count, previous to Napoleon's coming on board the *Bellerophon*. Captain Maitland, of course, obeyed, and stated at full length the manner in which the French frigates lay blockaded, the great improbability of their effecting an escape, and the considerable risk they would have run in attempting it; the application to him, first by Savary and Las Cases, afterwards by Las Cases and Gourgaud; his objecting to the frequent flags of truce; his refusal to allow Buonaparte to pass to sea, either in French ships of war, or in a neutral vessel; his consenting to carry to England the late Emperor and his suite, to be at the disposal of the Prince Regent, with his cautions to them, again and again renewed, in the presence of Captain Sartorius and Captain Gambier, that he could grant no stipulations or conditions whatever. These officers gave full evidence to the same effect, by their written attestations. If, therefore, the insinuation of Count Las Cases, for it amounts to no more, is to be placed against the express and explicit averment of Captain Maitland, the latter must preponderate, were it but by aid of the direct testimony of two other British officers. Finally, Captain Maitland mentioned Napoleon's acknowledgment, and that of his suite that, though their expectations had been disappointed.

they imputed no blame to him which he could not have escaped, had he used any unwarranted and fallacious proposals to entice them on board his vessel. As the last piece of evidence, he mentioned his taking farewell of Montholon, who again reverted to Napoleon's wish to make him a present, and expressed the Emperor's sense of his civilities, and his high and honourable deportment through the whole transaction.

Captain Maitland, to use his own words, then said, "I feel much hurt that Count Las Cases should have stated to Lord Keith that I had promised Buonaparte should be well received in England, or, indeed, made promises of any sort. I have endeavoured to conduct myself with integrity and honour throughout the whole of this transaction, and, therefore, cannot allow such an assertion to go uncontradicted."—"Oh!" said Count Montholon; "Las Cases negotiated this business; it has turned out very differently from what he and all of us expected. He attributes the Emperor's situation to himself, and is therefore desirous of giving it the best countenance he can; but, I assure you the Emperor is convinced your conduct has been most honourable;" then, taking my hand, he pressed it, and added, "and that is my opinion also."

Lord Keith was of course perfectly convinced that the charge against Captain Maitland was not only totally unsupported by testimony, but that it was disproved by the evidence of impartial witnesses, as well as by the conduct and public expression of sentiments of those who had the best right to complain of that officer's conduct, had it been really deserving of censure. The reason why Count Las Cases should persist in grounding hopes and wishes of his own framing, upon supposed expressions of encouragement from Captain Maitland, has been probably rightly treated by Count Montholon. Napoleon's conduct, in loading Captain Maitland with the charge of "laying snares for him", while his own conscience so far acquitted that brave officer that he pressed upon him thanks, and yet more substantial evidence of his favourable opinion, can, we are afraid,

only be imputed to a predominant sense of his own interest, to which he was not unwilling to have sacrificed the professional character and honourable name of an officer to whom, on other occasions, he acknowledged himself obliged. As Captain Maitland's modest and manly narrative is now published, the figment that Napoleon came on board the *Bellerophon* in any other character than as a prisoner of war must be considered as silenced for ever.

Having prosecuted this interesting subject to a conclusion, we return to the train of circumstances attending Napoleon's departure from England, so far as they seem to contain historical interest.

The inconvenient resort of immense numbers, sometimes not less than a thousand boats, scarce to be kept off by absolute force by those who rowed guard within the prescribed distance of three hundred yards from the *Bellerophon*, was rendered a greater annoyance when Napoleon's repeated expressions, that he would never go to St. Helena, occasioned some suspicions that he meant to attempt to escape. Two frigates were therefore appointed to lie as guards on the *Bellerophon*, and sentinels were doubled and trebled, both by night and by day.

An odd incident, of a kind which could only have happened in England (for though as many bizarre whims may arise in the minds of foreigners, they are much more seldom ripened into action), added to the cares of those who were to watch this important prisoner. Some newspaper, which was not possessed of a legal adviser to keep it right in point of form, had suggested (in tenderness, we suppose, to public curiosity) that the person of Napoleon Buonaparte should be removed to shore by agency of a writ of *habeas corpus*. This magical rescript of the Old Bailey, as Smollett terms it, loses its influence over an alien and prisoner of war, and, therefore, such an absurd proposal was not acted upon. But an individual, prosecuted for a libel upon a naval officer, conceived the idea of citing Napoleon, as an evidence in a court of justice, to prove, as he pretended, the state of the French

navy, which was necessary to his defence. The writ was to have been served on Lord Keith; but he disappointed the litigant, by keeping his boat off the ship while he was on board, and afterwards by the speed of his twelve-oared barge, which the attorney's panting rowers toiled after in vain. Although this was a mere absurdity, and only worthy of the laughter with which the anecdote of the attorney's pursuit and the admiral's flight was generally received, yet it might have given rise to inconvenience, by suggesting to Napoleon that he was, by some process or other, entitled to redress by the common law of England, and might have encouraged him in resisting attempts to remove him from the *Bellerophon*. On the 4th of August, to end such inconvenient occurrences, the *Bellerophon* was appointed to put to sea and remain cruising off the Start, where she was to be joined by the squadron destined for St. Helena, when Napoleon was, with his immediate attendants, to be removed on board the *Northumberland*.

His spirit for some time seemed wound up to some desperate resolve, and though he gave no hint of suicide before Captain Maitland, otherwise than by expressing a dogged resolution not to go to St. Helena, yet to Las Cases he spoke in undisguised terms of a Roman death. We own we are not afraid of such resolutions being executed by sane persons when they take the precaution of consulting an intelligent friend. It is quite astonishing how slight a backing will support the natural love of life, in minds the most courageous, and circumstances the most desperate. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that the philosophic arguments of Las Cases determined Napoleon to survive and write his history. Had he consulted his military attendants he would have received other counsels, and assistance to execute them if necessary. L'Allemand, Montholon, and Gourgaud assured Captain Maitland that the Emperor would sooner kill himself than go to St. Helena, and that, even were he to consent, they three were determined themselves to put him to death, rather than he should so far degrade himself. Captain Maitland, in reply, gave some hints

indicative of the gallows, in case such a scheme were prosecuted.

Savary and L'Allemand, were, it must be owned, under circumstances peculiarly painful. They had been among the list of persons excluded from the amnesty by the royal government of France, and now they were prohibited by the British Ministry from accompanying Napoleon to St. Helena. They entertained, not unnaturally, the greatest anxiety about their fate, apprehensive, though entirely without reason, that they might be delivered up to the French government. They resolved upon personal resistance to prevent their being separated from their Emperor, but fortunately were so considerate, amid their wrath, as to take the opinion of the late distinguished lawyer and statesman, Sir Samuel Romilly. As the most effectual mode of serving these unfortunate gentlemen, Sir Samuel, by personal application to the Lord Chancellor, learned that there were no thoughts of delivering up his clients to the French government, and thus became able to put their hearts at ease upon that score. On the subject of the resistance, as to the legality of which they questioned him, Sir Samuel Romilly acquainted them that life taken in an affray of the kind, would be construed into murder by the law of England. No greater danger, indeed, was to be expected from an assault, legalized upon the opinion of an eminent lawyer, than from a suicide adjusted with the advice of a counsellor of state; and we suppose neither Napoleon nor his followers were more serious in the violent projects which they announced than they might think necessary to shake the purpose of the English Ministry. In this they were totally unsuccessful; and their intemperate threats only occasioned their being deprived of arms, excepting Napoleon, who was left in possession of his sword. Napoleon and his followers were greatly hurt at this marked expression of want of confidence, which must also have been painful to the English officers who executed the order, though it was explained to the French gentlemen that the measure was only one of precaution, and that their weapons were to be carefully

preserved and restored to them. During his last day on board the *Bellerophon*, Napoleon was employed in composing a Protest, which contains nothing more than his address to Lord Keith and Sir Henry Bunbury. He also wrote a second letter to the Prince Regent.

On the 4th of August, the *Bellerophon* set sail, and next morning fell in with the *Northumberland* and the squadron destined for St. Helena, as also with the *Tonnant*, on board of which Lord Keith's flag was hoisted.

It was now that Napoleon gave Captain Maitland the first intimation of his purpose to submit to his exile, by requesting that Mr. O'Meara, surgeon of the *Bellerophon*, might be permitted to attend him to St. Helena, instead of his own surgeon, whose health could not stand the voyage. This made it clear that no resistance was designed; and, indeed, so soon as Napoleon observed that his threats had produced no effect, he submitted with his usual equanimity. He also gave orders to deliver up his arms. His baggage was likewise subjected to a form of search, but without unpacking or disturbing any article. The treasure of Buonaparte, amounting only to 4000 gold Napoleons, was taken into custody, to abridge him of that powerful means of effecting his escape. Full receipts, of course, were given, rendering the British Government accountable for the same; and Marchand, the favourite valet-de-chambre of the Emperor, was permitted to take whatever money he thought might be immediately necessary.

About eleven o'clock on the morning of the 7th August, Lord Keith came in his barge to transfer Napoleon from the *Bellerophon* to the *Northumberland*. About one o'clock, when Buonaparte had announced that he was in full readiness, a captain's guard was turned out, Lord Keith's barge was prepared, and as Napoleon crossed the quarter-deck, the soldiers presented arms under three ruffles of the drum, being the salute paid to a general officer. His step was firm and steady; his farewell to Captain Maitland polite and friendly. The officer had no doubt something to forgive to Napoleon, who had

endeavoured to fix on him the stigma of having laid a snare for him; yet the candid and manly avowal of the feelings which remained on his mind at parting with him, ought not to be suppressed. They add credit, were that required, to his plain, honest, and unvarnished narrative.

"It may appear surprising that a possibility could exist of a British officer being prejudiced in favour of one who had caused so many calamities to his country; but to such an extent did he possess the power of pleasing that there are few people who could have sat at the same table with him for nearly a month, as I did, without feeling a sensation of pity, allied perhaps to regret, that a man possessed of so many fascinating qualities, and who had held so high a station in life, should be reduced to the situation in which I saw him."

Napoleon was received on board of the *Northumberland* with the same honours paid at leaving the *Bellerophon*. Sir George Cockburn, the British admiral to whose charge the late Emperor was now committed, was in every respect a person highly qualified to discharge the task with delicacy towards Napoleon, yet with fidelity to the instructions he had received. Of good birth, accustomed to the first society, a handsome person, and an agreeable address, he had yet so much of the firmness of his profession as to be able to do unpleasing things when necessary. In every particular within the circle of his orders he was kind, gentle, and accommodating; beyond them he was inflexible. This mixture of courtesy and firmness was particularly necessary, since Napoleon, and still more his attendants on his behalf, were desirous upon several occasions to arrogate a degree of royal rank for the prisoner, which Sir George Cockburn's instructions, for reasons to be hereafter noticed, positively forbade him to concede. All that he could give, he gave with a readiness which showed kindness as well as courtesy; but aware that, beyond the fixed limit, each admitted claim would only form the foundation for another, he made his French guests sensible that ill-humour or anger could have no effect upon his conduct.

The consequence was that though Napoleon, when transferred to the *Northumberland*, was, by the orders of the Admiralty, deprived of certain marks of deference which he received on board of the *Bellerophon* (where Captain Maitland had no precise orders on the subject, and the withholding of which in him would have been a gratuitous infliction of humiliation), yet no positive quarrel, far less any rooted ill-will, took place betwixt Napoleon and the admiral. The latter remained at the principal place of his own table, was covered when on the quarter-deck, after the first salutations had passed, and disregarded other particulars of etiquette observed towards crowned heads; yet such circumstances only occasioned a little temporary coldness, which, as the admiral paid no attention to his guests' displeasure, soon gave way to a Frenchman's natural love of society; and Sir George Cockburn (ceasing to be the *Réquin*¹, as Las Cases says the French termed him when they were in the pet) became that mixture of the obliging gentleman and strict officer, for which Napoleon held him whenever he spoke candidly on the subject.

It may be mentioned, as no bad instance of this line of conduct and its effects, that upon the *Northumberland* crossing the line, the Emperor, desiring to exhibit his munificence to the seamen by presenting them with a hundred louis-d'or, under pretext of paying the ordinary fine, Sir George Cockburn, considering this tribute to Neptune as too excessive in amount, would not permit the donative to exceed a tenth part of the sum; and Napoleon, offended by the restriction, paid nothing at all. Upon another occasion, early in the voyage, a difference in national manners gave rise to one of those slight misunderstandings which we have noticed. Napoleon was accustomed, like all Frenchmen, to leave the table immediately after dinner, and Sir George Cockburn, with the English officers, remained after him at table; for, in permitting his French guests their liberty, the admiral did not choose to admit the right of Napoleon to break up the party at his (Sir George's) own table. This gave

¹ Shark.

some discontent. Notwithstanding these trifling subjects of dissatisfaction, Las Cases informs us that the admiral, whom he took to be prepossessed against them at first, became every day more amicable. The Emperor used to take his arm every evening on the quarter-deck, and hold long conversations with him upon maritime subjects, as well as past events in general.

While on board the *Northumberland*, the late Emperor spent his mornings in reading or writing; his evenings in his exercise upon deck, and at cards. The game was generally *vingt-un*. But when the play became rather deep he discouraged that amusement and substituted chess. Great tactician as he was, Napoleon did not play well at that military game, and it was with difficulty that his antagonist, Montholon, could avoid the solecism of beating the Emperor.

During this voyage Napoleon's *jour de fête* occurred, which was also his birthday. It was the 15th August—a day for which the Pope had expressly canonized a St. Napoleon to be the Emperor's patron. And now, strange revolution, it was celebrated by him on board of an English man-of-war, which was conducting him to his place of imprisonment, and, as it proved, his tomb. Yet Napoleon seemed cheerful and contented during the whole day, and was even pleased with being fortunate at play, which he received as a good omen.

Upon the 15th October, 1815, the *Northumberland* reached St. Helena, which presents but an unpromising aspect to those who design it for a residence, though it may be a welcome sight to the sea-worn mariner. Its destined inhabitant, from the deck of the *Northumberland*, surveyed it with his spy-glass. St. James' Town, an inconsiderable village, was before him, enchased, as it were, in a valley, amid arid and scarped rocks of immense height; every platform, every opening, every gorge, was bristled with cannon. Las Cases, who stood by him, could not perceive the slightest alteration of his countenance. The orders of Government had been that Napoleon should remain on board till a residence could be prepared suitable for the line of life he was to lead in

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future. But as this was likely to be a work of time, Sir George Cockburn readily undertook, on his own responsibility, to put his passengers on shore, and provide in some way for the security of Napoleon's person until the necessary habitation should be fitted up. He was accordingly transferred to land upon the 16th October; and thus the Emperor of France, nay, well-nigh of Europe, sunk into the Recluse of St. Helena.

III

ST. HELENA.

Napoleon's life, until his health began to give way, was of the most regular and monotonous character. Having become a very indifferent sleeper, perhaps from his custom of assigning, during the active part of his life, no precise time for repose, his hours of rising were uncertain, depending upon the rest which he had enjoyed during the earlier part of the night. It followed from this irregularity that during the day-time he occasionally fell asleep, for a few minutes, upon his couch or arm-chair. At times, his favourite valet-de-chambre, Marchand, read to him while in bed, until he was composed to rest, the best remedy, perhaps, for that course of "thick-coming fancies", which must so oft have disturbed the repose of one in circumstances so singular and so melancholy. So soon as Napoleon arose from bed, he either began to dictate to one of his generals (Montholon or Gourgaud generally), and placed upon record such passages of his remarkable life as he desired to preserve, or, if the weather and his inclination suited, he went out for an hour or two on horseback. He sometimes breakfasted in his own apartment, sometimes with his suite, generally about ten o'clock, and almost always *à la fourchette*. The fore part of the day he usually devoted to reading, or dictating to one or other of his suite, and about two or three o'clock received such visitors as had permission to wait upon him. An airing in the carriage or on horseback generally succeeded to this species of levee, on which occasions he was attended by all his suite. Their horses, supplied from the Cape of Good Hope, were of a good race and handsome appearance. On returning from his airings, he again resumed the book, or caused his amanuensis take up the pen until dinner-time, which was about eight o'clock at night. He preferred plain food, and ate plentifully, and with an apparent appetite. A very few glasses of claret, scarce

amounting to an English pint in all, and chiefly drank during the time of dinner, completed his meal. Sometimes he drank champagne; but his constitutional sobriety was such that a large glass of that more generous wine immediately brought a degree of colour to his cheek. No man appears to have been in a less degree than Napoleon subject to the influence of those appetites which man has in common with the lower range of nature. He never took more than two meals a day, and concluded each with a small cup of coffee. After dinner, chess, cards, a volume of light literature, read aloud for the benefit of his suite, or general conversation, in which the ladies of his suite occasionally joined, served to consume the evening till ten or eleven, about which time he retired to his apartment, and went immediately to bed.

We may add to this brief account of Napoleon's domestic habits that he was very attentive to the duties of the toilet. He usually appeared in the morning in a white night-gown, with loose trousers and stockings joined in one, a chequered red Madras handkerchief round his head, and his shirt-collar open. When dressed, he wore a green uniform, very plainly made, and without ornament (similar to that which, by its simplicity, used to mark the sovereign among the splendid dresses of the Tuileries), white waistcoat, and white or hanken breeches, with silk stockings, and shoes with gold buckles, a black stock, a triangular cocked hat, of the kind to be seen in all the caricatures, with a very small tri-coloured cockade. He usually wore, when in full dress, dress, the riband and grand cross of the Legion of Honour.

Such were the personal habits of Napoleon, on which there is little for the imagination to dwell, after it has once received the general idea. The circumstance of the large portion of his time employed in dictation alone interests our curiosity, and makes us anxious to know with what he could have found means to occupy so many pages, and so many hours. The fragments upon military subjects, dictated from time to time to Generals Gourgaud and Montholon, are not voluminous enough to account for the leisure expended in this manner; and even when

we add to them the number of pamphlets and works issuing from St. Helena, we shall still find room to suppose either that manuscripts remain which have not yet seen the light, or that Napoleon was a slow composer, and fastidious in the choice of his language. The last conjecture seems most probable, as the French are particularly scrupulous in the punctilios of composition, and Napoleon, Emperor as he had been, must have known that he would receive no mercy from the critics upon that particular.

The avowed works themselves, fragments as they are, are extremely interesting in a military point of view; and those in which the campaigns of Italy are described contain many most invaluable lessons on the art of war. Their political value is by no means so considerable. Gourgaud seems to have formed a true estimation of them, when, in answer to Baron Sturmer's inquiries, whether Napoleon was writing his history, he expressed himself thus:—"He writes disjointed fragments, which he will never finish. When asked why he will not put history in possession of the exact fact, he answers, it is better to leave something to be guessed at than to tell too much. It would also seem that, not considering his extraordinary destinies as entirely accomplished, he is unwilling to detail plans which have not been executed, and which he may one day resume with more success." To these reasons for leaving blanks and imperfections in his proposed history should be added the danger which a faithful and unreserved narrative must have entailed upon many of the actors in the scenes from which he was lifting the veil. It is no doubt true that Napoleon seems systematically to have painted his enemies, more especially such as had been once his adherents, in the most odious colours, and particularly in such as seemed likely to render them most obnoxious to the ruling powers; but the same principle induced him to spare his friends, and to afford no handle against them for their past efforts in his favour, and no motive for taking from them the power of rendering him farther service, if they should be in a capacity to do so.

These considerations operated as a check upon the pen of the historian; and it may be truly said that no man who has written so much of his own life, and that consisting of such singular and important events, has told so little of himself which was not known before from other sources. But the present is not the less valuable; for there is sometimes as much information derived from the silence as from the assertions of him who aspires to be his own biographer; and an apology for, or vindication of, the course of a remarkable life, however partially written, perhaps conveys the most information to the reader, next to that candid confession of faults and errors, which is so very seldom to be obtained in autobiography.

Napoleon's Memoirs, together with the labour apparently bestowed upon his controversial pamphlets written against Sir Hudson Lowe, seems to have furnished the most important part of his occupation whilst at St. Helena, and probably also of his amusement. It was not to be expected that in sickness and calamity he could apply himself to study, even if his youth had furnished him with more stores to work upon. It must be remembered that his whole education had been received at the military school of Brienne, where, indeed, he displayed a strong taste for the sciences. But the studies of mathematics and algebra were so early connected and carried on with a view to the military purposes in which he employed them, that it may be questioned whether he retained any relish for prosecuting his scientific pursuits in the character of an inquirer into abstract truths. The practical results had been so long his motive, so long his object, that he ceased to enjoy the use of the theoretical means, when there was no siege to be formed, no complicated manœuvres to be arranged, no great military purpose to be gained by the display of his skill—but when all was to begin and end with the discussion of a problem.

That Napoleon had a natural turn for belles lettres is unquestionable; but his leisure never permitted him to cultivate it, or to refine his taste or judgment on such subjects. The recommendation which, in 1784, described

him as fit to be sent to the Military School at Paris, observes, that he is tolerably acquainted with history and geography, but rather deficient in the ornamented branches, and in the Latin language. At seventeen years of age, he joined the regiment of La Fère, and thus ended all the opportunities afforded him of regular education. He read, however, very extensively; but, like all young persons, with little discrimination, and more to amuse himself than for the purpose of instruction. Before he had arrived at that more advanced period when youths of such talent as his, and especially when gifted with such a powerful memory, usually think of arranging and classifying the information which they have collected during their earlier course of miscellaneous reading, the tumults of Corsica, and subsequently the siege of Toulon, carried him into those scenes of war and business which were his element during the rest of his life, and down to the period we now speak of.

The want of information which we have noticed, he supplied, as most able men do, by the assistance derived from conversing with persons possessing knowledge, and capable of communicating it. No one was ever more dexterous than Napoleon at extracting from individuals the kind of information which each was best qualified to impart; and in many cases, while in the act of doing so, he contrived to conceal his own ignorance, even of that which he was anxiously wishing to know. But although in this manner he might acquire facts and results, it was impossible to make himself master, on such easy terms, of general principles, and the connection betwixt them and the conclusions which they lead to.

It was no less certain that, though in this manner Napoleon could obtain by discoursing with others the insulated portions of information which he was desirous of acquiring, and though the knowledge so acquired served his immediate purpose in public life, these were not habits which could induce him to resume those lighter subjects of study so interesting and delightful in youth, but which an advanced age is unwilling to undertake, and slow to profit by. He had, therefore, never corrected

his taste in the belles letters, but retained his admiration for Ossian, and other books which had fascinated his early attention. The declamatory tone, redundancy of expression, and exaggerated character of the poetry ascribed to the Celtic bard suit the taste of very young persons; but Napoleon continued to retain his relish for them to the end of his life; and, in some of his proclamations and bulletins, we can trace the hyperbolical and bombastic expressions which pass upon us in youth for the sublime, but are rejected as taste and reason become refined and improved. There was indeed this apology for Napoleon's lingering fondness for Ossian, that the Italian translation, by Cesarotti, is said to be one of the most beautiful specimens of the Tuscan language. The work was almost constantly beside him.

Historical, philosophical, or moral works, seem more rarely to have been resorted to for the amusement of Longwood. We have, indeed, been informed that the only books of this description for which Napoleon showed a decided partiality were those of Machiavel and Montesquieu, which he did not perhaps consider as fit themes of public recitation; Tacitus, who holds the mirror so close to the features of sovereigns, he is said always to have held in aversion, and seldom to have mentioned without terms of censure or dislike. Thus will the patient sometimes leathe the sight of the most wholesome medicine. The French novels of the day were sometimes tried as a resource; but the habits of order and decency which Napoleon observed, rendered their levities and indelicacies unfitted for such society.

There remained another department of literature, from which the party at Longwood derived frequent resources. The drama occupied a considerable part of those readings with which Napoleon used to while away the tedious hours of his imprisonment. This was an indication that he still retained the national taste of France; where few neglect to attend the spectacle, in one form or another, during the space betwixt dinner and the reunion of society in the evening. Next to seeing his ancient favourite Talma, was to Napoleon the reading some of

those chef-d'œuvres to which he had seen and heard him give life and personification. He is himself said to have read with taste and effect, which agrees with the traditions that represent him as having been early attached to theatrical representations. It was in the discussions following these readings, which Las Cases has preserved with so much zeal, that Buonaparte displayed his powers of conversation, and expressed his peculiar habits and opinions.

Corneille and Racine stood much higher in his estimation than Voltaire. There seems a good reason for this. They wrote their immortal works for the meridian of a court, and at the command of the most monarchical of monarchs, Louis XIV. The productions, therefore, contain nothing that can wound the ear of the most sensitive sovereign. In the King of Denmark's phrase, they "have no offence in them".

With Voltaire it is different. The strong and searching spirit, which afterwards caused the French Revolution, was abroad at this time, and though unaware of the extent to which it might lead, the philosopher of Ferney was not the less its proselyte. There were many passages, therefore, in his works, which could not but be instantly applied to the changes and convulsions of the period during which Napoleon had lived, to the despotic character of his government, and to the plans of freedom which had sunk under the influence of his sword. On this account Voltaire, whose compositions recalled painful comparisons and recollections, was no favourite with Napoleon. The *Mahomet* of that author he particularly disliked, avowing, at the same time, his respect for the Oriental impostor, whom he accused the poet of traducing and misrepresenting. Perhaps he secretly acknowledged a certain degree of resemblance between his own career and that of the youthful camel-driver, who, rising from a mean origin in his native tribe, became at once the conqueror and the legislator of so many nations. Perhaps, too, he remembered his own proclamations while in Egypt, in the assumed character of a Moslem, which he was wont to term by the true phrase of *Charlatanerie*,

but adding, that it was charlatanerie of a high and elevated character.

The character of Cæsar was another which Napoleon always strove to vindicate. The French general could not be indifferent to the Roman leader, who, like himself, having at first risen into notice by his victories over the enemies of the republic, had, also like himself, ended the struggles between the patricians and plebeians of ancient Rome, by reducing both parties equally under his own absolute dominion; who would have proclaimed himself their sovereign, even by the proscribed title of king, had he not been prevented by conspiracy; and who, when he had conquered his country, thought of nothing so much as extending an empire, already much too large, over the distant regions of Scythia and Parthia. The points of personal difference, indeed, were considerable; for neither did Napoleon indulge in the gross debauchery and sensuality imputed to Cæsar, nor can we attribute to him the Roman's powers as an author, or the gentle and forgiving character which distinguished him as a man.

Yet, although Napoleon had something vindictive in his temper, which he sometimes indulged when Cæsar would have scorned to do so, his intercourse with his familiar friends was of a character the most amiable. It is true, indeed, that, determined, as he expressed himself, to be Emperor within Longwood and its little demesne, he exacted from his followers the same marks of severe etiquette which distinguished the Court of the Tuileries; yet, in other respects, he permitted them to carry their freedom in disputing his sentiments, or replying to his arguments, almost beyond the bounds of ordinary decorum. He seemed to make a distinction between their duty towards him as subjects, and their privileges as friends. All remained uncovered and standing in his presence, and even the person who played at chess with him sometimes continued for hours without sitting down. But their verbal intercourse of language and sentiments was that of free men, conversing with a superior, indeed, but not with a despot. Captain Maitland mentions a dispute betwixt Napoleon and General Bertrand. The

latter had adopted a ridiculous idea that £30,000 a year, or some such extravagant sum, was spent in maintaining the grounds and establishment at Blenheim. Napoleon's turn for calculation easily detected the improbability. Bertrand insisted upon his assertion, on which Buonaparte said with quickness, "*Bah! c'est impossible.*" — "Oh!" said Bertrand, much offended, "if you are to reply in that manner, there is an end of all argument;" and for some time would not converse with him. Buonaparte, so far from taking umbrage, did all he could to soothe him and restore him to good-humour, which was not very difficult to effect.

But although Napoleon tolerated freedoms of this kind to a considerable extent, yet he still kept in his own hands the royal privilege of starting the topics of conversation, and conducting it as he should think proper; so that, in some respects, it seemed that, having lost all the substantial enjoyment of power, he had become more attached than ever to the observance of its monotonous, wearisome, unprofitable ceremonial. Yet there might be a reason for this, besides the gratification of his own pertinacious temper. The gentlemen who inhabited Longwood had followed him from the purest motives, and there was no reason to suppose that their purpose would waver, or their respect diminish. Still their mutual situation compelled the deposed sovereign, and his late subjects, into such close familiarity, as might perhaps beget, if not contempt, at least an inconvenient degree of freedom betwixt the parties, the very possibility of which he might conceive it as well to exclude by a strict barrier of etiquette.

We return to Napoleon's habits of amusement. Music was not one of the number. Though born an Italian, and possessing something of a musical ear, so far, at least, as was necessary to enable him to hum a song, it was probably entirely without cultivation. He appears to have had none of the fanaticism for music which characterizes the Italians.

Neither was Napoleon, as we have heard Denon reluctantly admit, a judge or an admirer of painting. He had

some pretence to understand sculpture; and there was one painting in the Museum before which he used to pause, terming it his own; nor would he permit it to be ransomed for a very large sum by its proprietor the Duke of Modena. But he valued it, not on account of its merits, though a masterpiece of art, but because he had himself been the means of securing it to the Museum at a great sacrifice. The other paintings in that immense collection, however great their excellence, he seldom paid much attention to. He also shocked admirers of painting by the contempt he showed for the durability of the art. Being informed that a first-rate picture would not last above five or six hundred years, he exclaimed, "Bah! a fine immortality!" Yet by using Denon's advice, and that of other *savants*, Napoleon sustained a high reputation as an encourager of the arts. His medals have been particularly and deservedly admired.

In respect of personal exercise at St. Helena, he walked occasionally, and while strong, did not shun steep, rough, and dangerous paths. But although there is some game on the island, he did not avail himself of the pleasure of shooting. It does not indeed appear that he was ever much attached to field sports, although, when Emperor, he replaced the hunting establishment upon a scale still more magnificent, as well as better regulated, than formerly. It is supposed that he partook of this princely pastime, as it has been called, rather out of a love of magnificent display than any real attachment to the sport. We may here mention, in his own words, the danger in which he was once placed at a boar-hunt. The picture will remind the amateur of the pieces of Rubens and Schneider.

"Upon one occasion at Marli," said the Emperor, "at a boar-hunt, I kept my ground with Soult and Berthier against three enormous wild-boars, who charged us up to the bayonet's point. All the hunting-party fled; 'twas a complete military rout. We killed the three animals dead; but I had a scratch from mine, and had nigh lost my finger" (on which a deep scar was still visible). "But the jest was to see the number of men, surrounded with

their dogs, concealing themselves behind the three heroes, and crying at top of their throats, 'To the Emperor's assistance! save the Emperor! help the Emperor!' and so forth; but not one coming forward."

While on the subject of Napoleon's exercises, we may mention another danger which he incurred by following an amusement more common in England than in France. He chose at one time to undertake the task of driving a calash, six in hand, which he overturned, and had a severe and dangerous fall. Josephine and others were in the vehicle. The English reader cannot fail to recollect that a similar accident happened to Cromwell, who, because, as the historian says, he could manage three nations, took upon him to suppose that he could drive six fiery horses, of which he had just received a present; and, being as unsuccessful as Napoleon in later days, overturned the carriage, to the great damage of the Secretary Thurlow, whom he had placed inside, and to his own double risk, both from the fall, and from the explosion of a pistol, which he carried privately about his person." Buonaparte's sole observation, after his own accident, was, "I believe every man should confine himself to his own trade".

The chief resource of Napoleon at St. Helena, as we have already said, was society and conversation, and those held chiefly with the gentlemen of his own suite. This need not have been the case, had he been able in the present instance to command that temper which had not failed him under great misfortunes, but seemed now to give way under a series of petty quarrels and mortifications.

The governor and the staff belonging to him were, of course, excluded from the society of Longwood, by the terms on which Napoleon stood with Sir Hudson Lowe. The officers of the regiments which lay in the island might most probably have afforded some well-informed men, who, having been engaged in the recent war, would have occa-

sionally supplied amusing society to the Emperor and his suite. But they did not in general frequent Longwood. Dr. O'Meara observes that the governor had exerted his influence to prevent the officers from cultivating the acquaintance of the French; which Sir Hudson Lowe repels as a calumny; confuted by the declarations of the officers of the 53rd themselves. But admitting that no intimations were used of set purpose to keep asunder the British officers from the French prisoners, such estrangement naturally followed from the unwillingness of military men to go where they were sure to hear not only their commanding officer for the time, but also their country and its Ministers, treated with the grossest expressions of disrespect, while there was no mode of calling the person who used them either to account or to explanation.

The rank and character of Sir Pulteney Malcolm, who commanded the squadron upon the station, set him above the feelings which might influence inferior officers, whether of the army or navy. He visited Napoleon frequently, and was eulogized by him in a description, which (though we, who have the advantage of seeing in the features of Sir Pulteney those of an honoured friend, can vouch for its being just) may have been painted the more willingly because it gives the artist an opportunity of discharging his spleen, while contrasting the appearance of the admiral with that of the governor, in a manner most unfavourable to the latter. Nevertheless we transcribe it, to prove that Buonaparte could occasionally do justice, and see ~~desert~~ even in a Briton.

"He said he had seen the new admiral. . 'Ah! there is a man with a countenance really pleasing, open, frank, and sincere. There is the face of an Englishman. His countenance bespeaks his heart, and I am sure he is a good man: I never yet beheld a man of whom I so immediately formed a good opinion, as of that fine, soldier-like, old man. He carries his head erect, and

speaks out openly and boldly what he thinks, without being afraid to look you in the face at the time. His physiognomy would make every person desirous of further acquaintance, and render the most suspicious confident in him."

Sir Pulteney Malcolm was also much recommended to Napoleon's favourable judgment by the circumstance of having nothing to do with the restraints imposed upon his person, and possessing the power neither of altering nor abating any of the restrictions he complained of. He was fortunate, too, in being able, by the calmness of his temper, to turn aside the violent language of Buonaparte, without either granting the justice of his complaints or giving him displeasure by direct contradiction. "Does your Government mean," said Napoleon one day to the English admiral, "to detain me upon this rock until my death's day?"—"I am sorry to say, sir," answered Sir Pulteney, "that such I apprehend is their purpose."—"Then the term of my life will soon arrive," said Napoleon. "I hope not, sir," answered the Admiral; "I hope you will survive to record your great actions, which are so numerous that the task will ensure you a term of long life." Napoleon bowed, and was gratified, probably both as a hero and as an author. Nevertheless, before Sir Pulteney Malcolm left the island, and while he was endeavouring to justify the Governor against some of the harsh and extravagant charges in which Napoleon was wont to indulge, the latter began to appeal from his judgment as being too much of an Englishman to be an impartial judge. They parted, however, on the best terms, and Napoleon often afterwards expressed the pleasure which he had received from the society of Sir Pulteney Malcolm.

The colonists of St. Helena did not, it may be well supposed, furnish many individuals sufficiently qualified, by rank and education, to be admitted into the society

of the exile. They, too, lay under the same awkward circumstances which prevented the British officers from holding intercourse with Longwood and its inhabitants. The Governor, should he be displeased at the too frequent attentions of any individual, or should he conceive any suspicion arising out of such an intercourse, had the power, and, in the opinion of the colonists, might not want the inclination, to make his resentment severely felt. Mr. Balcomb, however, who held the situation of purveyor, with one or two other inhabitants of the island, sometimes visited at Longwood. The general intercourse between the French prisoners and the colonists was carried on by means of the French domestics, who had the privilege of visiting James' Town as often as they pleased, and whose doing so could infer no disadvantageous suspicions. But the society of Longwood gained no advantage by the intercourse with James' Town, although unquestionably the facility of foreign communication was considerably increased to the exiles. Their correspondence was chiefly maintained by the way of Bahia; and it is certain they succeeded in sending many letters to Europe, although they are believed to have been less fortunate in receiving answers.

It was to be expected, that some accession to the society of Longwood might have accrued from the residence of three gentlemen of rank (two of them, we believe, having ladies and a family) the commissioners of Austria, Russia, and France. But here also ceremonial interposed one of those bars, which are effectual, or otherwise, according to the opinion of those betwixt whom they are erected. The commissioners of the allied powers had requested to be presented to Napoleon. On their wish being announced, he peremptorily declined to receive them in their official capacity, disclaiming the right which the princes of Europe had to interfere with and countenance the custody of his person. On the other

hand, the commissioners, finding their public function disowned, refused to hold any communication with Longwood in their private capacity; and thus there were excluded from this solitary spot three persons whose manners and habits, as foreigners, might have assorted tolerably with those of the exile and his attendants.

The society of St. Helena receives a great temporary increase at the seasons when vessels touch there on their way to India, or on their return to Europe. Of course every officer and every passenger on such occasions was desirous to see a person so celebrated as Napoleon; and there might sometimes occur individuals among them whom he too might have pleasure in receiving. The regulation of these visits to Longwood seems to have been one of the few parts of the general system of which Napoleon made no complaints. He had a natural reluctance to gratify the idle curiosity of strangers, and the regulations protected him effectually against their intrusion. Such persons as desired to wait upon Napoleon were obliged to apply, in the first place, to the governor, by whom their names were transmitted to General Bertrand, as grand maréchal of the household, who communicated Napoleon's reply, if favourable, and assigned an hour at which he was to receive their visit.

Upon such occasions, Napoleon was particularly anxious that the etiquette of an imperial court should be observed, while the visitors, on the contrary, were strictly enjoined by the governor not to go beyond the civilities due to a general of rank. If, therefore, as sometimes happened, the introduction took place in the open air, the French part of the company attendant on Buonaparte remained uncovered, while the English replaced their hats after the first salutation. Napoleon saw the incongruity of this, and laid his orders on his attendants to imitate the English in this particular point. It is said that they did not obey without scruples and murmurs.

Those visitors who were permitted to pay their respects at Longwood were chiefly either persons of distinguished birth, officers of rank in the army and navy, persons of philosophical inquiry (to whom he was very partial), or travellers from foreign regions, who could repay, by some information, the pleasure which they received from being admitted to the presence of a man so remarkable. Of these interviews, some who enjoyed the benefit of them have published an account; and the memoranda of others we have seen in manuscript. All agree in extolling the extreme good grace, propriety, and appearance of benevolence with which Napoleon clothed himself whilst holding these levees; and which scarce left the spectators permission to believe that, when surprised by a fit of passion, or when choosing to assume one for the purpose of effect, he could appear the rude, abrupt, and savage despot which other accounts described him. His questions were uniformly introduced with great tact, so as to put the person interrogated at his ease, by leading to some subject with which he was acquainted, while, at the same time, they induced him to produce any stock of new or curious information which he possessed.

The Journal of Captain Basil Hall of the Royal Navy, well known by his character both in his profession and in literature, affords a pleasing example of what we have been endeavouring to express, and displays, at the same time, the powerful extent of Buonaparte's memory. He recognized the name of Captain Hall instantly, from having seen his father, Sir James Hall, Bart., when he was at the Military Academy of Brienne, to which visit Sir James had been led by the love of science, by which he was always distinguished. Buonaparte explained the cause of his recollecting a private individual, after the intervention of such momentous events as he had himself been concerned in. "It is not," he said, "surprising.

Your father was the first Englishman that I ever saw; and I have recollected him all my life on that account." He was afterwards minute in his inquiries respecting the Royal Society of Edinburgh, of which Sir James Hall was long President. He then came to the very interesting subject of the newly-discovered island of Loo-Choo; and Captain Hall gives an account of the nature of the interrogations which he underwent, which we will not risk spoiling by an attempt at condensing it.

"Having settled where the island lay, he cross-questioned me about the inhabitants with a closeness—I may call it a severity of investigation—which far exceeds everything I have met with in any other instance. His questions were not by any means put at random, but each one had some definite reference to that which preceded it, or was about to follow. I felt in a short time so completely exposed to his view that it would have been impossible to have concealed or qualified the smallest particular. Such, indeed, was the rapidity of his apprehension of the subjects which interested him, and the astonishing ease with which he arranged and generalized the few points of information I gave him, that he sometimes outstripped my narrative, saw the conclusion I was coming to before I spoke it, and fairly robbed me of my story.

"Several circumstances, however, respecting the Loo-Choo people, surprised even him a good deal; and I had the satisfaction of seeing him more than once completely perplexed, and unable to account for the phenomena which I related. Nothing struck him so much as their having no arms. '*Point d'armes!*' he exclaimed, '*c'est à dire point de canons—ils ont des fusils?*' Not even muskets, I replied. '*Eh bien donc—des lances, ou, au moins, des arcs et des flèches?*' I told him they had neither one nor other. '*Ni poignards?*' cried he, with increasing vehemence.—'No, none.'—'*Mais!*' said Buonaparte, clenching his fist, and raising his voice to a loud pitch, '*Mais! sans armes, comment se bat-on?*'

"I could only reply that, so far as we had been able to discover, they had never had any wars, but remained in a state of internal and external peace. 'No wars!' cried he, with a scornful and incredulous expression, as if the existence of any people under the sun without wars was a monstrous anomaly.

"In like manner, but without being so much moved, he seemed to discredit the account I gave him of their having no money, and of their setting no value upon our silver or gold coins. After hear-

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ing these facts stated, he mused for some time, muttering to himself, in a low tone, 'Not know the use of money—are careless about gold and silver.' Then looking up, he asked, sharply, 'How then did you contrive to pay these strangest of all people for the bullocks and other good things which they seem to have sent on board in such quantities?' When I informed him that we could not prevail upon the people of Loo-Choo to receive payment of any kind, he expressed great surprise at their liberality, and made me repeat to him twice, the list of things with which we were supplied by these hospitable islanders."

The conversation proceeded with equal spirit, in which it is singular to remark the acuteness of Napoleon in seizing upon the most remarkable and interesting facts, notwithstanding the hurry of a casual conversation. The low state of the priesthood in Loo-choo was a subject which he dwelt on without coming to any satisfactory explanation. Captain Hall illustrated the ignorance of the people of Loo-Choo with respect to all the world, save Japan and China, by saying they knew nothing of Europe at all—knew nothing of France and England—and never had even heard of his Majesty; at which last proof of their absolute seclusion from the world Napoleon laughed heartily. During the whole interview, Napoleon waited with the utmost patience until his questions were replied to, inquired with earnestness into every subject of interest, and made naturally a most favourable impression on his visitor.

"Buonaparte," says the acute traveller, "struck me as differing considerably from the pictures and busts I had seen of him. His face and figure looked much broader and more square, larger, indeed, in every way, than any representation I had met with. His corpulency, at this time universally reported to be excessive, was by no means remarkable. His flesh looked, on the contrary, firm and muscular. There was not the least trace of colour in his cheeks; in fact, his skin was more like marble than ordinary flesh. Not the smallest trace of a wrinkle was discernible on his brow, nor an approach to a furrow on any part of his countenance. His health and spirits, judging from appearances, were excellent; though at

this period it was generally believed in England that he was fast sinking under a complication of diseases, and that his spirits were entirely gone. His manner of speaking was rather slow than otherwise, and perfectly distinct: he waited with great patience and kindness for my answers to his questions, and a reference to Count Bertrand was necessary only once during the whole conversation. The brilliant and sometimes dazzling expression of his eye could not be overlooked. It was not, however, a permanent lustre, for it was only remarkable when he was excited by some point of particular interest. It is impossible to imagine an expression of more entire mildness, I may almost call it of benignity and kindliness, than that which played over his features during the whole interview. If, therefore, he were at this time out of health and in low spirits, his power of self-command must have been even more extraordinary than is generally supposed; for his whole deportment, his conversation, and the expression of his countenance, indicated a frame in perfect health, and a mind at ease."

The date of this meeting was 13th August, 1817.

In the above interview Buonaparte played a natural part. Upon another remarkable occasion, 1st July, 1817, when he received Lord Amherst and the gentlemen composing and attached to the embassy, then returning from China, his behaviour and conversation were of a much more studied, constrained, and empirical character. He had obviously a part to play, a statement to make, and propositions to announce, not certainly with the view that the seed he had sowed might fall into barren ground, but that it might be retained, gathered up, and carried back to Britain, there to take root in public credulity, and bear fruit sevenfold. He rushed at once into a tide of politics, declaring that the Russian ascendancy was to be the destruction of Europe; yet, in the same moment, proclaimed the French and English to be the only effective troops deserving notice for their discipline and moral qualities. Presently after, he struck the English out of the field on account of the smallness of the army, and insisted that, by trusting to our military forces, we were endangering our naval ascendancy. He then entered upon a favourite

topic—the extreme negligence of Lord Castlereagh in failing to stipulate, or rather extort, a commercial treaty from France, and to wring out of Portugal reimbursement of our expenses. He seemed to consider this as sacrificing the interest and welfare of his country, and stated it as such with a confidence which was calculated to impress upon the hearers that he was completely serious in the extravagant doctrines which he announced.

He failed, of course, to make any impression on Lord Amherst, or on Mr. Henry Ellis, third commissioner of the embassy, to whom a large portion of this violent tirade was addressed, and who has permitted us to have the perusal of his private journal, which is much more full on the subject of this interview than the account given in the printed narrative of the embassy which appeared in 1817.

Having stated Lord Castlereagh's supposed errors towards the state, Napoleon was not silent upon his own injuries. It was chiefly in his conversation with Lord Amherst that he dwelt with great bitterness on Sir Hudson Lowe's conduct to him in various respects; but totally failed in producing the conviction which he aimed at. It seemed, on the contrary, to the ambassador and his attendants, that there never, perhaps, was a prisoner of importance upon whose personal liberty fewer actual restraints had been imposed than on that of the late Sovereign of France. Mr. Ellis, after personal inspection, was induced to regard his complaints concerning provisions and wine as totally undeserving of consideration, and to regret that real or pretended anger should have induced so great a man to countenance such petty misrepresentations. The house at Longwood, considered as a residence for a sovereign, Mr. Ellis allowed to be small and inadequate; but, on the other hand, regarded as the residence of a person of rank living in retirement, being the view taken in England of the prisoner's con-

dition, it was, in his opinion, both convenient and respectable. Reviewing, also, the extent of his limits, Mr. Ellis observes that greater personal liberty, consistent with any pretension to security, could not be granted to an individual supposed to be under any restraint at all. His intercourse with others, he observes, was certainly under immediate surveillance, no one being permitted to enter Longwood, or its domains, without a pass from the governor; but this pass, he affirms, was readily granted, and had never formed any check upon such visitors as Napoleon desired to see. The restraint upon his correspondence is admitted as disagreeable and distressing to his feelings, but is considered as a "necessary consequence of that which he now is, and had formerly been". "Two motives," said Mr. Ellis, "may, I think, be assigned for Buonaparte's unreasonable complaints: The first, and principal, is to keep alive public interest in Europe, but chiefly in England, where he flatters himself that he has a party; and the second, I think, may be traced to the personal character and habits of Buonaparte, who finds an occupation in the petty intrigues by which these complaints are brought forward, and an unworthy gratification in the *tracasseries* and annoyance which they produce on the spot."

The sagacity of Mr. Ellis was not deceived; for General Gourgaud, among other points of information, mentions the interest which Buonaparte had taken in the interview with the embassy which returned to Britain from China, and conceived that his arguments had made a strong impression upon them. The publication of Mr. Ellis's account of the embassy dispelled that dream, and gave rise to proportional disappointment at St. Helena.

Having now given some account of the general circumstances attending Buonaparte's residence in St. Helena, while he enjoyed a considerable portion of health, of his mode of living, his studies and amusements, and having

quoted two remarkable instances of his intercourse with strangers of observation and intelligence, we have to resume, in the next chapter, the melancholy particulars of his decline of health, and the few and unimportant incidents which occurred betwixt the commencement of his sickness and its final termination.

Reports had been long current concerning the decline of Buonaparte's health, even before the battle of Waterloo; and many were disposed to impute his failure in that decisive campaign, less to the superiority of his enemies than to the decrease of his own habits of activity. There seems no room for such a conclusion. The rapid manner in which he concentrated his army upon Charleroi, ought to have silenced such a report for ever. He was subject occasionally to slight fits of sleepiness, such as are incident to most men, especially after the age of forty, who sleep ill, rise early, and work hard. When he landed at St. Helena, so far did he seem from showing any appearance of declining health that one of the British grenadiers who saw him exclaimed, with his national oath, "They told us he was growing old;—he has forty good campaigns in his belly yet". A speech which the French gentlemen envied, as it ought, they said, to have belonged to one of the Old Guard. We have mentioned Captain Hall's account of his apparent state of health in summer 1817; that of Mr. Ellis, about the same period, is similar, and he expresses his belief that Buonaparte was never more able to undergo the fatigues of a campaign than at the moment he saw him. Yet at this time, viz. July, 1817, Napoleon was alleging the decline of his health as a reason for obtaining more indulgence, while, on the other hand, he refused to take the exercise judged necessary to preserve his constitution, unless a relaxation of superintendence should be granted to him. It is probable, however, that he himself

felt, even at that period, the symptoms of that internal malady which consumed his life. It is now well known to have been the cruel complaint of which his father died, a cancer, namely, in the stomach, of which he had repeatedly expressed his apprehensions, both in Russia and elsewhere. The progress of this disease, however, is slow and insidious, if indeed it had actually commenced so early as 1817. Gourgaud, at a much later period, avowed himself a complete disbeliever in his illness. He allowed, indeed, that he was in low spirits to such an extent as to talk of destroying himself, and his attached followers, by shutting himself and them up in a small apartment with burning charcoal—an easy death, which Berthollet the chemist had, it seems, recommended. Nevertheless, "on the subject of General Buonaparte's health, General Gourgaud stated that the English were much imposed upon; for that he was not, as far as bodily health was concerned, in any degree materially altered, and that the representations upon this subject had little, if any, truth in them. Dr. O'Meara was certainly the dupe of that influence which General Buonaparte always exercises over those with whom he has frequent intercourse, and though he (General Gourgaud) individually had only reason *de se louer de Mr. O'Meara*, yet his intimate knowledge of General Buonaparte enabled him confidently to assert that his state of health was not at all worse than it had been for some time previous to his arrival at St. Helena."

Yet, as before hinted, notwithstanding the disbelief of friends and foes, it seems probable that the dreadful disease of which Napoleon died was already seizing upon the vitals, though its character was not decisively announced by external symptoms. Dr. Arnott, surgeon to the 20th regiment, who attended on Napoleon's death-bed, has made the following observations upon this important subject:

We are given to understand, from great authority, that this affection of the stomach cannot be produced without a considerable predisposition of the parts to disease. I will not venture an opinion; but it is somewhat remarkable that he often said that his father died of scirrhus of the pylorus; that the body was examined after death, and the fact ascertained. His faithful followers, Count and Countess Bertrand, and Count Montholon, have repeatedly declared the same to me.

"It then, it should be admitted that a previous disposition of the parts to this disease did exist, might not the depressing passions of the mind act as an exciting cause? It is more than probable that Napoleon Buonaparte's mental sufferings in St. Helena were very poignant. By a man of such unbounded ambition, and who once aimed at universal dominion, captivity must have been severely felt.

"The climate of St. Helena I consider healthy. The air is pure and temperate, and Europeans enjoy their health, and retain the vigour of their constitution, as in their native country."

Dr. Arnott proceeds to state that, notwithstanding this general assertion, dysentery and other acute diseases of the abdominal viscera prevailed among the troops. This he imputes to the carelessness and intemperance of the English soldiers, and the fatigue of the working-parties; as the officers, who had little night duty, retained their health and strength as in Europe.

"I can therefore safely assert," continues the physician, "that any one of temperate habits, who is not exposed to much bodily exertion, night air, and atmospherical changes, as a soldier must be, may have as much immunity from disease in St. Helena as in Europe; and I may therefore farther assert that the disease of which Napoleon Buonaparte died was *not* the effect of climate."

In support of Dr. Arnott's statement, it may be observed, that of Napoleon's numerous family of nearly fifty persons, English servants included, only one died during all their five years' residence on the island; and that person (Cipriani, the major-domo) had contracted the illness which carried him off, being a species of consumption, before he left Europe.

Dr. Arnott, to whose opinion we are induced to give great weight, both from the excellence of his character and his having the best opportunities of information, states that the scirrhus, or cancer of the stomach, is an obscure disease; the symptoms which announce it being common to, and characteristic of, other diseases in the same region; yet he early conceived that some morbid alteration of the structure of the stomach had taken place; especially after he learned that his patient's father had died of scirrhus of the pylorus. He believed, as already hinted, that the disease was in its incipient state, even so far back as the end of the year 1815, when the patient was affected with pain in the stomach, nausea, and vomiting, especially after taking food; which symptoms never left him from that period, but increased progressively till the day of his death.

From this period, therefore, Napoleon was in a situation which, considering his great actions, and the height of his former fortunes, deserved the compassion of his most bitter enemies, and the sympathy of all who were disposed to take a moral lesson from the most extraordinary vicissitude of human affairs which history has ever presented. Nor can we doubt that such reflections might have eventually led to much relaxation in the severity with which the prisoner was watched, and, it may be, at length to his entire emancipation. But to attain this end, it would have been necessary that Napoleon's conduct, while under restrictions, should have been of a very different character from that which he thought it most politic, or felt it most natural, to adopt. First, to obtain the sympathy and privileges due to an invalid, he ought to have permitted the visits of some medical person whose report might be held as completely impartial. This could not be the case with that of Dr. O'Meara, engaged as he was in the prisoner's intimate and even secret service, and on the worst terms with the

governor; and Napoleon's positive rejection of all other assistance seemed to countenance the belief, however unjust, that he was either feigning indisposition, or making use of some slight symptoms of it to obtain a relaxation of the governor's vigilance. Nor was it to be supposed that Dr. Antommarchi's evidence, being that of an individual entirely dependent on Napoleon, could be considered as more authentic, till corroborated by some indifferent, and, at the same time, competent medical authority.

Secondly, it is to be remembered that the fundamental reason on which Napoleon's confinement was vindicated, was that his liberty was inconsistent with the tranquillity of Europe. To prove the contrary, it would have been necessary that the ex-Emperor should have evinced a desire to retreat from political disputes, and shown symptoms of having laid aside or forgotten those ambitious projects which had so long convulsed Europe. Compassion, and the admiration of great talents, might then have led the states of Europe to confide in the resigned dispositions of one whom age, infirmities, and sufferings appeared to incline to dedicate the remainder of his days to ease and retirement, and in whom they might seem a sure guarantee for his pacific intentions. But so far were such feelings from being exhibited that everything which emanated from St. Helena showed that the ex-Emperor nourished all his former plans, and vindicated all his former actions. He was not satisfied that the world should adopt the opinion that his ambition was allayed, and his pretensions to empire relinquished. On the contrary, his efforts, and those of the works into which he breathed his spirit, went to prove, if they proved anything, that he never entertained ambition of a culpable character—that his claims of sovereignty were grounded upon national law and justice—that he had a right to entertain them formerly, and that he was

disposed and entitled to assert them still. He was at pains to let the world know that he was not altered in the slightest degree, was neither ashamed of his projects, nor had renounced them; but, if restored to Europe, that he would be in all respects the same person, with the same claims, and little diminished activity, as when he landed at Cannes to recover the empire of France.

This mode of pleading his cause had the inevitable consequence of confirming all those who had deemed restrictions on his freedom to be necessary in the outset (and these were the great majority of Europe), in the belief that the same reasons existed for continuing the restraint, which had originally caused it to be imposed. We are unwilling to revert again to the hackneyed simile of the imprisoned lion; but certainly, if the royal animal which Don Quixote desired to set at liberty had, instead of demeaning himself peaceably and with urbanity, been roaring, ramping, and tearing the bars of his cage, it may be questioned whether the Great Redresser of Wrongs himself would have advocated his freedom.

In November, 1816, Napoleon sustained a loss to which he must have been not a little sensible, in the removal of Count Las Cases from his society. The devoted attachment of the Count to his person could not be doubted, and his age and situation as a civilian made him less apt to enter into those feuds and quarrels which sometimes, notwithstanding their general attachment to Napoleon, seemed to have arisen among the military officers of the household of Longwood. He was of a literary turn, and qualified to converse upon general topics, both of history and science. He had been an emigrant, and understanding all the manœuvres and intrigues of the ancient noblesse, had many narrations which Napoleon was not unwilling to listen to. Above all, he received and recorded everything which was said by Napoleon, with undoubting faith and unwearied assiduity. And, like the author of

one of the most entertaining books in the English language (Boswell's *Life of Johnson*), Count Las Cases thought nothing trivial that could illustrate his subject. Like Boswell, too, his veneration for his principal was so deep, that he seems to have lost, in some cases, the exact perception of right and wrong, in his determination to consider Napoleon as always in the right. But his attachment, if to a certain degree tending to blind his judgment, came warm from his heart. The Count gave a substantial mark, also, of his sincerity, in dedicating to his master's service a sum of £4000, or thereabouts, his whole private fortune, which was vested in the English funds.

For our misfortune, as also for his own, since he must have considered his separation from Buonaparte as such, Count Las Cases had been tempted into a line of conduct inconsistent with the engagement he had come under with the other attendants of the ex-Emperor, not to hold secret communication beyond the verge of the island. The opportunity of a servant of his own returning to England, induced him to confide to the domestic's charge a letter, written upon a piece of white silk that it might be the more readily concealed, which was stitched into the lad's clothes. It was addressed to Prince Lucien Buonaparte. As this was a direct transgression, in a most material point, of the conditions which Count Las Cases had promised to observe, he was dismissed from the island and sent to the Cape of Good Hope, and from thence to Europe. His journal remained for some time in the hands of Sir Hudson Lowe; but, as we had formerly occasion to mention, alterations and additions were afterwards made, which, in general, are more vituperative of the Governor than the manuscript as it originally stood when the Count left St. Helena. The abridgment of the Count's stay at the island was much to be regretted, as his journal forms the best record, not only of Na-

pooleon's real thoughts, but of the opinions which he desired should be received as such. Unquestionably the separation from his devoted follower added greatly to the disconsolate situation of the Exile of Longwood; but it is impossible to suppress the remark that, when a gentleman attached to Napoleon's suite found himself at liberty thus to break through a plighted engagement in his chief's behalf, it sufficiently vindicated Sir Hudson Lowe for putting little faith in the professions made to him, and declining to relax any reasonable degree of vigilance which the safe custody of his prisoner seemed to demand.

The complaints of Napoleon and his followers produced, as they ought to have done, an inquiry into the personal treatment of the ex-Emperor, in the British Parliament; when the general reasoning which we have hinted at, joined to the exposure which ministers afforded of the exaggerated representations that had been made in the statements which had come from St. Helena, were found greatly to preponderate over the arguments of Napoleon's compassionate and accomplished advocate, Lord Holland.

The question came before the House of Lords, on 18th March, 1817. Lord Holland, in a speech of great good sense and moderation, disowned all attempts at persuading the House that the general line of policy adopted with respect to Napoleon should be changed. It had been adopted in contradiction to his (Lord Holland's) sentiments, but it had been confirmed by Parliament, and he did not hope to obtain a reversal of their judgment. But, if the confining Napoleon was, as had been alleged, a measure of necessity, it followed that necessity must limit what necessity had created, and, of course, that the prisoner should be treated with no unnecessary harshness. His lordship did not presume to state the reports which had reached him as absolute matters of fact, but only as rumours which demanded an inquiry, where the honour

of the country was so nearly concerned. Most of the allegations on which Lord Holland grounded his motion were contained in a paper of complaints sent by General Montholon. The particulars noticed in this remonstrance were circumstances which have been already adverted to, but may be here briefly noticed, as well as the answers by the British Government.

First, the restrictions upon the exercising-ground formerly allowed to Napoleon was alleged as a grievance. The climate of St. Helena, Lord Holland admitted, was good, but his lordship complained that the upper part of the island, where Longwood was situated, was damp and unhealthy. The inconvenience of the house was also complained of.

Lord Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary of State, replied to this charge that the general accounts of Longwood described it as healthy. It had been the usual country residence of the lieutenant-governor, which went far to show that the site could not be ineligible. The situation had been preferred by Napoleon himself, who was so impatient to take possession of it that he even wished to have pitched a tent there till the house could be cleared for his reception. The restriction of the bounds of exercise, he explained to have been caused by Napoleon's evincing some disposition to tamper with the inhabitants. He still had a circuit of eight miles, within which he might range unattended and uncontrolled. If he wished to go farther, he was at liberty to traverse the island, upon permitting an orderly officer to join his suite. His refusal to take exercise on such terms was not the fault of the British Government; and if Napoleon's health suffered in consequence, it was the result not of the regulations, which were reasonable and indispensable, but of his own wilfulness in refusing to comply with them.

The second class of exceptions taken by Lord Holland

was against what he considered as the harsh and iniquitous restrictions upon the exile's communication with Europe. He was not, his lordship stated, permitted to obtain books, or to subscribe for journals and newspapers. All intercourse by letter was interdicted to the distinguished prisoner, even with his wife, his child, and his nearest and dearest relatives. He was not allowed to write under seal to the Prince Regent.

Upon these several topics Lord Bathurst answered, that a list of books, the value of which amounted to £1400 or £1500 (which General Montholon termed a few books), had been sent by Napoleon to Britain; that the commissioners put this list into the hands of an eminent French bookseller, who had supplied as many as could be obtained in London and Paris, but several of them, chiefly works on military matters, could not be procured. The volumes which could be procured had been sent, with an apology for the omission of those which were not to be gotten; but the residents of Longwood had not admitted the excuse. Respecting the permission of a free subscription by Napoleon to journals, Lord Bathurst deemed it his duty to place some restriction upon that species of indulgence, attempts having been detected to establish a correspondence with Napoleon through the medium of newspapers. On the subject of intercourse with Europe by letter, Lord Bathurst stated that it was not interdicted, unless by the condition that Sir Hudson Lowe should previously be permitted to read the letter, whether of business or otherwise. This right, Lord Bathurst stated, had been exercised only by the governor in person, and with strict delicacy and feeling; and he repelled, with the most flat contradiction, the assertions of Montholon that the Governor of St. Helena had broken open and detained letters, under pretence that they did not come through the channel of the English Minister. Lord Bathurst said that General Montholon had been challenged

by Sir Hudson Lowe to produce a single instance of such tyranny having been permitted, but that the French general had remained silent, the assertion being absolutely false. All the letters which the relatives of Napoleon were disposed to send through his, Lord Bathurst's office, he said, should be instantly forwarded, but it was a necessary preliminary that such should be written. Now, a letter from his brother Joseph, which was received in October last, and instantly forwarded, was the only one from any of his family or relatives which had reached the office. His lordship then adverted to the regulation which enacted that even a letter to the Prince Regent must pass through the governor of St. Helena's hands in an open state. Lord Bathurst explained that the regulation gave the governor no authority or option as to transmitting the letter, which he was directed to forward instantly. The rule only required that Sir Hudson Lowe should be privy to the contents, in order that, if it should contain any impeachment of his conduct, his defence or apology might reach London as soon as the accusation. This, his lordship remarked, was necessary, in order that no time might be lost in redressing a complaint of a grave character, or in repelling any frivolous and unsubstantial charge. He added that, should any sealed letter be addressed to the Prince Regent by Napoleon, he, Lord Bathurst, would have no hesitation to open it, if the governor had not previously done so. He should conceive it to be his duty to forward it instantly as addressed, whenever he was acquainted with the contents; but being in his department responsible for the acts of the sovereign, he would feel it his duty to make himself previously acquainted with the nature of the communication.

Thirdly, Lord Holland touched on the inadequacy of the sum allowed for the maintenance of Napoleon, and of the unworthiness of making that personage contribute to bear his own charges. The Ministers, his lordship

stated, having placed him in a situation where great expense was necessary, turned round upon him, and insisted that he should himself be in a great measure at the charge of supporting it.

Lord Bathurst replied by stating the facts with which the reader is already acquainted. He mentioned that the sum of £8000 had been fixed upon as adequate, after the heavy expenses of the first year; and that it was increased to £12,000 on the remonstrance of Sir Hudson Lowe. This allowance, he said, was the same given to the governor, who had to bear the cost of frequent entertainments. It did not appear to Government that the family of Napoleon, which was to be maintained on the footing of that becoming a general officer of distinction, ought to cost more than that of Sir Hudson Lowe, who actually held that condition, with the necessity of discharging the expenses of his staff, and all other incumbent disbursements. He gave some details on the subject of the provisions and the cellar, from which it appeared, that, besides the inferior species of wine, the table of Napoleon was supplied at the rate of two bottles daily of those of a superior quality for each individual.

Lord Holland concluded with stating that although Queen Mary could be no otherwise regarded than as the bitterest enemy of the illustrious Elizabeth, yet the greatest stain upon the memory of the latter sovereign was not the unjust, for *unjust* it was not, but the harsh and ungenerous treatment of Mary. He reminded the House that it would not be considered by posterity, whether Buonaparte had been justly punished for his crimes, but whether Great Britain had acted in that generous manner which became a great country. He then moved for the production of such papers and correspondence betwixt St. Helena and the British Government, as should seem best fitted to throw light on the personal treatment of Napoleon.

It may be observed that, in the candid and liberal manner in which Lord Holland stated the case, he was led into a comparison unfavourable to his own argument. To have rendered the case of Mary (the justice of which his lordship admitted, in questioning its generosity) parallel to that of Napoleon, two remarkable circumstances were wanting. First, Mary, far from being at war with Queen Elizabeth, was ostensibly on the most friendly terms with that sovereign when she took refuge in England; secondly, the British Ministry testified no design to finish Napoleon's confinement by cutting off his head.

Lord Darnley, who had concurred with Lord Holland in desiring an inquiry, now considered the reports alluded to as totally refuted by the candid and able statement of Lord Bathurst, and was not of opinion that Lord Holland should press the motion farther. The Marquis of Buckingham's opinion was founded on the broad ground of Napoleon's delinquencies towards Europe, and England in particular. He was of opinion that every degree of restraint necessary to prevent his escape should be imposed and enforced. The severe and close durance to which General Buonaparte was subjected was not, his lordship said, dictated by motives of revenge, but of security. It was a piece of political justice which we owed to Europe, and the defeat of which would never be forgotten in this or in any other state of the civilized world.

The motion of Lord Holland does not appear to have been seconded, and was negatived without a division.

There can be no doubt that the failure of this effort in the British Senate had a deep effect on Napoleon's spirits, and may, perhaps, have aggravated that tendency to disease in the stomach, which was suspected to have already taken place. Nothing is better known, though perhaps few things are more difficult to be satisfactorily

explained, than the mysterious connection betwixt distress of mind and the action of the digestive powers. Violent sickness is produced on many persons by extreme and sudden affliction, and almost everyone feels the stomach more or less affected by that which powerfully and painfully occupies the mind. And here we may add that Lord Holland's kindness and compassion for so great a man, under such severe circumstances, were shown by a variety of delicate attentions on his part and that of his lady, and that the supplies of books and other articles sent by them through the Foreign Office, where every facility was afforded for the conveyance, continued from time to time to give Napoleon assurance of their sympathy. But though he gratefully felt their attentions, his distress of body, and perhaps of mind, assumed a character incapable of receiving consolation.

This unhappy state was kept up and prolonged by the extent to which Buonaparte indulged in determined opposition to the various regulations respecting the custody of his person; on which subject everything which occurred occasioned a struggle against the authority of Sir Hudson Lowe, or a new effort to obtain the Imperial distinctions which he considered as due to his rank.

The last point seems to have been carried to the length of childish extravagance. It was necessary, for example, that Dr. O'Meara should report to the governor of the island the state of the prisoner's health, which began to give room for serious apprehension. Napoleon insisted, that when this bulletin was rendered in writing, O'Meara, whom he considered as in his own service, should give him the title of Emperor. It was in vain that the Doctor remonstrated, pleading that the instructions of Government, as well as the orders of Lieutenant-general Lowe, prohibited him from using this forbidden epithet; and it was with difficulty that he at last prevailed that the word Personage or Patient might be substituted for the

offensive phrase of *General Buonaparte*. Had this ingenious device not been resorted to, there could have been no communication with the Government on the subject of Napoleon's health.

The physician of Napoleon had till now enjoyed an easy office. His health was naturally sound; and, like many persons who enjoy the same inestimable advantage, the ex-Emperor doubted of the healing powers of medicines which he never needed to use. Abstinence was his chief resource against stomach complaints, when these began to assail him, and the bath was frequently resorted to when the pangs became more acute. He also held it expedient to change the character of his way of living, when he felt affected with illness. If it had been sedentary, he rode hard and took violent exercise; and if, on the contrary, he had been taking more exercise than usual, he was accustomed to lay it aside for prolonged repose. But more recently he had not the wish to mount on horseback, or take exercise at all.

About the 25th of September, 1817, Napoleon's health seems to have been seriously affected. He complained much of nausea, his legs swelled, and there were other unfavourable symptoms, which induced his physician to tell him that he was of a temperament which required much activity; that constant exertion of mind and body was indispensable; and that without exercise he must soon lose his health. He immediately declared that, while exposed to the challenge of sentinels, he never would take exercise, however necessary. Dr. O'Meara proposed calling in the assistance of Dr. Baxter, a medical gentleman of eminence on Sir Hudson Lowe's staff. "He could but say the same as you do," said Napoleon, "and recommend my riding abroad; nevertheless, as long as the present system continues, I will never stir out." At another time he expressed the same resolution, and his determination to take no medicines. Dr. O'Meara replied

that, if the disease should not be encountered by remedies in due time, it would terminate fatally. His answer was remarkable:—"I will have at least the consolation that my death will be an eternal dishonour to the English nation, who sent me to this climate to die under the hands of ——" The physician again represented that, by neglecting to take medicine, he would accelerate his own death. "That which is written is written," said Napoleon, looking up. "Our days are reckoned."

This deplorable and desperate course seems to have been adopted partly to spite Sir Hudson Lowe, partly in the reckless feelings of despondency inspired by his situation, and in some degree, perhaps, was the effect of the disease itself, which must necessarily have disinclined him to motion. Napoleon might also hope that, by thus threatening to injure his health by forbearing exercise, he might extort the Governor's acquiescence in some points which were disputed betwixt them. When the Governor sent to offer him some extension of his riding ground, and Dr. O'Meara wished him to profit by the permission, he replied that he should be insulted by the challenge of the sentinels, and that he did not choose to submit to the caprice of the Governor, who, granting an indulgence one day, might recall it the next. On such grounds as these—which, after all, amounted just to this, that being a prisoner, and one of great importance, he was placed under a system of vigilance, rendered more necessary by the constant intrigues carried on for his escape—did he feel himself at liberty to neglect those precautions of exercise and medicine, which were necessary for the preservation of his health. His conduct on such occasions can scarce be termed worthy of his powerful mind; it resembled too much that of the froward child, who refuses its food, or its physic, because it is contradicted.

The removal of Dr. O'Meara from Napoleon's person, which was considered by him as a great injury, was the

next important incident in the monotony of his life. It seems, from quotations given elsewhere in this volume, that Dr. O'Meara had been for some time a confidant of Sir Hudson Lowe, and was recommended by him to Ministers as a person by whose means he could learn what passed in the family of Napoleon. But in process of time Dr. O'Meara, growing, perhaps, more intimate with the prisoner, became unwilling to supply the Governor with the information of which he had been formerly profuse, and a quarrel took place betwixt him and Sir Hudson Lowe. In describing the scenes which passed between him and the Governor, Dr. O'Meara writes with a degree of personal animosity which is unfavourable to his own credit. But his departure from St. Helena was occasioned by a warmer mark of the interest which he took in Napoleon's fortunes, than could be inferred from his merely refusing to inform Sir Hudson of what was said at Longwood.

Dr. O'Meara seems not only to have taken the part of Napoleon in his controversies with the Governor, but also to have engaged deeply in forwarding a secret correspondence with a Mr. Holmes, the ex-Emperor's agent in London. This appears to have been clearly proved by a letter received from the agent, relating to large remittances of money to St. Helena, by the connivance of the physician. Under such suspicions, Dr. O'Meara was withdrawn by the Governor's mandate from attending on the person of Napoleon, and sent back to England. Napoleon had never obeyed his medical injunctions, but he complained severely when he was recalled from his household, expressing his belief that the depriving him of the medical attendant, whose prescriptions he had never followed, was a direct and bold step in the plan contrived for murdering him. It is probable, however, he regretted Dr. O'Meara's secret services more than those which were professional.

Sir Hudson Lowe again offered the assistance of Dr. Baxter, but this was construed at Longwood into an additional offence. It was even treated as an offer big with suspicion. The governor tried, it was said, to palm his own private physician upon the Emperor, doubtless that he might hold his life more effectually in his power. On the other hand, the British ministers were anxious that everything should be done which could prevent complaints on this head. "You cannot better fulfil the wishes of His Majesty's Government" (says one of Lord Bathurst's despatches to the governor) "than by giving effect to any measure which you may consider calculated to prevent any just ground of dissatisfaction on the part of General Buonaparte, on account of any real or supposed inadequacy of medical attendance."

Dr. Stokoe, surgeon on board the *Conqueror*, was next called in to visit at Longwood. But differences arose betwixt him and the Governor, and after a few visits his attendance on Napoleon was discharged.

After this period the prisoner expressed his determination, whatever might be the extremity of his case, not to permit the visits of an English physician; and a commission was sent to Italy to obtain a medical man of reputation from some of the seminaries in that country. At the same time, Napoleon signified a desire to have the company of a Catholic priest. The proposition for this purpose came through his uncle, Cardinal Fesch; to the Papal government, and readily received the assent of the British ministry. It would appear that this mission had been thought by his Holiness to resemble, in some degree, those sent into foreign and misbelieving countries; for two churchmen were despatched to St. Helena instead of one.

The senior priest, Father Bonavita, was an elderly man, subject to the infirmities belonging to his period of life, and broken by a residence of twenty-six years

in Mexico. His speech had been affected by a paralytic stroke. His recommendation to the office which he now undertook was his having been father confessor to Napoleon's mother. His companion was a young abbé, called Vignali. Both were pious, good men, well qualified, doubtless, to give Napoleon the comfort which their Church holds out to those who receive its tenets, but not so much as to reclaim wanderers, or confirm those who might doubt the doctrines of the Church.

Argument or controversy, however, were not necessary. Napoleon had declared his resolution to die in the faith of his fathers. He was neither an infidel, he said, nor a philosopher. If we doubt whether a person who had conducted himself towards the Pope in the way which history records of Napoleon, and who had at one time been excommunicated (if, indeed, the ban was yet removed), could be sincere in his general professions of Catholicism, we must at least acquit the exile of the charge of deliberate atheism. On various occasions he expressed, with deep feelings of devotion, his conviction of the existence of the Deity, the great truth upon which the whole system of religion rests; and this at a time when the detestable doctrines of atheism and materialism were generally current in France. Immediately after his elevation to the dignity of First Consul, he meditated the restoration of religion; and thus, in a mixture of feeling and of policy, expressed himself upon the subject to Thibaudeau, then a counsellor of state. Having combated for a long time the systems of modern philosophers upon different kinds of worship, upon deism, natural religion, and so forth, he proceeded. "Last Sunday evening, in the general silence of nature, I was walking in these grounds (of Malmaison). The sound of the church-bell of Ruel fell upon my ear and renewed all the impressions of my youth. I was profoundly affected, such is the power of early habit and associations; and I

considered, if such was the case with me, what must not be the effect of such recollections upon the more simple and credulous vulgar? Let your philosophers answer that. The people must have a religion." He went on to state the terms on which he would negotiate with the Pope, and added, "They will say I am a Papist—I am no such thing. I was a Mahomedan in Egypt. I will be a Catholic here, for the good of the people. I do not believe in forms of religion, but in the existence of a God!" He extended his hands towards heaven—"Who is it that has created all above and around us?" This sublime passage proves that Napoleon (unfortunate in having proceeded no farther towards the Christian shrine) had at least crossed the threshold of the temple, and believed in and worshipped the Great Father of the Universe.

The missionaries were received at St. Helena with civility, and the rites of mass were occasionally performed at Longwood. Both the clergymen were quiet, unobtrusive characters, confining themselves to their religious duties, and showing neither the abilities nor the active and intriguing spirit which Protestants are apt to impute to the Catholic priesthood.

The same vessel which arrived at St. Helena on the 18th September, in 1819, with these physicians for the mind, brought with them Dr. F. Antommarchi, anatomic pro-sector (that is, assistant to a professor of anatomy) to the Hospital of St. Marie Neuve at Florence, attached to the University of Pisa, who was designed to supply the place about the prisoner's person, occupied by Dr. O'Meara, and after him provisionally by Dr. Stokoe. He continued to hold the office till Napoleon's death, and his *Account of his Last Moments*, a work in two volumes, though less interesting, and showing far less acuteness than that of Las Cases, or of O'Meara, is yet useful and entertaining, as relating to the last days of so extraordinary a person. Dr. Antommarchi seems to have been

acceptable to Napoleon, and the rather that he was a native of Corsica. He brought also news from his family. The Princess Pauline Borghese had offered to come to attend him. "Let her remain where she is," said Napoleon; "I would not have her witness the degrading state which I am reduced to, and the insults to which I am subjected."

It is needless to resume the subject of these alleged insults. They consisted in the precautions which Sir Hudson Lowe deemed himself obliged to take for the security of his prisoner, particularly in requiring that a British officer should be regularly made assured of his being at Longwood; and that an officer, not under the rank of captain, should attend him on the excursions which he proposed to make through the island. On these subjects Napoleon had made his mind up to a species of passive resistance, and had, as we have seen, already expressed himself determined to take no exercise, however indispensable to his health, unless the regulations of his confinement were entirely dispensed with, or modified according to his own pleasure. This was an argument *ad misericordiam*, which must have given the governor great distress and uneasiness; since, if the health of the prisoner should fail, even though it was through his own wilfulness, Sir Hudson could not expect that his conduct would escape censure. At the same time, if he yielded to this species of compulsory argument, it might be carried to an extent altogether inconsistent with the safe custody of the captive. His vigilance was also sharpened by constant reports of plots for the liberation of Napoleon, and the sums of money which he and his family had at their command rendered it dangerous to trust to the natural securities of the island. It is remarkable, too, that, in demanding, as a matter of right, freedom from the restrictions of which he complained, Napoleon never proposed any concessions on his part, by offer of his

parole or otherwise, which might tend to give any additional moral assurance, in place of those limitations which he desired to have removed. Yet, to accommodate himself in some degree to his prisoner's obstinacy, Sir Hudson Lowe was content that the British officer, whose duty it was to report on the presence of Napoleon at Longwood, should only be required to satisfy himself of it by such indirect opportunities as his walking in the garden, or appearing at the window, permitted him to enjoy, and on such occasions he was enjoined to keep his own person concealed. In this way there were days which passed without any regular report on this most important point, for which Sir Hudson Lowe would have been highly responsible if an escape had been effected. We beg to refer to Dr. Antommarchi's work for instances of the peculiar and grossly indelicate opportunities, which, to compound between the necessity of the case and the obstinacy of Napoleon, his attendants took to make his person visible when he was not aware of it.

Schemes for Napoleon's escape were not wanting. A Colonel Latapie, distinguished as a partisan officer, was said to be at the head of an attempt to carry him off from St. Helena, which was to be undertaken by a band of desperadoes from America. But Napoleon said he knew too well the character of such adventurers to hope to profit by them. Government had other information of attempts to be made from America, but none of them seem to have proceeded to any serious length.

It was different with the undertaking of Johnstone, a smuggler of an uncommonly resolute character, and whose life had been a tissue of desperate risks. He had made a memorable escape from Newgate, and had afterwards piloted Lord Nelson's vessel to the attack of Copenhagen, when the ordinary masters of the fleet, and pilots, declined the task. Johnstone was also said to have meditated a bold attempt to carry off Buonaparte on a

former occasion, when he trusted himself on the water for the purpose of visiting Flushing. And now he certainly engaged in a plot, to deliver Napoleon from St. Helena, of a very singular kind. A submarine vessel—that is, a ship capable of being sunk under water for a certain time, and of being raised again at pleasure by disengaging certain weights—was to be the means of effecting this enterprise. It was thought that, by sinking the vessel during the daytime, she might escape the notice of the British cruisers, and, being raised at night, might approach the guarded rock without discovery. The vessel was actually begun in one of the building-yards upon the Thames; but, the peculiarity of her construction having occasioned suspicions, she was seized by the British Government.

These, and others which we could name, were very perilous and wild attempts, yet calculated to keep vigilance alive; for in every case in which great natural difficulties had been surmounted by such enterprises, it has been because these difficulties have been too much relied upon. But while such precarious means of escape were presented from time to time, the chance upon which Napoleon secretly relied for release from his present situation was vanishing from his eyes.

His case was mentioned in the House of Commons, but incidentally only, on the 12th July, 1819. The subject was introduced into a debate on finance, when Mr. C. H. Hutchinson pointed out the yearly expense of detaining Napoleon at St. Helena, which he stated to amount to half a million sterling, as a useless expenditure of public money. In this statement he received no countenance from anyone except Mr. Joseph Hume. It was answered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and the expense was declared not to exceed a fifth part of the sum alleged. The leading members of Opposition seemed to take no interest in the question; and it was believed at St.

Helena that Napoleon's disappointment in the hopes which he had entertained of their strong and overpowering interposition in his behalf, first led to his mental depression and total abandonment of hope.

The complexion of the times, indeed, had become such as to strengthen every reason which existed for detaining him in captivity. The state of England, owing to the discontent and sufferings of the manufacturing districts—and more especially that of Italy, convulsed by the short-lived revolutions of Naples and Savoy—rendered the safe custody of Napoleon a matter of more deep import than it had been at any time since his fall. What the effect of his name might have produced in that moment of general commotion, cannot be estimated, but the consequences of his escape must have been most formidable.

The British Ministry, aware of the power of such a spirit to work among the troubled elements, anxiously enjoined additional vigilance to the governor of St. Helena:

"The overthrow of the Neapolitan government, the revolutionary spirit which more or less prevails over all Italy, and the doubtful state of France itself, must excite his attention, and clearly show that a crisis is fast approaching, if not already arrived, when his escape would be productive of important consequences. That his partisans are active, cannot be doubted; and if he be ever willing to hazard the attempt, he will never allow such an opportunity to escape. You will, therefore, exert all your attention in watching his proceedings, and call upon the Admiral to use his utmost vigilance, as upon the navy so much must ultimately depend."

The alarm was natural, but there was no real cause for apprehension. Politics and war were never more to know the powerful influence of Napoleon Buonaparte. His lost hopes aggravating the progress of the cruel disease, which had its course in the stomach, it now affected the whole frame, and undermined the strength

of the constitution. Death was now finally to terminate the fretful and degrading discussions, by which he inflicted, and from which he received, so much pain, and to open the gates of a prison for which Hope herself could scarce present another key. The symptoms of disorganization in the digestive powers became more and more apparent, and his reluctance to take any medicine, as if from an instinctive persuasion that the power of physic was in vain, continued as obstinate as ever. On one of the many disputes which he maintained on this subject, he answered Antommarchi's reasoning thus:—"Doctor, no physicking! We are, as I already told you, a machine made to live. We are organized for that purpose, and such is our nature. Do not counteract the living principle. Let it alone—leave it the liberty of defending itself—it will do better than your drugs. Our body is a watch, that is intended to go for a given time. The watchmaker cannot open it; and must, on handling it, grope his way blindfolded and at random. For once that he assists and relieves it by dint of tormenting it with his crooked instruments, he injures it ten times, and at last destroys it." This was on the 14th of October, 1820.

As the ex-Emperor's health grew weaker, it cannot be thought extraordinary that his mind became more and more depressed. In lack of other means of amusing himself, he had been somewhat interested in the construction of a pond and fountain in the garden of Longwood, which was stocked with small fishes. A mixture of copperas in the mastic employed in cementing the basin had affected the water. The creatures, which had been in a good measure the object of Napoleon's attention, began to sicken and to die. He was deeply affected by the circumstance, and, in language strongly resembling the beautiful verses of Moore, expressed his sense of the fatality which seemed to attach itself to him. "Everything I love—everything that belongs to me," he

exclaimed, "is immediately struck. Heaven and mankind unite to afflict me!" At other times he lamented his decay of energy. The bed, he said, was now a place of luxury, which he would not exchange for all the thrones in the universe. The eyes, which formerly were so vigilant, could now scarcely be opened. He recollected that he used to dictate to four or five secretaries at once. "But then," he said, "I was Napoleon—now I am no longer anything—my strength, my faculties forsake me—I no longer live, I only exist." Often he remained silent for many hours, suffering, as may be supposed, much pain, and immersed in profound melancholy.

About the 22nd January, 1821, Napoleon appeared to resume some energy, and to make some attempt to conquer his disease by exercise. He mounted his horse, and galloped, for the last time, five or six miles around the limits of Longwood, but nature was overcome by the effort. He complained that his strength was sinking under him rapidly.

The Governor had already transmitted to Britain accounts of Napoleon's decay of health, without having it, however, in his power to ascertain how far it was real, or how far the appearances were assumed. The patient would neither receive the visit of any English surgeon or physician, nor would he authorize the communication of Dr. Antommarchi with Sir Hudson Lowe. The Governor was obliged to state accounts of the prisoner's declining health as reports the reality of which he had no means of ascertaining. The generous feelings of the great personage at the head of the British Government were naturally deeply interested in the fate of the prisoner, and prompted him, by every means in his power, and especially by expressions of his own sympathy, to extend such hope and comfort to Napoleon as he could be supposed to receive under the necessity of his continued captivity. The following is Lord Bathurst's

despatch to Sir Hudson Lowe on this interesting subject, dated 16th February, 1821:—

“ I am aware how difficult it is to make any communication to the General which will not be liable to misrepresentation; and yet, if he be really ill, he may derive some consolation by knowing that the repeated accounts which have of late been transmitted of his declining health, have not been received with indifference. You will, therefore, communicate to General Buonaparte the great interest which his Majesty has taken in the recent accounts of his indisposition, and the anxiety which his Majesty feels to afford him every relief of which his situation admits. You will assure General Buonaparte that there is no alleviation which can be derived from additional medical assistance, nor any arrangement consistent with the safe custody of his person at St. Helena (and his Majesty cannot now hold out any expectation of his removal), which his Majesty is not most ready and desirous to afford. You will not only repeat the offer which has already been more than once made, of such further medical assistance as the island of St. Helena affords, but you will give him the option of procuring the attendance of any of the medical gentlemen who are at the Cape, where there is one, at least, of considerable eminence in his profession; and, in case of any wish being expressed by the General to receive such assistance, you will consider yourself authorized to make a communication to the Cape, and take such other measures as may be necessary to secure the immediate attendance of the person whom the General may name.

Napoleon had not the satisfaction to know the interest which his Majesty took in his illness, which would probably have afforded him some gleam of consolation. The tenor of the letter might, perhaps, have induced him to think, that his own system of pertinacious contest with the authorities, under whose charge he was placed, had been so far injudicious, as to lead to doubts of the reality of the disorder under which he was dying; and had therefore been one great cause of intercepting the sympathy, and perhaps the relief, which must otherwise have extended itself to a situation so well deserving of commiseration.

Towards the end of March the disease assumed a character still more formidable, and Dr. Antommarchi became desirous of obtaining a consultation with some of the

English medical men. The Emperor's aversion to their assistance had been increased by a well-meant offer of the Governor, announcing that a physician of eminence had arrived at the island, whom he therefore placed at General Buonaparte's devotion.¹ This proposal, like every other advance on the part of Sir Hudson Lowe, had been received as a meditated injury; "He wants to deceive Europe by false bulletins", said Napoleon; "I will not see anyone who is in communication with him." To refuse seeing every physician but his own, was certainly an option which ought to have been left in Napoleon's choice, and it was so left accordingly. But in thus obstinately declining to see an impartial medical man, whose report must have been conclusive respecting his state of health, Napoleon unquestionably strengthened the belief that his case was not so desperate as it proved to be.

At length the ex-Emperor consented that Dr. Antommarchi should consult with Dr. Arnott, surgeon of the 20th regiment. But the united opinion of the medical gentlemen could not overcome the aversion of Napoleon to medicine, or shake the belief which he reposed in the gloomy doctrines of fatalism. "Quod scriptum scriptum," he replied, in the language of a Moslem; "All that is to happen is written down. Our hour is marked, and it is not in our power to claim a moment longer of life than Fate has predestined for us."

Dr. Antommarchi finally prevailed in obtaining admittance for Dr. Arnott into the apartment and presence of the patient, who complained chiefly of his stomach, of the disposition to vomit, and deficiency of the digestive powers. He saw him, for the first time on 2nd April, 1821, and continued his visits regularly. Napoleon expressed his opinion that his liver was affected. Dr. Arnott's

¹ Dr. Shortt, physician to the forces, who, at this time, replaced Dr. Baxter as principal medical officer at St. Helena, and to whom we have been obliged for much valuable information.

observations led him to think that, though the action of the liver might be imperfect, the seat of the disease was to be looked for elsewhere. And here it is to be remarked, that Napoleon, when Dr. Antommarchi expressed doubts on the state of his stomach, had repelled them with sharpness, though his own private belief was that he was afflicted with the disease of his father. Thus, with a capricious inconsistency, natural enough to a sick-bed, he communicated to some of his retinue his sense of what disease afflicted him, though, afraid perhaps of some course of medicine being proposed, he did not desire that his surgeon should know his suspicions. From the 15th to the 24th of April, Napoleon was engaged from time to time in making his testamentary bequests. On the day last mentioned, he was greatly exhausted by the fatigue of writing, and showed symptoms of over-excitation. Among these may be safely included, a plan which he spoke of for reconciling all religious dissensions in France, which he said he had designed to carry into effect.

• As the strength of the patient gradually sunk, the symptoms of his disease became less equivocal, until, on the 27th April, the ejection of a dark-coloured fluid gave farther insight into the nature of the malady. Dr. Antommarchi persevered in attributing it to climate, which was flattering the wish of the patient, who desired to lay his death upon his confinement at St. Helena; while Dr. Arnott expressed his belief that the disease was the same which cut off his father in the pure air of Montpellier. Dr. Antommarchi, as usually happens to the reporter of a debate, silenced his antagonist in the argument, although Dr. Arnott had by this time obtained the patient's own authority for the assertion. Upon the 28th of April, Napoleon gave instructions to Antommarchi, that after his death his body should be opened, but that no English medical man should touch him, unless in the case of assistance being absolutely necessary, in which case

he gave Antommarchi leave to call in that of Dr. Arnott. He directed that his heart should be conveyed to Parma, to Maria Louisa; and requested anxiously that his stomach should be particularly examined, and the report transmitted to his son. "The vomitings", he said, "which succeed one another without interruption, lead me to suppose that the stomach is, of all my organs, the most diseased; and I am inclined to believe that it is attacked with the same disorder which killed my father—I mean a scirrhus in the pylorus." On the 2nd May, the patient returned to the same interesting subject, reminded Antommarchi of his anxiety that the stomach should be carefully examined. "The physicians of Montpellier had announced that the scirrhus in the pylorus would be hereditary in my family. Their report is, I believe, in the hands of Louis. Ask for it, and compare it with your own observations, that I may save my son from the sufferings I now experience."

During the 3rd May, it was seen that the life of Napoleon was drawing evidently to a close,* and his followers, and particularly his physician, became desirous to call in more medical assistance;—that of Dr. Shortt, physician to the forces, and of Dr. Mitchell, surgeon of the flagship, was referred to. Dr. Shortt, however, thought it proper to assert the dignity belonging to his profession, and refused (being under the same roof with the patient) to give an opinion on a case of so much importance in itself, and attended with so much obscurity, unless he were permitted to see and examine him. The officers of Napoleon's household excused themselves by professing that the Emperor's strict commands had been laid on them that no English physician, Dr. Arnott excepted, should approach his dying bed. They said, that even when he was speechless they would be unable to brook his eye, should he turn it upon them in reproof for their disobedience.

About two o'clock of the same day, the priest Vignali administered the sacrament of extreme unction. Some days before, Napoleon had explained to him the manner in which he desired his body should be laid out in state, in an apartment lighted by torches, or what Catholics call *une chambre ardente*. "I am neither," he said, in the same phrase which we have formerly quoted, "a philosopher nor a physician. I believe in God, and am of the religion of my father. It is not everybody who can be an atheist. I was born a Catholic, and will fulfil all the duties of the Catholic Church, and receive the assistance which it administers." He then turned to Dr. Antommarchi, whom he seems to have suspected of heterodoxy, which the doctor, however, disowned, "How can you carry it so far?" he said. "Can you not believe in God, whose existence everything proclaims, and in whom the greatest minds have believed?"

As if to mark a closing point of resemblance betwixt Cromwell and Napoleon, a dreadful tempest arose on the 4th May, which preceded the day that was to close the mortal existence of this extraordinary man. A willow which had been the Exile's favourite, and under which he had often enjoyed the fresh breeze, was torn up by the hurricane; and almost all the trees about Longwood shared the same fate.

The 5th of May came amid wind and rain. Napoleon's passing spirit was deliriously engaged in a strife more terrible than that of the elements around. The words "*tête d'armée*", the last which escaped his lips, intimated that his thoughts were watching the current of a heady fight. About eleven minutes before six in the evening, Napoleon, after a struggle which indicated the original strength of his constitution, breathed his last.

The officers of Napoleon's household were disposed to have the body anatomized in secret. But Sir Hudson

Lowe had too deep a sense of the responsibility under which he and his country stood, to permit this to take place. He declared that, even if he were reduced to make use of force, he would ensure the presence of English physicians at the dissection.

General Bertrand and Montholon, with Marchand, the valet-de-chambre of the deceased, were present at the operation, which took place on the 6th of May. It was also witnessed by Sir Thomas Reade, and some British staff-officers. Drs. Thomas Shortt, Archibald Arnott, Charles Mitchell, Matthew Livingstone, and Francis Burton, all of them medical men, were also present. The cause of death was sufficiently evident. A large ulcer occupied almost the whole of the stomach. It was only the strong adhesion of the diseased parts of that organ to the concave surface of the lobe of the liver, which, being over the ulcer, had prolonged the patient's life by preventing the escape of the contents of the stomach into the cavity of the abdomen. All the other parts of the viscera were found in a tolerably healthy state. The report was signed by the British medical gentlemen present. Dr. Antommarchi was about to add his attestation; when, according to information which we consider as correct, General Bertrand interdicted his doing so, because the report was drawn up as relating to the body of *General Buonaparte*. Dr. Antommarchi's own account does not, we believe, greatly differ from that of the British professional persons, though he has drawn conclusions from it which are apparently inconsistent with the patient's own conviction, and the ghastly evidence of the anatomical operation. He continued to insist that his late patron had not died of the cancer which we have described, or, in medical language, of scirrhus of the pylorus, but of a *chronic gastro hepatitis*, a disease he stated to be endemic in the island of St. Helena; although we do not observe it asserted or proved that the hospital

of the island, at any time, produced a single case like that of the deceased captive.

The gentlemen of Napoleon's suite were desirous that his heart should be preserved and given to their custody. But Sir Hudson Lowe did not feel himself at liberty to permit this upon his own authority. He agreed, however, that the heart should be placed in a silver vase, filled with spirits, and interred along with the body; so that, in case his instructions from home should so permit, it might be afterwards disinterred and sent to Europe.

The place of interment became the next subject of discussion. On this subject Napoleon had been inconsistent. His testamentary disposition expressed a wish that his remains should be deposited on the banks of the Seine; a request which he could not for an instant suppose would be complied with, and which appears to have been made solely for the sake of producing effect. The reflection of an instant would have been sufficient to call to recollection that he would not, while in power, have allowed Louis XVIII. a grave in the land of his fathers; nor *did* he permit the remains of the Duc D'Enghien any other interment than that assigned to the poorest outcast, who is huddled to earth on the spot on which he dies. But neither did the agitated state of the public mind now general through Italy recommend the measure.

A grave for the Emperor of France, within the limits of the rocky island to which his last years were limited, was the alternative that remained; and sensible that this was likely to be the case, he had himself indicated the spot where he wished to lie. It was a small secluded recess, called Slane's, or Haines' Valley, where a fountain arose at which his Chinese domestics used to fill the silver pitchers which they carried to Longwood for Napoleon's use. The spot had more of verdure and shade than any in the neighbourhood; and the illustrious Exile was often accustomed to repose under the beautiful weeping willows

which overhung the spring. The body, after lying in state in his small bedroom, during which time it was visited by every person of condition in the island, was, on the 8th May, carried to the place of interment. The pall which covered the coffin was the military cloak which Napoleon had worn at the battle of Marengo. The members of his late household attended as mourners, and were followed by the Governor, the Admiral, and all the civil and military authorities of the island. All the troops were under arms upon the solemn occasion. As the road did not permit a near approach of the hearse to the place of sepulture, a party of British grenadiers had the honour to bear the coffin to the grave. The prayers were recited by the priest, Abbé Vignali. Minute guns were fired from the admiral's ship. The coffin was then let down into the grave, under a discharge of three successive volleys of artillery, from fifteen pieces of cannon. A large stone was then lowered down on the grave, and covered the moderate space now sufficient for the man for whom Europe was once too little.¹

¹ In 1846, under Louis Philippe, with the consent of the British Government, Napoleon's body was removed to Paris, to rest under a stately tomb at the *Invalides*.

THE END.

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